Case Summary (G.R. No. L-49065)
Factual Background
Petitioners alleged that they were co-owners, to the extent of two-thirds, of the subject property under TCT No. T-65878. They claimed acquisition of their two-thirds share through conveyances executed on 11 July 1985: two deeds of absolute sale from Miriam Catherine Ralla, and from another source stated in the allegations as Joan Pauline R. Belista. Petitioners further alleged that the sale was reconfirmed and/or ratified by subsequent instruments, and that an order dated 11 May 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 8 Legaspi City ratified and confirmed the conveyance involving Joan Pauline R. Belista.
Petitioners also alleged that at the time of the sale there was a ten-year lease contract over the property expiring on 15 July 1991, prompting them to delay registration and title transfer until after the lease ended. After the lease expired, sometime in the first week of August 1991, petitioners’ father allegedly went to the Register of Deeds to register the deed and obtain a new title in petitioners’ names. He allegedly discovered that, by order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea in RTC Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16, the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-65878 in petitioners’ possession was declared of no further force and effect, and that a new second owner’s duplicate copy had been issued to private respondent.
Petitioners traced the origin of this development to the petition filed on Sept. 20, 1990 by private respondent in RTC Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16, docketed as CAD Case No. T-1024. Petitioners alleged that private respondent falsely and fraudulently claimed that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-65878 was lost or destroyed while in petitioners’ possession and custody, based on her Affidavit of Loss. Petitioners further alleged that private respondent’s representations were false, particularly that the affidavit claimed delivery of the owner’s duplicate by her mother after her father’s death and her subsequent loss during typhoon “Sisang”. Petitioners asserted that these representations were perjurious because two-thirds of the property covered by TCT No. T-65878 had already been sold to them on July 11, 1985, and because the owner’s duplicate copy was allegedly delivered by private respondent’s brother, Gerardo Ralla, to petitioners on the same day.
According to petitioners, on the basis of these representations, Judge Rhodie A. Nidea issued an order on Dec. 7, 1990 directing the Register of Deeds to issue a second owner’s duplicate copy to private respondent, with annotations and encumbrances, and declaring the lost or destroyed owner’s duplicate of TCT No. T-65878 of no further force and effect. Petitioners alleged that the Register of Deeds then issued the second owner’s duplicate to private respondent. Petitioners further alleged that despite repeated demands and settlement attempts, private respondent refused to deliver the second owner’s duplicate copy to them.
Petitioners asserted that the order had become final and executory, but claimed it was null and void because it was issued in reliance on the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations of private respondent.
Court of Appeals Ruling
Petitioners sought annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals to invalidate the RTC order directing issuance of the second owner’s duplicate. The Court of Appeals denied due course. It reasoned that the fraud alleged was, at most, intrinsic rather than extrinsic fraud, and that intrinsic fraud did not justify setting aside a final judgment.
In support, the Court of Appeals applied the distinction between extrinsic fraud and intrinsic fraud. It characterized extrinsic fraud as fraudulent acts of the prevailing party committed outside the trial that prevented the defeated party from presenting fully its side of the case. It characterized intrinsic fraud as acts during litigation, such as the use of forged or false documents or perjured testimony, that do not affect the presentation of the case but prevent a fair and just determination.
Applying these concepts, the Court of Appeals concluded that the alleged fraud was the admission by the RTC of a false affidavit of loss, which it treated as intrinsic fraud. It stated that the use of a false affidavit of loss did not constitute extrinsic fraud warranting invalidation of a final judgment. It further explained that petitioners were not kept out of the proceedings because they could have rebutted or opposed the affidavit, since notice had been duly given in the case.
The Court of Appeals nevertheless dismissed the petition, relying on the intrinsic fraud characterization. It also rejected the petitioners’ position on forum shopping insofar as private respondent invoked Circular No. 28-91, holding that the Court of Appeals action should proceed on the intrinsic fraud ground.
The Parties’ Contentions Before the Supreme Court
Petitioners, in seeking reversal, maintained that the order granting private respondent’s petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate was void. They anchored this in the claim that the owner’s duplicate was not truly lost because it was in their possession, and that the RTC’s action was based on false and fraudulent representations in the affidavit of loss and supporting allegations.
Private respondent argued that petitioners’ action amounted to forum shopping. She alleged that in a prior civil case for recovery of possession in the RTC of Albay against JB Line (identified as Civil Case No. T-1590), petitioners had intervened and alleged substantially the same facts used in the annulment petition. Private respondent thus contended that the Court of Appeals should not entertain the annulment petition due to violation of Circular No. 28-91.
Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Issues
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for annulment. It accepted the doctrinal distinction on fraud but emphasized a critical additional principle: a final judgment may be annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but also for lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the decision.
While the Court of Appeals viewed the use of a false affidavit of loss as intrinsic fraud similar to the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, the Supreme Court pointed out that jurisdictional error could render the resulting decision void and therefore subject to attack at any time. The Court drew support from jurisprudence holding that when a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in another person’s possession, any reconstituted or replacement title is void because the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. It cited Serra Sera v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 482 (1991) for this proposition on analogous facts.
The Supreme Court further invoked the statutory rule in Rep. Act No. 26, which it summarized through its cited text: in case a certificate of title considered lost or destroyed is later found or recovered, the original shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate. This statutory rule reinforced that a proceeding premised on a lost or destroyed certificate cannot stand when the certificate is actually recoverable or already in another’s possession, as it implicates the court’s authority to order replacement.
