Case Summary (G.R. No. 211065)
Factual Background
Petitioner and the apartment owner operated under an oral, month-to-month lease arrangement. In 1990, the owner sold the apartment to Quayalay Realty Corporation. The seller notified petitioner on December 5, 1990 that, because of the sale, the petitioner’s month-to-month lease “will no longer be renewed at its expiration on December 30, 1990.” Petitioner was advised that she could discuss continuation of the lease with the new owner.
On December 29, 1990, petitioner received a further notice from Quayalay Realty Corporation requesting that she vacate the premises no later than January 5, 1991, warning that the realty firm would file action if she refused. Petitioner pleaded for additional time to remain, but her request was denied. Because petitioner and other lessees did not vacate, Quayalay Realty Corporation filed ejectment suits against them on January 9, 1991 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. The cases were consolidated in Branch 25.
MeTC Proceedings
In the ejectment actions, Quayalay Realty Corporation alleged that the oral month-to-month lease had expired on December 30, 1990 and had not been renewed, and that it had demanded that the lessees vacate but they refused. Petitioner’s defense was that the oral lease was for an indefinite period and therefore did not expire at the end of any month. She asserted that Quayalay Realty had no cause of action.
On March 22, 1991, the MeTC rendered judgment for Quayalay Realty Corporation. The MeTC ruled that the lease was month-to-month and, because it was not renewed, ejectment was proper. It ordered petitioner to vacate, to pay rentals from January 1991 up to the finality of the judgment, and to pay P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus costs.
RTC Appeal
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court. On May 5, 1992, the RTC affirmed the MeTC decision, but it increased attorney’s fees to P8,000.00.
Court of Appeals Ruling
Petitioner later appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s ruling on ejectment, but it deleted the attorney’s fees award. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was dismissed for lack of merit, prompting the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Parties’ Contentions in the Supreme Court
Petitioner raised several assignments of error, all anchored on the theory that she could not be judicially ejected.
First, she argued that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that her verbal contract of lease had a definite period, thereby allegedly rendering nugatory Sections 5 and 6 of B.P. Blg. 877.
Second, she claimed that even apart from the statutory grounds in B.P. Blg. 25, as amended by B.P. Blg. 877, the owner-lessor still could not eject her merely because the lease period had expired under Article 1687 of the Civil Code.
Third, she maintained that the buyer, Quayalay Realty, had knowledge of an existing indefinite lease and therefore was bound to respect it.
Fourth, petitioner contended that even if she paid a monthly rate, without a set lease period, the term could be fixed only if such relief was prayed for in the complaint, which she argued was not the case.
Core Issue
The Supreme Court treated the determinative issue as whether the oral lease contract was month-to-month, and therefore terminable at the end of each month upon notice, or whether it was for an indefinite period that could not be ended by expiration.
Legal Basis and Reasoning
The Court held that petitioner’s lease was, in law, a month-to-month lease. The Court relied on its prior rulings that a month-to-month lease is, under Article 1687, a lease with a definite period. Under Article 1687, when the period for the lease has not been fixed, the law supplies a period based on the rent: it is from month to month if the rent is monthly. The Court emphasized that this provision had not been affected in the relevant respect by Section 6 of B.P. Blg. 877, which suspended certain rules on residential units covered by the Act, but did not suspend Article 1687. The Court explained that what was suspended was Art. 1673 as to the ground that would otherwise allow ejectment upon expiration, but Art. 1687 itself remained available to determine the period of the lease.
Applying that statutory framework, the Court noted that petitioner had been notified that the lease would expire on December 30, 1990. With that expiration and the required demand, petitioner’s right to remain came to an end.
The Court rejected petitioner’s argument that ejectment was improper because none of the enumerated statutory grounds existed. The Court observed that ejectment by reason of expiration of the period of the lease was expressly included as a ground under Section 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 877. Petitioner’s reliance on Section 5 of the original B.P. Blg. 25, which referred to expiration of a “written lease contract,” was deemed erroneous. The Court pointed out that B.P. Blg. 877 changed the wording to “expiration of the period of the lease contract,” thus removing any distinction based on whether the lease was oral or written. Accordingly, the Court sustained the ejectment based on expiration.
