Title
Department of Education vs. Cua
Case
G.R. No. 169013
Decision Date
Dec 16, 2008
A school principal accused of sexual harassment was exonerated by the CSC, but DepEd's untimely appeal led to his dismissal. SC upheld CA, citing due process violations and finality of judgments.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 169013)

Factual Background

On March 11, 1996, two complaints for sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming a public officer were filed with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports – Regional Office No. III against Godofredo G. Cuanan, then Principal of Lawang Kupang Elementary School. An Investigating Committee convened by Regional Director Vilma L. Labrador found Cuanan guilty and recommended forced resignation, and Regional Director Labrador issued a Decision on January 28, 2000 imposing forced resignation without prejudice to benefits. Secretary Andrew Gonzales affirmed that Decision on April 13, 2000, and denied Cuanan’s petition for reconsideration on June 19, 2000.

Proceedings Before the Civil Service Commission

Cuanan appealed to the CSC which, by Resolution No. 030069 dated January 20, 2003, set aside the June 19, 2000 resolution and exonerated him from the charge of sexual harassment. Copies of Resolution No. 030069 were sent to the parties on January 23, 2003; Cuanan received his copy on January 31, 2003. Cuanan thereafter requested reinstatement and the local division and regional offices processed endorsements recommending reinstatement subject to the finality of the CSC resolution.

DepEd’s Renewed Action and Reinstatement

The DepEd sought a copy of CSC Resolution No. 030069 in March 2003 and received a reference copy on March 28, 2003. On April 11, 2003, Secretary Edilberto C. de Jesus filed a Petition for Review/Reconsideration with the CSC; no copy of that pleading was served upon Cuanan. A Supplemental Petition was filed on July 29, 2003. Meanwhile, division orders declared Cuanan reinstated effective April 30, 2003 and directed his return to duty in July 2003, after which he requested inclusion in the payroll and payment of salaries.

CSC Resolution No. 041147 and Litigation in the Court of Appeals

On October 22, 2004, the CSC issued Resolution No. 041147 which set aside Resolution No. 030069 and found Cuanan guilty of Sexual Harassment, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, imposing dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of service eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Cuanan received a copy of the resolution on November 9, 2004, and filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on November 22, 2004 seeking annulment of CSC Resolution No. 041147 on grounds including lack of standing by DepEd to seek reconsideration, lateness of the petition, and failure to afford him procedural due process by serving copies of pleadings. The Court of Appeals granted the petition on May 16, 2005, set aside CSC Resolution No. 041147, and denied DepEd’s motion for reconsideration on July 18, 2005.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The petition to the Supreme Court raised two principal questions: whether the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari as an improper remedy in assailing CSC Resolution No. 041147, and whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 041147.

Parties’ Contentions

DepEd argued that the proper remedy from a CSC decision is a petition for review under Rule 43, that a motion for reconsideration is a precondition to Rule 65 certiorari, that DepEd as not being the complainant could nonetheless question the resolution, that the petition for review/reconsideration was seasonably filed, and that the CSC was not bound by the procedural rules in question. Cuanan contended that DepEd had no standing to seek reconsideration because it was not the complainant and not an adversely affected party, or that, if it had standing, the petition was filed out of time; he also asserted that his right to due process was violated because he was not furnished copies of the pleadings and was not given the opportunity to comment.

Court of Appeals’ Ruling

The Court of Appeals held that although remedies by motion for reconsideration and by petition for review under Rule 43 were available, certiorari under Rule 65 was warranted because the act complained of was patently illegal. The CA found grave abuse of discretion by the CSC in accepting and acting upon DepEd’s petition for review/reconsideration without furnishing Cuanan with copies of the pleadings or requiring him to comment, and it concluded that the DepEd failed to establish that the earlier CSC resolution was not yet final and executory when it sought reconsideration.

Supreme Court’s Analysis on DepEd’s Standing

The Supreme Court examined whether DepEd could seek reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 030069 and affirmed that the disciplining authority qualifies as a party adversely affected and may appeal a judgment of exoneration. The Court relied on Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., and CSC Resolution No. 021600 Section 2(l) to conclude that the DepEd, as the appointing and disciplining authority, was a real party in interest and had authority to file a motion for reconsideration.

Supreme Court’s Analysis on Proper Remedy and Exceptions

The Court reiterated that the ordinary remedy from a CSC resolution is a petition for review under Rule 43 within fifteen days, and that recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is ordinarily improper. The Court, however, identified recognized exceptions permitting certiorari, including where the writs issued are null and void or where proceedings are a nullity for lack of due process. The Court held that exception (c) applied and further observed that the petition filed in the CA could be treated as a petition for review because it was filed within the 15-day reglementary period, thereby giving effect to the remedial rules in a manner that advances substantial justice.

Supreme Court’s Analysis on Finality and Due Process

The Court found that CSC Resolution No. 030069 had become final and executory because copies were mailed to the parties on January 23, 2003 and Cuanan received his copy on January 31, 2003, while DepEd’s later request for a copy in March 2003 did not rebut the presumption under Section 3, Rule 131 that official duty has been regularly performed. The Court emphasized that once finality attaches a judgment is immutable, citing Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo. The Court further held that administrative bodies are bound to observe fundamental requirements of due process, citing Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, and that Section 43.A of the URACCS requires that pleadings filed with the Commission be copy furnished the other party with proof of service and restricts supplemental pleadings to a procedure that affords notice and opportunity to comment. Because no copy of DepEd’s petition for review/reconsideration or supplemental pleading was served upon Cuanan and he was not required to file comments, the Court concluded that Cuanan was denied procedural due process and that the pleadings not served upon him should not have been considered by the CSC.

Supreme Court’s Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition of Department of Education and affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87499. The Court sustained the CA’s finding that the CSC gravely abused its discretion by entertaining and deciding on DepEd’s plead

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