Title
De Vera vs. Pelayo
Case
G.R. No. 137354
Decision Date
Jul 6, 2000
A non-lawyer challenged the Ombudsman's referral of his complaint against a judge to the Supreme Court, which upheld the referral, affirming judicial exclusivity in reviewing judicial conduct.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 137354)

Factual Background

SALVADOR M. DE VERA filed, on August 28, 1996, a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, to enjoin a municipal trial court from proceeding with an ejectment action against him. The case was re-raffled to Hon. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Branch 168, after the originally assigned judge inhibited. On July 9, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner’s application for a temporary restraining order, and on September 1, 1998 it denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Administrative Complaint Before the Ombudsman

On September 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint accusing Hon. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO of violations of Articles 206 and 207 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019. On October 2, 1998, Associate Graft Investigation Officer Erlinda S. Rojas submitted an Evaluation Report recommending referral of the complaint to the Supreme Court. Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Apotadera approved the recommendation, and the Office of the Ombudsman declared the matter closed insofar as that Office was concerned and referred the case to the Court Administrator on October 13, 1998.

Post-Referral Proceedings and Motion for Reconsideration

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Evaluation Report on November 6, 1998. The Office of the Ombudsman considered comments and recommendations, and on January 4, 1999 denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; Assistant Graft Investigative Officer Roland B. Galvan had recommended denial, while Director Angel C. Mayoralgo, Jr., and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera recommended approval of the referral. Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, Rules of Court on February 17, 1999; the Supreme Court gave due course to the petition on January 24, 2000.

Issue Presented

The core issue was whether the Office of the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to entertain and investigate criminal charges filed against a regional trial court judge arising from his judicial acts, or whether such complaints should be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman itself rather than referred to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner’s Contentions

Petitioner contended that his complaint alleged crimes committed by a judge and therefore the Ombudsman, not the Supreme Court, had the authority to determine whether a crime was committed and to prosecute the judge. He criticized the jurisprudence relied upon by the Ombudsman as erroneous and inapplicable to his complaint.

Respondents’ Position and Government Argument

The Office of the Ombudsman followed the Evaluation Report’s recommendation to refer the complaint to the Supreme Court, relying on established jurisprudence that judicial acts implicating allegations of unjust decisions or malicious delay must be first reviewed and declared unjust by a court. The Solicitor General, through memorandum, supported the Ombudsman’s action and urged that no grave abuse of discretion occurred.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Evaluation Report dated October 2, 1998 and the Ombudsman’s memorandum dated January 4, 1999 in toto, finding no grave abuse of discretion by the respondent. The Court ordered no costs. Chief Justice Davide, Jr., and Justices Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago concurred.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court held that the Ombudsman did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or with passion, prejudice or personal hostility in referring the complaint to the Supreme Court and terminating its investigation. The Court relied on its prior decision in In Re: Joaquin Borromeo, which it described as laying down the rule that before civil or criminal actions against a judge for violations of provisions such as those proscribing knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order (there cited as Articles 204 and 205) may be entertained, there must first be a final and authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order is indeed unjust. That declaration may come from a higher court’s certiorari or prohibition action or from an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge for promulgating an unjust order or decision. The Court reiterated that the determination wh

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