Title
Delos Santos vs. Elizalde
Case
G.R. No. 141810
Decision Date
Feb 2, 2007
Dispute over Boracay land inheritance; appeal dismissed due to petitioners' failure to file brief and late motion for reconsideration.
ownership dispute
four lots
motion for reconsideration
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 141810)

Nature of the Controversy and Originating Claims

On December 15, 1986, petitioners filed in the Kalibo, Aklan RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages and Attorney’s Fees, covering four adjoining lots designated as Lots 393-A, 393-B, 394-D, and 394-E, with a total area of 14,771 square meters, located in Boracay Island. Petitioners alleged that the parcels were inherited from Mariano delos Santos, their common ascendant, either by their own right or by right of representation.

Respondents and intervenors presented competing claims of ownership. The Elizaldes, as the first set of intervenors, asserted that they bought the lots on June 18, 1974 from the heirs of Leonardo delos Santos, whom they claimed was the rightful and exclusive owner. The Casimeros, as a second set of intervenors, claimed ownership over Lots 393-B and 394-E as heirs of Tomasa Prado, who allegedly owned those parcels. The third set of intervenors, namely Jesus delos Santos and Rosita delos Santos-Flores, claimed entitlement to two-thirds (2/3) of the disputed lots as their inheritance as legitimate children of Leonardo delos Santos. They also asserted that they did not sell or assign their share, including to Fred Elizalde.

RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 3683

After trial, the RTC rendered its April 29, 1996 Decision, the dispositive portion of which (as relevant) dismissed petitioners’ complaint and the intervenors’ complaint in intervention filed by the Casimeros for lack of merit; declared two deeds of sale (Exhibits 29 and 30) null and void insofar as they affected Jesus and Rosita’s two-thirds share; declared Jesus delos Santos and Rosita delos Santos-Flores lawful owners of two-thirds (2/3) (or 9,915 square meters) of the land; and declared Fred Elizalde the lawful owner of the remaining one-third (1/3) (or 4,957 square meters) of the land, segregated by a boundary line. The RTC also directed cancellation or revision of tax declarations in Fred Elizalde’s name and ordered delivery of possession to the defendants and the first set of intervenors.

Appeals Taken and Subsequent Filings before the Court of Appeals

Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal dated June 6, 1996, while Fred Elizalde filed his Notice of Appeal dated May 16, 1996. The appeals were docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48475 (for Elizalde) and CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 (for petitioners).

The Court of Appeals subsequently issued a June 2, 1998 Notice to File Brief, requiring petitioners and Elizalde to file their respective briefs within forty-five (45) days from receipt. Petitioners sought extensions: on July 27, 1998 they filed by registered mail a Motion for Extension of Time admitting receipt of the notice on June 15, 1998, and praying for a forty-five (45)-day extension to September 13, 1998. On September 10, 1998, they filed another extension motion seeking another forty-five (45) days, until October 27, 1998. Further extensions followed, including an ex parte request for a final extension until November 27, 1998, and subsequent motions until the period sought reached January 27, 1999. Overall, petitioners obtained an accumulated extension of one hundred eighty (180) days from the initial extension application.

Respondents opposed the repeated extensions and moved for dismissal of petitioners’ appeal for failure to file the required appellant’s brief. Meanwhile, on October 6, 1998, respondents Fred Elizalde, Jesus delos Santos, and Rosita delos Santos-Flores filed a Joint Manifestation and Motion, stating that Elizalde abandoned his appeal by virtue of an amicable settlement between the parties through a May 27, 1997 Agreement and related arrangements. They sought to have the appeal withdrawn and further requested that Elizalde be excused from filing an appellant’s brief.

Motion to Withdraw Appeal and the May 11, 1999 CA Decision

On October 27, 1998, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Final Extension until November 27, 1998, and thereafter filed additional motions for extension, culminating in a requested deadline of January 27, 1999. Despite these efforts, respondents maintained that petitioners had not complied with the requirement to file the appellant’s brief.

