Title
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 113220-21
Decision Date
Jan 21, 1997
Farmworkers claimed cultivation rights over disputed land; PARAD issued TRO, DARAB overstepped with SQO. Court upheld PARAD's jurisdiction, nullified DARAB's order, emphasizing procedural adherence.
disputed land
legal battle
temporary restraining orders

Case Summary (G.R. No. 113220-21)

Factual Background: The ABOGNE Case Before the PARAD

In CA-G.R. SP No. 30474, the private respondents—Salvador O. Abogne, Artemio Catamora, and Raul Ordan—filed on 10 March 1993 a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) at Teresa, Rizal, docketed as PARAD Case No. IV-0075-93. They sought an order maintaining them in peaceful possession and cultivation of a portion of the land said to total twelve hectares within the larger 45-hectare tract. They alleged that they were farmworkers and occupant-tillers of the land; that the area was agricultural; that they invested efforts and money cultivating and planting fruit trees and root crops; and that on 4 March 1993 the portion being cultivated was bulldozed at the instance of Federico Balanon and others acting for BSB Construction, destroying their improvements. They prayed for a restraining order to stop further bulldozing and to maintain the status quo.

On the same date of filing, PARAD Fe Arche-Manalang issued an order enjoining BSB Construction and all persons representing it to cease and desist from any further bulldozing and development activities on the property under litigation or from committing acts disturbing the status quo.

Petitioners’ Challenge and the Certiorari Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 30474

On 12 March 1993, the petitioners filed with the DARAB a complaint to nullify the PARAD restraining order. They argued that the land was not agricultural but residential; that the private respondents were not tenant-farmers but mere squatters; that a criminal case for illegal conversion of agricultural land was filed by private respondents against Federico Balanon; and that Atty. Inlayo and PARAD Fe Arche-Manalang acted maliciously and conspired in issuing the restraining order without first hearing petitioners.

Without waiting for the DARAB complaint’s resolution, on 19 March 1993 the petitioners filed a certiorari petition with the Court of Appeals, essentially reiterating the same allegations and seeking annulment of the PARAD restraining order on jurisdictional and grave-abuse-of-discretion grounds.

Factual Background: The BEA Case Before the DARAB and the DARAB Status Quo Order

In CA-G.R. SP No. 31179, after the Court of Appeals had taken cognizance of CA-G.R. SP No. 30474, another group of private respondents—Lourdes Bea, Benjamin Enriquez, and Natividad Enriquez—filed a complaint with the DARAB against BSB Construction, represented by Federico Balanon. They claimed the same right to cultivate the same portion of land being developed or bulldozed, alleging they were farmworkers and occupant-tillers, had invested money and effort to develop the area agriculturally, and that on 4 March 1993 bulldozing by BSB Construction destroyed their crops and threatened further bulldozing that would eject them.

They sought immediate protection through a restraining order because they feared great and irreparable damage to their source of livelihood. On 6 May 1993, the DARAB issued a status quo order, directing BSB Construction and those acting under its command not to bulldoze or scrape fruit-bearing trees and root crops; not to harass or disturb the private respondents’ peaceful possession; and directing relevant sheriffs and agrarian reform officers and the Philippine National Police unit to ensure peaceful possession during the pendency of the litigation, with a compliance report to be submitted within five days.

The DARAB explained that the status quo order was issued to protect both parties pending resolution of the PARAD’s adjudication of the underlying case in PARAD Case No. IV-RI-0075-93.

The Court of Appeals’ Dispositions in Both Petitions Below

Before the Court of Appeals, private respondents sought the annulment of the PARAD TRO and of the DARAB status quo order, asserting that: the land was not covered by the CARL because it had been declared outside P.D. No. 27 by former Minister Conrado Estrella as early as 1983 and converted into residential land before R.A. No. 6657 took effect, supported by Development Permits issued by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission; the claimants below were mere squatters; the complaint allegedly failed to show prima facie entitlement to injunctive relief; an opinion from the Secretary of Justice indicated R.A. No. 6657 did not cover land previously classified as residential in town plans and zoning ordinances approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board; and the DARAB status quo order, having been issued despite the Court of Appeals’ due course in CA-G.R. SP No. 30474, constituted disrespect to the rule of law.

