Title
Dela Paz vs. Republic
Case
G.R. No. 195726
Decision Date
Nov 20, 2017
Marcelino Dela Paz sought reconstitution of a lost land title, but the Supreme Court denied his petition, ruling that his evidence failed to meet the stringent requirements under R.A. No. 26 for clear and convincing proof of the title's existence and loss.
reconstitution of land title
insufficient evidence
extrajudicial settlement
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 195726)

The Property, Ownership History, and Alleged Loss of the Title

Marcelino filed a verified petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 206714, describing a specific parcel under Lot 457-A-12-B-2-B-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-2114428, situated in Bagbag, Quezon City. The record showed that the property was the subject of an extrajudicial settlement dated 23 October 2000 among the heirs of Luz Dela Paz, namely Franklin S. Bortado, Sr., Franklin P. Bortado, Jr., and Marylou Bortado. Marcelino and his mother, Jenny Rose Dela Paz, later bought the subject land on 23 November 2005.

Marcelino’s theory for reconstitution was that the original copy of TCT No. 206714 was destroyed in the 11 June 1988 fire, and that the owner’s duplicate copy was allegedly lost in 2001, as allegedly evidenced by an affidavit of loss duly registered and recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.

Evidence Presented to the RTC

To support his petition, Marcelino submitted several documents: (a) a photocopy of TCT No. 206714; (b) real property tax declarations; (c) receipts of payment of real property tax; and (d) a sketch plan and the subdivision plan of the land. He also presented a Land Registration Authority (LRA) report stating that the plan and technical description of the property could be used as a basis for inscription on the reconstituted title. In addition, he submitted a certified microfilm copy of the plan and a technical description of the property on file with the LRA.

RTC Ruling Granting Reconstitution

After considering the evidence, the RTC granted the petition. It ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to reconstitute the original copy of TCT No. 206714 in the name of Luz Dela Paz and to issue the second owner’s duplicate copy to Marcelino, based on the approved subdivision plan and technical description, while recognizing that encumbrances subsisting at the time of loss could be carried over, and provided that no certificate of title existed in the Registry of Deeds.

CA Rulings Reversing the RTC and Dismissing the Petition

On review, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC order and dismissed the reconstitution petition. The CA was not persuaded that the evidentiary showing satisfied the requirements for judicial reconstitution.

First, the CA noted that the heirs of Luz Dela Paz—who allegedly executed the extrajudicial settlement and deed of absolute sale—were not presented in court to acknowledge those documents. It further emphasized that the deed of sale was not registered as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 to become a credible basis for granting Marcelino’s cause.

Second, the CA treated the registry certification regarding the alleged loss of the original title in the fire as form-like, with the owner’s name and the TCT number allegedly entered in blanks. The CA observed that the certification did not clearly establish that TCT No. 206714 was actually issued and registered under Luz Dela Paz. It also reasoned that while the certification mentioned that another TCT number was not saved, it did not necessarily prove the fate of TCT No. 206714.

Third, the CA found it troubling that, from 1988 to 2001, the heirs allegedly did not file a petition for reconstitution or execute an affidavit of loss regarding the duplicate owner’s copy, and that the affidavit of loss was made only after the property was transferred to Marcelino and Jenny Rose Dela Paz on 23 November 2005. The CA further noted that Marcelino’s affidavit allegedly failed to explain the circumstances of the loss and that the petition itself was filed only in 2007, about nineteen years after the fire.

Fourth, the CA ruled that tax declarations and tax receipts could not support reconstitution because they were issued for taxation purposes only. It held that a tax declaration is merely prima facie evidence of claim of ownership and is not the central issue in a reconstitution proceeding, which concerns whether a title should be reissued—not ownership.

Fifth, the CA held that the photocopy of TCT No. 206714 constituted secondary evidence and was inadmissible absent satisfactory proof of its admissibility under Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It also stated that the photocopy allegedly concealed the name of the registered owner, raising serious doubts as to its genuineness. It further observed that Marcelino failed to testify why he had a photocopy of the owner’s duplicate and how he obtained it.