Applying these principles to the allegations in petitioners’ petition, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals dismissal was error because the case did not merely involve intrinsic fraud. The Court stated that if the title was not in truth lost but was in petitioners’ possession, the RTC’s decision in the replacement proceeding would be void for lack of jurisdiction, and thus could be attacked any time. Consequently, the Court found it improper for the Court of Appeals to foreclose annulment solely on the basis that the alleged fraud was intrinsic.
On the forum shopping issue, the Supreme Court rejected private respondent’s claim. It reviewed petitioners’ answer in intervention in the recovery of possession case (Civil Case No. T-1590). It found that petitioners’ allegations there were not the same as, and did not have the same objective as, the annulment petition in CAD Case No. T-1024. The Court noted that petitioners had invoked facts in the earlier intervention in order to demand partition, while recognizing that private respondent owned one-third. By contrast, the annulment petition in the Court of Appeals was solely to seek annulment of the RTC judgment in CAD Case No. T-1024 granting issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate to private respondent. For that reason, the Court held that the forum shopping allegation lacked basis.
Legal Basis and Reasoning
The Supreme Court’s reversal rested on two linked doctrines. First, it recognized that although fraud in a prior proceeding may be categorized as intrinsic rather than extrinsic, annulment remains possible if the rendering court lacked jurisdiction. Second, it treated replacement proceedings for lost certificates of title as jurisdiction-dependent, such that if the certificate was not actually lost but was already in another person’s possession, the replacement decision was void.
The Court incorporated these principles by reading the intrinsic-extrinsic fraud doctrine alongside the jurisdictional exceptions. It acknowledged that cases such as Palanca v. Republic, 24 SCRA 819 (1968) associate forged instruments or perjured testimony with intrinsic fraud, but it distinguished the present context by emphasizing that jurisdictional defects allow annulment without the extrinsic fraud requirement.
It then supplied the statutory underpinning through Rep. Act No. 26, which gives primacy to the original certificate if it is later found or recovered. This rule supported the jurisdictional approach in Serra Sera v. Court of Appeals, leading the Court to conclude that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in limiting its analysis to intrinsic fraud.
On procedura
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-49065)
- Petitioners Antonio Demetriou and Harriet Demetriou, together with other co-owners named in the caption, instituted an action in the Court of Appeals to annul a Regional Trial Court decision ordering the Register of Deeds to issue a new owner’s duplicate certificate of title in favor of private respondent Hilda Ralla-Almine.
- Respondents were the Court of Appeals, Hon. Judge Rhodie A. Nidea, and Hilda Ralla-Almine.
- The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ petition for annulment due course, holding that the fraud alleged was intrinsic fraud and not extrinsic fraud, and thus did not justify setting aside a final judgment.
- Petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for review, challenging the Court of Appeals ruling.
Key factual allegations
- Petitioners alleged that they were co-owners to the extent of two-thirds of Lot No. 7651-A of the subdivision survey PSD-05-005263, a portion of Lot 7651, situated at Poblacion, Tabaco, Albay, with an area of one thousand ten (1,010) square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-65878.
- Petitioners alleged that TCT No. T-65878 stood in the name of Pablo Ralla, private respondent’s deceased father.
- Petitioners alleged that they acquired the two-thirds share through deeds of absolute sale, including a sale by Miriam Catherine Ralla executed on 11 July 1985, and a reconfirming sale by deed executed in July 1986.
- Petitioners alleged that a sale from Joan Pauline R. Belista was ratified and confirmed by an order dated 11 May 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of the Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 8 in Legaspi City.
- Petitioners alleged that at the time of their purchase, a ten-year lease contract existed over the property, set to expire on 15 July 1991, prompting them to await lease expiration before registering the sale and obtaining a new title.
- Petitioners alleged that after the lease expired, in the first week of August 1991, the father of petitioners went to the Register of Deeds to register the deeds and obtain a new title.
- Petitioners alleged that the Register of Deeds informed them that an order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea in the RTC of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16 had declared the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. T-65878, then allegedly in the possession of petitioners, to be of no further force and effect and had resulted in issuance of a new second owner’s duplicate to private respondent.
- Petitioners alleged that their investigation disclosed that on September 20, 1990, private respondent filed CAD Case No. T-1024 in the RTC, falsely and fraudulently alleging that the owner’s duplicate was lost and/or destroyed while in petitioners’ possession and citing an Affidavit of Loss.
- Petitioners alleged that the affidavit’s representations were false because they purportedly knew that two-thirds of the property had already been sold to petitioners on 11 July 1985, and that the owner’s duplicate had been delivered by Gerardo Ralla (private respondent’s brother) to petitioners on the same day.
- Petitioners alleged that based on these alleged fraudulent representations, Judge Rhodie A. Nidea issued an order dated December 7, 1990, directing the Register of Deeds to issue a second owner’s duplicate with annotations and encumbrances and declaring the lost or destroyed duplicate to be without force and effect.
- Petitioners alleged that pursuant to that order, the Register of Deeds issued a second owner’s duplicate to private respondent.
- Petitioners alleged that despite repeated demands and settlement attempts, private respondent refused to turn over the duplicate to petitioners.
- Petitioners alleged that the order had become final and executory but was void because it allegedly rested on private respondent’s fraud, and that petitioners were compelled to litigate and incur expenses.
Fraud characterization by Court of Appeals
- The Court of Appeals framed the controlling question as whether the alleged fraud was extrinsic or intrinsic fraud for purposes of annulling a final judgment.
- The Court of Appeals held that an action to annul a final judgment on ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral.
- The Court of Appeals described extrinsic fraud as fraudulen