In its Decision dated 23 September 1993, the Court of Appeals dismissed the certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 30474 and upheld the validity of the PARAD TRO. It reasoned that the allegations in the complaint showed the necessity for the TRO; respondents’ defenses were matters of defense; and the propriety of the TRO had become moot after the TRO’s 20-day lifetime expired.

As to CA-G.R. SP No. 31179, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, nullified the DARAB status quo order and all proceedings in DARAB Case No. 0100-93 (Reg. Case No. IV-RI-0075), including an order of arrest dated 15 July 1993. It held that the DARAB acted on a matter over which it had no jurisdiction because the case was effectively already pending before the PARAD. It stressed that the DARAB could not interfere by simultaneously acting with the PARAD over the same controversy; that issuing the status quo order was a violation of the orderly procedure required by the agrarian procedural rules; and that once the DARAB order was void, the DARAB had no power to order arrest for violation of that void order.

In its Resolution of 27 December 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the petitioners’ partial motion for reconsideration. It maintained that the ten-day period it directed for the PARAD to resolve the application for a writ of preliminary injunction derived from the Court of Appeals’ supervisory power in certiorari cases, and it was necessary to prevent an unfair indefinite restraint.

Petitioners’ Issues Before the Supreme Court

The petitioners then filed the Supreme Court petition, asserting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in: first, the Court of Appeals’ direction in CA-G.R. SP No. 30474 that the incident pending in the ABOGNE Case be resolved within ten days from notice; and second, the Court of Appeals’ declaration in CA-G.R. SP No. 31179 that all proceedings in the BEA Case were null and void.

As to the ten-day directive, petitioners argued that in certiorari the specific supervisory act converted into an independent remedy for noncompliance and thus should not be treated as an incident of supervision; that the restraining order against private respondents was not necessary because the DARAB SQO subsisted pending final nullification of the BEA case; that the directive prematurely interfered with quasi-judicial proceedings governed by separate rules, considering the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that any delay was attributable to private respondents’ filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 30474; and that absent a writ in the ABOGNE Case, no occasion existed for the supervisory act.

As to the nullification of DARAB proceedings, petitioners relied on their prior jurisdictional theory: that delegation of quasi-judicial authority to PARADs did not contemplate total abdication, so pending proceedings before a PARAD did not automatically divest the DARAB; and that the DARAB status quo order could be justified as an exercise of original jurisdiction or in aid of appellate jurisdiction. They also emphasized the asserted similarity of the two sets of complainants, their asserted right to consolidation, and the alleged purpose of the DARAB SQO to ensure PARAD authority would not be pre-empted.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling on CA-G.R. SP No. 30474 (ABOGNE Case)

The Court held that the first grievance failed. It recognized that the Court of Appeals had certiorari jurisdiction over the PARAD TRO. Since the parties were heard on the propriety of the TRO, the Court of Appeals could direct the PARAD to act within a specified period. The Court emphasized that the TRO had already expired, and that the DARAB Revised Rules contemplate evidence presentation during the TRO’s lifetime, with a scheduled hearing already set by PARAD Manalang on 31 March 1993 at 1:00 p.m.

The Court further rejected the claim that the ten-day period was arbitrary. It added that the Court of Appeals had, in effect, extended the restraint by enjoining the parties from bulldozing or disturbing possession during the pendency of both cases, and petitioners could not assail the necessity or effects of the restraint while failing to question the subsequent related injunctions.

More importantly, the Court found a separate and more persuasive basis to dismiss CA-G.R. SP No. 30474. It ruled that the certiorari petition was premature, thus failing for lack of cause of action due to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court noted the sequence: the petitioners’ certiorari petition was filed on 19 March 1993, shortly after the private respondents had filed with the DARAB on 12 March 1993 their complaint to nullify the PARAD TRO. The Court reasoned that the complaint, though disguised, was in reality an appeal-like recourse to the DARAB from the PARAD order on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Under the DARAB Revised Rules, such matters were covered by the provisions on appeal from orders or decisions of the Regional or Provincial Adjudicator on grave abuse of discretion.

Since petitioners and respondents had invoked an available administrative remedy whose adequacy was not shown to be lacking, private respondents could not abandon it at their chosen time. The Court treated failure to exhaust administrative remedies as fatal to the cause of action. It further observed that such dismissal, in effect, amounted to a d

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