The Court also dismissed petitioner’s contention that Quayalay Realty was bound to respect her lease because it had knowledge of an existing indefinite arrangement. It held that once the lease expired, there was no lease remaining for the new owner to be bound by.
Finally, the Court found no merit in petitioner’s procedural theory that the appellate court improperly fixed the lease period. The Court ruled that it did not “fix” the period as a matter of discretion. Rather, Article 1687 supplied the period automatically. Because petitioner paid monthly rent, the law considered the lease to be month-to-month, terminable at the end of each month. The Court added that, given the pendency of the case for years after filing in 1991, petitioner’s stay effectively extended for about five years, which the Court found sufficiently long for her to obtain alternative accommodation.
Disposition
The Supreme Court denied t
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 211065)
Parties and Procedural Posture
- Consolacion de Vera filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing adverse rulings in ejectment proceedings.
- Quayalay Realty Corporation sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila for the ejectment of Consolacion de Vera as tenant of an apartment unit.
- The MeTC rendered judgment in favor of Quayalay Realty Corporation on March 22, 1991.
- The Regional Trial Court affirmed the MeTC decision on May 5, 1992, and increased attorney’s fees.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision while deleting the award of attorney’s fees.
- The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
- The case reached the Court on certiorari, with petitioner insisting that she could not be judicially ejected.
Key Factual Allegations
- Consolacion de Vera was the tenant of an apartment unit located at 1067 Bilbao St., Tondo, Manila.
- She leased the unit in 1967 from its original owner, Llantos, Lim & Sons, Inc., and she paid rentals monthly.
- The original rental was P150.00 per month.
- The monthly rental increased to P924.00 upon the termination of the lease on December 30, 1990.
- In 1990, the apartment building was sold to Quayalay Realty Corporation, which notified petitioner on December 5, 1990 that the month-to-month lease “will no longer be renewed at its expiration on December 30, 1990.”
- Petitioner received a further notice on December 29, 1990 from Quayalay Realty Corporation ordering her to vacate not later than January 5, 1991.
- Petitioner requested time to remain but her request was denied.
- Because petitioner and other lessees refused to vacate, Quayalay Realty Corporation filed ejectment suits on January 9, 1991 in the MeTC.
- The ejectment cases were consolidated in Branch 25 of the MeTC.
- In the MeTC, Quayalay Realty Corporation alleged that the month-to-month oral lease contract had expired on December 30, 1990 and that it had demanded the lessees to vacate.
- Petitioner asserted that the oral lease was for an indefinite period of time and therefore did not expire at the end of each month.
- The MeTC ruled the lease was month-to-month and, because it was not renewed, ordered petitioner to vacate and to pay rentals from January 1991 up to finality of the judgment, plus attorney’s fees and costs.
- The RTC affirmed the ejectment but increased attorney’s fees to P8,000.00.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC but deleted the attorney’s fees award.
Issues Raised
- The first issue required determination of whether petitioner’s oral contract of lease had a definite period as a month-to-month tenancy, allegedly rendering Section 5 and 6 of B.P. Blg. 877 nugatory.
- The second issue asked whether, independently of the statutory grounds enumerated for ejectment, the owner-lessor could eject solely because the period of lease allegedly fixed under Article 1687 of the Civil Code had expired.
- The third issue challenged the ruling that the new owner was not bound to respect the lease, emphasizing that petitioner claimed respondent was aware of an existing indefinite lease.
- The fourth issue argued that even if monthly rent was paid, and no lease period was set, the lease term could be fixed only if such relief was prayed for in the complaint, which petitioner alleged was absent.
Statutory Framework
- The Court relied on Article 1687 of the Civil Code, which provides that when the period for the lease has not been fixed, the law implies a term based on the rent agreed upon.
- Article 1687 states that if the rent is paid monthly and no period is fixed, the lease is understood to be from month to month, terminable at the end of every month.
- Article 1687 further provides that courts may fix a longer term when the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year, despite the absence of a