Sixth, the CA concluded that the sketch plan and subdivision plan were mere additional requirements under R.A. No. 26 and were not, by themselves, sufficient bases for reconstitution. It relied on the idea that the LRA report did not allow ascertainment that the lot was covered by the specific lost or destroyed TCT, that the technical description did not bear the relevant TCT, and that the officers who verified the plan and technical description were not presented as witnesses to confirm the same.

Issues on Petition to the Supreme Court

Marcelino elevated the case through a Rule 45 petition, faulting the CA for holding that the documentary evidence was insufficient for reconstitution. The principal legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether Marcelino presented competent proof that TCT No. 206714 could be reconstituted based on the evidence submitted.

Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Question Raised

The Supreme Court observed that Rule 45 limits review to questions of law. It also recognized that it does not ordinarily reevaluate factual findings. Nevertheless, it considered the case because the CA reversed the RTC on the evidentiary sufficiency of the documentary proof, which required reassessment of the probative weight of Marcelino’s evidence.

Quantum of Proof and Standards for Reconstitution

The Court reiterated that courts must not grant reconstitution petitions hastily. It described reconstitution as the restoration of a lost or destroyed instrument or title in its original form and condition, and emphasized the danger of issuing an incorrect reconstituted title when the original was not truly lost or destroyed. The Court also noted the policy need to protect the stability of the Torrens system.

The Supreme Court held that the established standard in land registration actions requires proof not merely by a preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence, meaning evidence that produces a firm belief in the mind of the trier of fact as to the allegations to be established. The Court held that this standard applies in reconstitution proceedings because the grant of reconstitution produces effects of cancelling an alleged lost or destroyed title and reissuing a new duplicate title, and because reconstitution is an in rem proceeding whose final outcome cannot readily be reopened.

Thus, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly show three jurisdictional requirements: that the certificate of title was lost or destroyed, that it existed in its original form before loss, and that the petitioner has legal interest in the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.

Application to Marcelino’s Evidence: Failure to Show Jurisdictional Facts and Statutory Sources

The Court then assessed Marcelino’s claimed documentary sources, noting that Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529, as amended by R.A. No. 6732, recognizes judicial reconstitution under R.A. No. 26, and also recognizes administrative reconstitution under the limited circumstances defined by the statute.

In judicial reconstitution, Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 enumerates the sources from which transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted, in specific order, including the owner’s duplicate, co-owner’s/mortgagee’s/lessee’s duplicate, certified copies previously issued by the register of deeds or legal custodian, registered deeds or authenticated copies, documents showing mortgages or encumbrances, and finally “any other document” that the court deems sufficient.

The Supreme Court held that none of Marcelino’s evidence fell properly within the enumerated sources. It explained why each category failed:

First, the extrajudicial settlement and deed of absolute sale could not qualify under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 26 because the documents were not filed with the Registry of Deeds and, more importantly, they were not shown to be the basis for the issuance of the title. The Court reasoned that Marcelino sought reconstitution in the name of Luz Dela Paz. Therefore, documents transferring the property to the heirs would not supply the required information for the registered owner if they did not reflect under whose name the title should be registered. The Court applied the same logic to the deed of sale.

Second, the photocopy of TCT No. 206714 was not a certified copy issued by the Registry of Deeds or a legal custodian. The Court emphasized that a photocopy without certification lacks credibility and cannot support accurate reproduction of a title.

The Court highlighted that the photocopy allegedly concealed the registered owner’s name. It held that the purpose of reconstitution cannot justify reproducing a title based on a document that does not even identify the registered owner, and that this circumstance alone raised doubt as to authenticity and genuineness.

Third, the Court rejected the reliance on Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 26 because the documents did not match the kind of documents referred to in parag

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