G.R. No. 181284 - Unduran vs. Aberasturi

Case Summary (G.R. No. 181284)

Petitioner

The petitioners are the Department of Finance, represented by Secretary Cesar V. Purisima, and the Bureau of Customs, represented by Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon, seeking certiorari and prohibition to annul or restrain the RTC orders that restrained implementation of CPO 189‑2013.

Respondents

The respondents are the fifteen (of twenty‑seven) BOC personnel who filed the action for declaratory relief and injunctive relief before the RTC challenging their mass detail to the CPRO and the validity of the detailing order (CPO 189‑2013).

Key Dates

EO 140 signed: 2 September 2013.
EO 140 published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star: 17 September 2013 (Section 9 provided immediate effect upon such publication).
CPO 189‑2013 issued and dated: 17 September 2013 (detailing 27 BOC personnel to CPRO and stating it is “effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked”).
Petition for declaratory relief filed in RTC Manila: 30 September 2013.
72‑hour TRO issued by Executive Judge Dela Cruz: 1 October 2013.
TRO extended by Judge Laron‑Cacanindin to 20 days: Order dated 4 October 2013.
Hearing on preliminary injunction set: 18 October 2013; denial of preliminary injunction: Order dated 21 October 2013.
Petition for certiorari filed in the Supreme Court by petitioners: 21 October 2013.
Supreme Court decision (reported): August 24, 2015.

Applicable Law and Governing Principles

The Court applied the 1987 Constitution (decision date 2015) and relevant administrative and civil service rules cited by the parties and the ponencia, notably: Executive Order No. 140 (creating CPRO), Customs Personnel Order No. B‑189‑2013, the Omnibus Rules implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (defining “personnel action” and “detail”), Civil Service Commission (CSC) issuances (including CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 2002 and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19‑99), Article 2 of the Civil Code (effectivity of laws and executive issuances as amended by EO No. 200), Section 703 of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA No. 1937) on assignment of customs officers, and Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governing declaratory relief.

Antecedent Facts

EO 140 established CPRO within the DOF and provided that CPRO “shall be composed of its organic personnel, as approved by the DBM upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary, augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel as well as those detailed or seconded from other agencies.” EO 140’s Section 9 provided it would take effect immediately upon publication; it was published on 17 September 2013. On that same day Commissioner Biazon issued CPO 189‑2013 detailing 27 BOC personnel to CPRO, approved by Secretary Purisima. Fifteen of those detailed refused to report and filed a petition for declaratory relief and injunctive relief in the RTC, alleging among other things that the detail was ultra vires, premature because EO 140 had not taken effect, violated statutory provisions and security of tenure, and was indefinite in duration and therefore null.

Issues Presented

The Court framed four central issues: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the respondents’ action for declaratory relief; (2) whether respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing in the RTC; (3) whether EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code by its effectivity timing; and (4) whether CPO 189‑2013 was validly issued.

Ruling — Jurisdiction over the Action for Declaratory Relief

The ponencia recognized that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) has exclusive jurisdiction over personnel actions affecting civil service employees (appointments, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment, demotion, separation, etc.), as reflected in the Omnibus Rules and CSC rules. CPO 189‑2013 is a detailing order and therefore, on its face, a personnel action subject to CSC jurisdiction. However, respondents’ petition alleged constitutional and validity defects — specifically that CPO 189‑2013 was issued before EO 140’s effectivity, that the detailing intended to circumvent election‑period movement restrictions, and that CPO 189‑2013 was patently illegal and oppressive. The Court held that once respondents raised issues of validity and constitutionality that went beyond the pure personnel‑action character, the controversy transcended the exclusive administrative domain and could be cognizable by the RTC; accordingly the RTC did not abuse its discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the declaratory relief action.

Ruling — Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The ponencia reviewed the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and its numerous exceptions (e.g., where the challenged act is patently illegal, where judicial intervention is urgent, where the question is purely legal, etc.). Because respondents alleged that CPO 189‑2013 was patently illegal and unconstitutional, the Court concluded this case fell within the recognized exceptions and that respondents were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief in the RTC.

Ruling — Effectivity of Executive Order No. 140

Respondents contended EO 140 only took effect fifteen days after publication (i.e., 2 October 2013) under Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Court explained that Article 2 permits a different effectivity date “unless otherwise provided.” Section 9 of EO 140 expressly provided that the order “shall take effect immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” Because EO 140 was published on 17 September 2013, it became effective that day. The Court further noted that internal, interpretative regulations principally affecting agency personnel need not be published to be valid, and EO 140’s internal character supports its validity even without publication; nonetheless, EO 140 was published and was effective immediately on 17 September 2013.

Ruling — Validity of Customs Personnel Order No. B‑189‑2013

The Court ruled in favor of respondents on the validity of CPO 189‑2013 and found that CPO 189‑2013 was not validly issued. The principal grounds were: (1) EO 140 contemplated that CPRO would be composed of organic personnel approved by the DBM upon the DOF Secretary’s recommendation and that DOF and BOC personnel would augment and reinforce that organic core; at the time of the detailing, CPRO had neither an approved organic complement nor the DOF rules and procedures required by EO 140; (2) CPO 189‑2013 effected a mass detail before there existed any organic personnel to augment or reinforce, contrary to the structure EO 140 prescribed; and (3) CPO 189‑2013 left the detail indefinite by stating it was “effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked,” without fixing a period, whereas CSC policy (Resolution No.

