Title
De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Case
G.R. No. 129824
Decision Date
Mar 10, 1999
Employees of De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor formed a union in 1993, alleging unfair labor practices and illegal dismissal. The NLRC ruled in their favor, ordering reinstatement and back wages, upheld by the Supreme Court.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 156023)

Factual Background

Private respondents, all employees of De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor, formed a labor organization on 14 February 1993 and affiliated with the Federation of Free Workers on 26 February 1993. Their union was denominated FFW-Kapatirang Manggagawa sa De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor, for which a charter was issued by the Federation and registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations. On 10 March 1993, the union filed a certification election with DOLE-NCR. On 23 March 1993, the union filed a notice of strike on the alleged ground of unfair labor practice tied to the dismissal of union officers.

On 6 April 1993, union president Victoriano Santos stopped working. On 12 April 1993, the other private respondents “walked out” from their jobs. On 13 May 1993, the union instituted a case for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and non-payment of overtime pay before the NLRC National Capital Region Arbitration Branch. Petitioners opposed and later, on 26 May 1993, the petition for certification election was dismissed because the union could not be the bargaining agent for two companies; that dismissal was not appealed. On 21 June 1993, private respondents disaffiliated from the Federation of Free Workers, attributing the cause to the Federation’s failure to send a representative in two hearings before the labor arbiter. On 28 June 1993, private respondents pursued an amended complaint in their individual capacities, with Rogelio Bartolay joining as party-complainant.

The amended complaint listed the dates of hiring, termination, and pay of each private respondent, with termination generally reflected in April 1993 (principally April 6, 1993 or April 12, 1993, depending on the individual).

Proceedings Before the Labor Arbiter

In their position paper filed on 12 July 1993, private respondents alleged that petitioners had previously warned them not to organize or join any labor organization and had threatened them with dismissal if they did so. They claimed that despite the warnings and threats, they organized Kapatirang Manggagawa sa De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor and affiliated with the Federation of Free Workers, which allegedly triggered their termination. Petitioners, in their position paper, denied dismissal and asserted that the union was not a genuine organizing effort and was instead a ploy to extort money. Petitioners also claimed that private respondents “walked out” in preparation for a planned strike. According to petitioners, most employees did not join the walk out, and that left the private respondents embarrassed and failing to return to work. Petitioners further claimed that notices were sent urging private respondents to return, but most refused to receive them, except Priscila Villavecer and Renato Villavecer. Petitioners also asserted that those who refused had obtained employment elsewhere and that some individuals made threatening phone calls.

In a supplemental affidavit, Victoriano Santos denied that they received any notice to return to work. He alleged that they were prevented from entering the work premises and were informed of their dismissal. He also alleged harassment by “hired” policemen who showed fake warrants of arrest against union leaders.

On 16 June 1994, Labor Arbiter Arthur L. Amansec dismissed the unfair labor practice complaint. The labor arbiter anchored dismissal on the failure of private respondents to present letters of dismissal, and ordered, as compassionate justice, the payment of separation pay equivalent to fifteen (15) days for every year of service, while dismissing other claims for lack of merit. Both parties appealed to the NLRC.

NLRC Ruling

On 19 February 1997, the NLRC issued the questioned Order. The NLRC granted the appeal of private respondents insofar as illegal dismissal was concerned, denied petitioners’ appeal, and set aside the labor arbiter’s decision. It declared petitioners liable for illegal dismissal, ordered reinstatement and payment of back wages computed from the time of illegal dismissal until actual reinstatement, subject to the earning elsewhere rule. If reinstatement was not practicable, it directed payment of separation pay at one (1) month for every year of service.

The NLRC denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in a Minute Resolution dated 31 March 1997.

Issues Raised by Petitioners

Petitioners sought certiorari, alleging, in essence, that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They argued that the NLRC did not accord proper respect to the labor arbiter’s factual findings and, further, that the NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction by applying stringent procedural rules and by treating petitioners’ return-to-work notices as mere fabrications.

Supreme Court Review Standard

The Supreme Court reiterated that grave abuse of discretion exists when the judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner. The Court also held that abuse of discretion does not necessarily follow merely because the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter. The Court emphasized that a divergence in evidentiary assessment between the NLRC and the labor arbiter does not automatically justify a full review of facts through certiorari. It further stated that an NLRC ruling, if not bereft of substantial support, deserves respect.

The NLRC’s Basis for Reversal: Illegal Dismissal and Rejection of Abandonment

The Supreme Court held that the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter not without reason. The NLRC found the labor arbiter’s findings patently defective. It stressed that the complaint on illegal dismissal was intertwined with issues constituting union busting and that the labor arbiter zeroed in on the absence of “letters of termination” rather than the entirety of the union-busting context. The NLRC noted that private respondents consistently claimed that petitioners had cautioned them from joining a labor union from the start and that, after they insisted on forming one, management’s ire led to their adverse treatment. The NLRC found that union president Santos and two others were first barred from entering the premises on April 6, 1993, while the rest followed on April 12, 1993. It concluded that the prohibition did not come in the same explicit form for all, because some were prohibited by the removal of machines from their work premises.

The NLRC also found it incomprehensible that long-serving employees, some employed for seventeen years and others for ten years or more, would throw away their productive years by simply walking out and abandoning their jobs. It characterized this as running counter to human experience.

The Supreme Court agreed with the core legal point used by the NLRC in rejecting abandonment. It reiterated that abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires proof of a deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and that the burden of proof rests on the employer to establish an unequivocal intent by the employee to discontinue. The Court held that such intent cannot be lightly inferred from ambivalent acts. It also stated that abandonment requires proof of two elements: the intention to abandon and an overt act from which the intention may be inferred.

The Supreme Court sustained the NLRC’s assessment that it was unlikely for private respondents—given the lengths of their employment—to have abandoned their jobs without a proven overt act demonstrating a clear intent to desist from work.

Return-to-Work Notices and the Limits of Procedural Complaints

Petitioners and the Office of the Solicitor General contended that the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it disregarded the return-to-work notices as fabrications. The OSG argued that the NLRC had not properly considered evidence showing that notices were received by Renato Villavecer and Priscila Villavecer, and that their receipt disproved a finding that the notices were mere fabrications.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ challenge. It held that the NLRC correctly refused to consider the notices on the ground that their existence had not been duly testified to by respondents, and that respondents had not caused the personal serving of the notices or proven the circumstance of alleged refusal to receive them. It further reasoned that the receipt by Renato and Priscila of notices did not prove that the other private respondents received their own notices. It also held that the notices were sent after the alleged dismissal had already occurred on April 6 and April 12, 199

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