G.R. No. 83377 - De Vera vs. Aguilar

Case Summary (G.R. No. 83377)

Key Dates and Applicable Law

Deed of sale to respondents by Marcosa Bernabe: February 11, 1956.
Registration of deed by respondents: February 13, 1956.
Free patent issued to Mariano Aguilar: July 20, 1977.
Petitioners’ claim of resale of property back to Marcosa Bernabe: April 28, 1959 (subject deed).
Filing of suit for reconveyance: March 26, 1981.
Trial court decision ordering reconveyance: July 31, 1985.
Court of Appeals reversal: November 27, 1987.
Supreme Court decision date: February 9, 1993.
The legal framework applied is based on the 1987 Philippine Constitution and pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5, Rule 130 on Secondary Evidence.

Factual Background and Property Ownership History

The disputed land, originally owned by Marcosa Bernabe, was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe De Vera to Atty. Leonardo Bordador. Upon maturity, respondents redeemed the property and procured a deed of absolute sale from Marcosa Bernabe on February 11, 1956. The deed was duly registered, leading to the cancellation of Marcosa Bernabe’s tax declaration and issuance of a new tax declaration in respondents’ names. The Aguilars consistently paid taxes on the property and were eventually issued a free patent covering the land.

Petitioners’ Claims and Legal Actions

Petitioners asserted their status as co-owners by virtue of being heirs of Marcosa Bernabe and demanded partition. They claimed that the respondents had resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959, supporting their claim to reconveyance. Petitioners filed a falsification charge against respondents, which the fiscal dismissed due to lack of prima facie evidence. The subsequent lawsuit for reconveyance was adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which ruled in petitioners’ favor based on the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959.

Trial Court’s Ruling and Admission of Evidence

The RTC admitted, over respondents’ objection, a xeroxed copy (Exhibit A) of the alleged deed of sale from the respondents back to Marcosa Bernabe. The court found that the petitioners proved the existence and due execution of the document through the testimony of the notary public and an eyewitness, ordering reconveyance, damages, litigation expenses, and attorney’s fees in favor of the petitioners.

Court of Appeals Reversal on Grounds of Insufficient Proof of Loss

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, ruling that the petitioners failed to prove the loss or destruction of the original deed and all duplicate originals. Consequently, the presentation of secondary evidence, namely the xeroxed copy of the deed, was inadmissible due to lack of compliance with the Rules of Evidence, specifically Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Legal Principles on Secondary Evidence

Secondary evidence is admissible only when the original document is proven to be lost or destroyed. The burden is on the proponent to establish the document’s existence, execution, loss or destruction, and then its contents. All original copies or duplicates must be accounted for prior to admission of secondary evidence because each duplicate is considered part of the original writing. Failure to account for all originals negates the admissibility of copies under the best evidence rule.

Analysis of the Petitioners’ Failure to Establish Loss of Originals

Although the petitioners satisfactorily established the existence and due execution of the deed through the testimony of the notary public and others, they failed to prove that all original copies were lost or destroyed. The notary public testified that the deed had approximately four to five original copies. The petitioners only accounted for three, leaving some originals unaccounted for.

Respondents’ Evidence Showing Availability of Original

The Court of Appeals emphasized that according to petitioners’ own witnesses, the original of the deed was in the custody of the Provincial Assessor’s Office in Malolos, Bulacan, where it had been submitted for registration. Instead of presenting the original in court or requesting its production from the Registrar of Deeds, petitioners failed to exert sufficient effort to secure the document. Further, the destruction of duplicates in the notary’s office fire related only to copies in his custody, not all originals. Additional testimony from officials

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 83377)

Background and Procedural History

This case stems from a petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals' decision dated November 27, 1987, which reversed the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 14.
The trial court initially ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordering the respondents to reconvey the disputed property and to pay damages and attorney's fees.
The Court of Appeals reversed this ruling based on the petitioners’ failure to prove the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale along with all duplicate originals, thus rendering the presentation of a xeroxed copy inadmissible.
The Supreme Court was tasked with resolving whether the petitioners sufficiently established the loss of the original document to allow secondary evidence.

Facts of the Case

The petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia, and Maria de Vera and the respondents Mariano and Leona Aguilar are heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who died in 1960.
The disputed land, located in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an area of 4,195 square meters, was owned by Marcosa Bernabe.
Basilio and Felipe de Vera mortgaged the land to Atty. Leonardo Bordador. The respondents redeemed it from him and then purchased it from Marcosa Bernabe evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956.
The respondents registered the sale, leading to the cancellation of Marcosa's tax declaration and the issuance of a new one under their names. They have been paying property taxes since.
In 1977, Mariano Aguilar received a free patent of the land, and a certificate of title was issued in his name.
The petitioners later claimed co-ownership and demanded partition, alleging the respondents had resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959.
The respondents denied the alleged resale and maintained their sole ownership of the property. A charge of falsification filed against the respondents was dismissed by the fiscal for lack of prima facie case.
The petitioners subsequently filed a reconveyance suit which was decided in their favor by the trial court based on a photocopy (xerox) of a deed of sale allegedly executed on April 28, 1959.

Issues Presented

The central issue is whether the petitioners sufficiently proved