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 181284)

Parties and Caption

Petitioners:
- Department of Finance, represented by Secretary Cesar V. Purisima (in his official capacity).
- Bureau of Customs, represented by Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon (in his official capacity).
Respondents:
- Hon. Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr., in his capacity as Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila.
- Hon. Felicitas O. Laron-Cacanindin, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 17.
- Private respondents: Ronnie C. Silvestre; Edward P. Dela Cuesta; Rogel C. Gatchalian; Imelda D. Cruz; Lilibeth S. Sandag; Raymond P. Ventura; Ma. Liza S. Torres; Arnel C. Alcaraz; Ma. Lourdes V. Mangaoang; Francis Agustin Y. Erpe; Carlos T. So; Marietta D. Zamoranos; Carmelita M. Talusan; Arefiles H. Carreon; Romalino G. Valdez.
Case citation and bench:
- 767 Phil. 611, Second Division, G.R. No. 209331, August 24, 2015.
- Majority opinion penned by Justice Carpio; Peralta, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur; Justice Leonen files a separate dissenting opinion.

Nature of the Case and Relief Sought

The petition is for certiorari and prohibition, assailing RTC Manila, Branch 17, Order dated 4 October 2013 extending a 72-hour temporary restraining order (TRO) to 20 days (until 21 October 2013) without the need for posting bond, in Civil Case No. 13-130820.
Petitioners sought from the Supreme Court the annulment of the RTC orders and prayed for issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to enjoin enforcement of Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 and related RTC acts.
Respondents (private employees) earlier filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction before RTC Manila; they challenged CPO No. B-189-2013 and sought injunctive relief against its implementation.

Antecedent Facts — Executive Order No. 140 and CPO No. B-189-2013

Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) was issued on 2 September 2013, creating the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of Finance (DOF).
EO 140’s stated function: CPRO "shall be responsible for reviewing the customs administration policies, rules and procedures, and thereafter providing sound recommendations for the improvement of the same."
Section 3 of EO 140: CPRO "shall be composed of its organic personnel, as approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) upon recommendation of the DOF Secretary, augmented and reinforced by DOF and BOC personnel as well as those detailed or seconded from other agencies, whether attached to the DOF or not."
Section 9 of EO 140: the Order "shall take effect immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation."
EO 140 was published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013.
On the same date of publication (17 September 2013), BOC Commissioner Biazon issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-2013), detailing 27 BOC personnel (Collectors of Customs V and VI, including the private respondents) to CPRO, declaring the order "effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked."
CPO 189-2013 was approved by DOF Secretary Purisima.

Procedural History in the Lower Courts

On 30 September 2013, respondents filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before RTC Manila (docketed Civil Case No. 13-130820).
On 1 October 2013, Executive Judge Marino M. Dela Cruz, Jr. issued a 72-hour TRO enjoining petitioners from implementing CPO 189-2013.
The case was raffled to Judge Felicitas O. Laron-Cacanindin (Branch 17). On 4 October 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin extended the 72-hour TRO for 20 days (until 21 October 2013) without requiring a bond and set a hearing for preliminary injunction on 18 October 2013.
On 21 October 2013, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Supreme Court, seeking interim relief; Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied respondents’ application for a preliminary injunction in an Order dated 21 October 2013.
In an Order dated 5 November 2013, Judge Laron-Cacanindin inhibited herself from further hearing the case.
Among the 27 affected BOC personnel, 12 complied with the CPO and reported; 15 refused and filed the RTC petition. After the denial of the preliminary injunction, six of the fifteen later reported to CPRO to avoid charges of insubordination.

Legal Issues Framed by the Court

Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents.
Whether respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing their action with the RTC.
Whether EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective immediately upon publication.
Whether Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 was validly issued.

Governing Statutes, Rules, and Authorities Quoted or Applied

Constitution provisions concerning the Civil Service Commission (Article IX-B): the CSC as central personnel agency, with quasi-judicial powers, and its mandate to administer the civil service.
Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), Book V, Title I: definitions of personnel action and related provisions.
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 — personnel action definition and Section 8, Rule VII on detail.
Section 703 of Republic Act No. 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code) on assignment of customs officers and employees.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99 (1999), Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — jurisdictional divisions among Commission Proper, Regional Offices, and Heads of Agencies.
CSC Resolution No. 02-1181 (Policies on Detail, 13 September 2002) — maximum period of detail generally one year unless consented otherwise.
Article 2 of the Civil Code as amended by Executive Order No. 200 concerning effectivity of laws (15 days rule) and the proviso allowing a different effectivity where provided.
Relevant Supreme Court precedents cited: Corsiga v. Judge Defensor; Olanda v. Bugayong; Mantala v. Salvador; Hypermix Feeds Corporation; Department of Agrarian Reform v. Trinidad Valley Realty & Development Corporation; TaAada v. Tuvera; and other cases on exhaustion of remedies, primary administrative jurisdiction, requisites for declaratory relief, and the doctrine of breach prior to filing.

Majority’s Analysis — Jurisdiction Over the Petition

Acknowledgement of the CSC’s broad and exclusive jurisdiction over personnel actions in the civil service, as established by Constitution, E.O. 292, and implementing Omnibus Rules.
Definition of "detail" under Omnibus Rules (Section 8, Rule VII): a temporary movement of an employee from one department or agency to another, not involving reduction in rank or salary, and not requiring issuance of another appointment.
Recognition that CPO 189-2013 is an order detailing BOC personnel to CPRO and that respondents’ core grievance concerns a personnel action (detail and reassignment), ordinarily within CSC jurisdiction.
Determination that the petition filed before the RTC went beyond a mere personnel-action protest because respondents also assailed the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013 (including allegations that CPO 189-2013 was issued before EO 140 took effect and was used to beat the COMELEC ban on personnel movement).
The majority’s view: when the challenged act raises issues of validity and constitutionality, the matter transcends the exclusive personnel-action remit of the CSC and may be cognizable by the RTC; therefore, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the action.

Majority’s Analysis — Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Statement of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: administrative agencies