De Vera vs. Aguilar

Factual Background

Marcosa Bernabe owned a parcel in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, designated as Cadastral Lot No. 3621, Cad. 337, with an area of 4,195 square meters. Petitioners, together with respondent Leona Aguilar, were children and heirs of Marcosa Bernabe. Petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera mortgaged the property to Atty. Leonardo Bordador; the respondents redeemed the mortgage and Marcosa Bernabe executed a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956 conveying the property to the Aguilars. The respondents registered that deed on February 13, 1956, which led to the issuance of tax declarations in the Aguilars' names and continuous tax payments by them. On July 20, 1977, a free patent issued to respondent Mariano Aguilar and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356 (M) was issued in his name.

Prelitigation Correspondence and Criminal Proceeding

On September 1, 1980 the petitioners asserted their alleged co-ownership as children of Marcosa Bernabe, demanded partition, and alleged that the respondents had resold the land to Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959; they threatened perjury and falsification charges. The respondents denied the allegation and replied on September 27, 1980, asserting sole ownership. The petitioners filed a criminal complaint for falsification, which Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. Mercado recommended to be dismissed on March 31, 1981 for lack of a prima facie case.

Civil Action and Trial Court Ruling

The petitioners filed a civil action for reconveyance on March 26, 1981. The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment on July 31, 1985 ordering the defendants to reconvey the property to the plaintiffs and to pay litigation expenses, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. The trial court admitted, over objection, Exhibit A, a xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959 by which the respondents purportedly sold the property back to Marcosa Bernabe.

Appeal to the Court of Appeals

The respondents appealed, contending that they never sold the property on April 28, 1959 and that the petitioners failed to produce the original of the alleged deed; hence the xeroxed copy was not the best evidence and should have been excluded. The petitioners countered that the execution of the deed had been proved by the notary public and by an attesting witness, and that the loss of the original had been shown by testimony from the National Archives and the Provincial Assessor’s office.

Court of Appeals' Determination

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, concluding that the petitioners had not satisfactorily proven the loss or destruction of the original deed and of all duplicate original copies; consequently secondary evidence in the form of a xeroxed copy (Exhibit A) was inadmissible. The appellate court relied on testimony that the original had been submitted to the Register of Deeds and on the notary’s admission that his office files had suffered fire damage only as to one duplicate, and it found the representatives of the Assessor’s Office and the National Archives’ testimony insufficient to establish loss of every original.

Issue Presented

The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners had satisfactorily proven the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale so as to permit the reception of the xeroxed copy under Section 4 of Rule 130 on secondary evidence.

Rule on Secondary Evidence and Order of Proof

The Court stated the governing rule: under Section 4 of Rule 130, when the original writing has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced, its contents may be proved by a copy upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability. The proper order of proof ordinarily is existence, execution, loss, and contents, although the trial court may alter the order in its discretion. The sufficiency of the predicate for admission of an alleged lost deed rested within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances.

Findings on Execution of the Document

The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that petitioners had adequately established the due execution of the alleged April 28, 1959 deed. The notary public, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., prepared and notarized the document and positively identified signatures, and an attesting witness, Luis de Vera, corroborated the execution, satisfying the execution element of the predicate.

Findings on Loss, Destruction, and Duplicates

The Court emphasized that after execution proof, the petitioners bore the burden to prove that the original had been lost or destroyed and that all duplicate originals had been accounted for. The notary testified that the deed had about four or five original copies; therefore, all originals or duplicates had to be shown to be unavailable before a copy could be admitted. The record showed that petitioners accounted for only three of the four or five originals, and the testimony indicated that at least one original had been submitted to the Register of Deeds. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the original was not shown to be lost or destroyed but had been submitted for registration, and that the petitioners should have sought production from that office or called its custodian.

Assessment of Proffered Evidence of Loss

The Supreme Court found unpersuasive the testimony that the notary’s files were gutted by fire because that established loss only of the notary’s duplicate copy, not of all originals. Testimony by the provincial assessor’s representative and by the National Archives that they had no copy did not suffice to prove the loss or destruction of ev