Title
Dela PeAa vs. Avila
Case
G.R. No. 187490
Decision Date
Feb 8, 2012
The Dela PeAa family contested the validity of a property sale and mortgage executed by Antonia PeAa. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Gemma Avila, affirming the prior decision that upheld the validity of the sale and mortgage, dismissing the Dela PeAas' claims.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. 17763)

Factual Background

The litigation involved a 277 square meter residential parcel registered originally in the name of Antonia R. Dela Pena under TCT No. N-32315 in Marikina City. On 7 May 1996 Antonia obtained a loan of P250,000.00 from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co., secured by a notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage which stated the contract period as three months. On 4 November 1997 Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma Remilyn C. Avila, which enabled Gemma to procure title under TCT No. 337834. On 26 November 1997 Gemma constituted a real estate mortgage over the property in favor of Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC) to secure a credit facility with a P1,200,000.00 limit. From December 1997 to March 1998 Gemma executed promissory notes evidencing loans aggregating P1,200,000.00 from FEBTC. When Gemma failed to pay, FEBTC foreclosed extrajudicially and acquired the property at public auction, thereafter causing issuance of TCT No. 415392 in its name.

Procedural History

On 18 May 1998 Antonia and Alvin filed Civil Case No. 98-445-MK for annulment of the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale, reconveyance, and damages, alleging the property was conjugal, that the mortgage to Aguila lacked the deceased husband’s consent, and that the sale was simulated or procured by fraud. Gemma answered and denied material allegations, asserted the property was Antonia’s exclusive property and that the sale and subsequent mortgage transactions were made to settle obligations and to secure loans used to pay Aguila. On 25 September 1999 the Dela Penas impleaded FEBTC alleging bad faith purchase at the auction. FEBTC answered asserting it was a mortgagee in good faith and alternatively filed cross-claims against Gemma. The RTC declared Gemma in default, received testimonial and documentary evidence, and on 18 December 2007 rendered judgment for the plaintiffs annulling the Deed of Absolute Sale, ordering reconveyance and awarding damages; the RTC also granted FEBTC’s cross-claim against Gemma. FEBTC appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed on 31 March 2009. The Dela Penas filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.

The Parties’ Contentions Before the Supreme Court

The Dela Penas argued that the CA erred in reversing the RTC on three principal points: that the property was conjugal; that the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale was null and void for failure to liquidate the conjugal partnership under Article 130, Family Code; and that FEBTC was a mortgagee/purchaser in bad faith. Gemma maintained the sale was valid and that she obtained loans from FEBTC to settle Antonia’s obligation to Aguila and to extend Antonia additional funds. FEBTC asserted it was a mortgagee in good faith, that the mortgage to it predated any recorded adverse claim, and that it exercised its rights when it foreclosed upon nonpayment.

Trial Court Ruling

The RTC found the property conjugal and held that Antonia’s sale to Gemma was void for lack of liquidation under Article 130, Family Code after the termination of the marriage. The RTC rejected FEBTC’s good faith claim and ordered reconveyance to the Dela Penas, awarded moral damages and attorney’s fees, and on FEBTC’s cross-claim ordered Gemma to pay the mortgage indebtedness with interest.

Court of Appeals Decision

The CA reversed the RTC. It found the property was paraphernal because the Dela Penas failed to prove acquisition during the marriage, and therefore the property was Antonia’s exclusive property. The CA held Antonia was barred from annulling the sale because she had represented the property as hers and because the NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 482-802 indicated the signatures on the mortgage and on the deed of sale were written by the same person. The CA further held that FEBTC was a mortgagee in good faith because Gemma’s mortgage to it predated Antonia’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the subsequent Notice of Lis Pendens annotation.

Supreme Court Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision in toto. The Court held that the Dela Penas failed to prove the property was acquired during the marriage, so the presumption of conjugality under Article 160, Civil Code did not operate. The Court sustained the CA’s finding that the property was paraphernal and therefore Antonia validly executed the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale to Gemma. The Court also upheld FEBTC as a mortgagee in good faith and confirmed the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court applied Article 160, Civil Code and reiterated the settled rule that the presumption of conjugality presupposes proof that the property was acquired during the marriage; proof of the time of acquisition is a condition sine qua non for the presumption to operate, citing Francisco v. Court of Appeals and other authorities. The Court explained that mere registration in the name of the wife with the phrase “married to” does not establish conjugal character, citing Ruiz v. Court of Appeals. The Court found the Dela Penas produced no competent evidence fixing the time of acquisition; even the principal witness admitted his assertion rested solely on Antonia’s claim. The Court found Antonia’s credibility wanting, noting her contradictory pleadings and admissions in court that she had been misled, and relied on the NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 482-802, which concluded the contested signatures were written by one and the same person. The Court emphasized the evidentiary weight of notarized public documents and the presumption of regularity that attends them, which can be overcome only by clear, strong, and convincing evidence; the Dela Penas failed to meet that burden. On foreclosure and the status of FEBTC, the Court invoked Article 2126, Civil Code, and jurisprudence establishing that a mortgage subjects the property to satisfaction of the secured obligation and that foreclosure is the mortgagee’s right upon nonpayment. Because the mortgage to FEBTC was executed on 26 November 1997, it predated

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