On April 8, 1999, petitioners, through then counsel Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano, filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Appeal, asserting that petitioners and respondents delos Santos entered into an amicable settlement denominated as an Undertaking executed on September 19, 1998. The undertaking allegedly required payment of PhP 4,000,000.00 to petitioners in consideration of their leaving the disputed lots peacefully. The motion claimed that the undertaking was signed by 39 of the 46 petitioners and notarized by Atty. Edgar S. Calizo. It also alleged that respondents’ counsel, Atty. Romeo R. Robiso, executed a promissory note on October 15, 1998 on behalf of petitioners for the same amount. Petitioners’ motion thus sought withdrawal of their appeal.

On May 11, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued its assailed Decision, dismissing CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 and CA-G.R. SP No. 48475 and treating the appeals as withdrawn, justified on the basis of petitioners’ and Elizalde’s failure to file their respective appellant’s briefs, and consistent with the prayers in the joint manifestation and motions and the ex parte motion to withdraw.

Subsequent Appearance, Motion for Reconsideration, and Allegations of Forgery

An Entry of Appearance was filed on June 17, 1999 by Atty. Cesar T. Verano, allegedly representing petitioners. The entry showed the conformity of petitioner Vicente delos Santos alone. On the same date, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with prayer for reinstatement of appeal, verified only by Vicente delos Santos. Petitioners argued, among others, that they had no knowledge of the promulgation of the CA Decision, that they never entered into any amicable settlement, and that their alleged signatures in the May 27, 1997 agreement were forged. They further claimed they had not authorized Atty. Victoriano to withdraw their appeal.

Respondents opposed the motion. They asserted, among other points, that the motion should not be admitted because it lacked a notice of hearing, that the appeal had been correctly dismissed for failure to file appellant’s brief, and that the agreement was valid. Petitioners later filed a reply, attaching a handwritten note in Filipino alleging that petitioners’ signatories did not sign the agreement, did not receive any portion of the consideration, did not authorize their former counsel to withdraw the appeal, and were not furnished a copy of the CA Decision. The note listed many signatories, but only eight were among the forty-six petitioners before the Court of Appeals.

On January 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution, ruling that petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration with prayer for reinstatement of appeal—filed by new counsel—was denied for being late by nine (9) days. The Court of Appeals stated that the records showed counsel of record, Atty. Victoriano, received a copy of the CA Decision dated May 11, 1999 on May 24, 1999, so the deadline to file the motion for reconsideration expired on June 8, 1999. It thus held the motion, filed on June 17, 1999, to be belated.

Issues Raised in the Petition

Petitioners raised two main issues. First, they contended that the Court of Appeals erred in denying admission of their Motion for Reconsideration for lateness, arguing that the reglementary period should be counted from when petitioners allegedly learned of the Decision on June 2, 1999, and that the delay resulted from counsel’s negligence. They further argued that strict application of the period would elevate technicalities over substantial justice.

Second, petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing their appeal and considering it withdrawn, insisting that the undertaking or agreement was void due to forgery and non-receipt of the alleged consideration, and that their ownership claim was supported by competent evidence.

Legal Framework on Timeliness of Motions for Reconsideration

The Court held that petitioners’ computation was incorrect. Citing Rule 37, Section 1, in relation to Rule 41, Section 3, the Court emphasized that the period for appeal runs for fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order. The Court explained that the fifteen-day period begins upon receipt of notice, and that receipt by counsel of record is considered notice to the parties. It also underscored that official receipt is not the service upon the party alone; rather, service upon counsel of record is treated as service upon the party for purposes of the reglementary period.

Applying these rules, the Court treated May 24, 1999, when Atty. Victoriano received the CA Decision, as the proper reckoning point. The Court further noted that petitioners’ later appearance of new counsel on June 17, 1999 did not alter the reckoning point, since substitution of counsel must be properly carried out. Under Rule 138, Section 26, the new counsel’s name must be entered in the docket and notice of change given to the adverse party. The Court invoked its ruling in GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Principe (G.R. No. 141484, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 555) that unless substitution is properly made, the counsel of record remains considered as counsel for the party, and notice sent to such counsel is notice to the party.

Court’s Ruling on the Court of Appeals’ Refusal to Admit the Motion for Reconsideration

Given the reckoning from May 24, 1999, the Court agreed that petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration filed on June 17, 1999 was belated. Thus, the Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly denied admission.

The Court also rejected petitioners’ plea for liberal application. While petitioners cited cases where the Court excused small delays, the Court stressed that liberal application is limited to exceptional instances meant to prevent

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