G.R. No. L-600 - De Luz vs. Court of 1st Instance of Leyte

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-600)

Commencement of the Divorce Case and Service on the Wife

Simeon alleged that on July 20, 1941, Soledad abandoned him by leaving him and going to her mother at Sinait, Ilocos Sur, and that his efforts to secure her return had proved fruitless. On this basis, he sought a decree of divorce in the Court of First Instance of Leyte under Executive Order No. 141.

Soledad was served with summons at Sinait, together with a copy of the complaint, on January 20, 1944. Subsequently, on January 13, 1944, she filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter.

Denial of Motion to Dismiss and Delay in Filing Answer

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order issued on April 1, 1944 by Judge Froilan Bayona. The copy of the order was received by Soledad’s attorney on May 12, and on that same date the attorney deposited in the mail an answer addressed to the Court of First Instance of Leyte. The answer reached the court only on June 23, having been in transit for approximately one month and eleven days.

Alimony Pendente Lite and Subsequent Requests for Orders and Relief

On August 19, Soledad’s attorney filed a petition praying for alimony pendente lite in the amount of P250 a month. The record states that no order disposing of that petition had yet been received.

On October 2, 1945, counsel filed an ex parte motion seeking a copy of any order that may have been issued regarding alimony pendente lite. On October 23, 1945, Judge Fernando Hernandez denied the ex parte motion on the ground that the case had already been decided on March 24, 1944, and that it did not appear that the decision had been set aside. Soledad’s attorney received this order on November 7, 1945, and on the same date filed a motion (with affidavits) praying that the decision be set aside, that Soledad’s answer be admitted, and that she be granted alimony pendente lite. Counsel swore that it was only on that date that he learned of the March 24, 1944 decision.

On February 9, 1946, the trial court denied Soledad’s motion. After receiving the denial, counsel filed on March 1, 1946 another motion praying for trial on the merits, insisting that the March 24, 1944 decision was a nullity, having been rendered without granting Soledad her day in court. The motion was denied on April 13, prompting the petition before the Supreme Court.

Posture of the Record in the Lower Court

From the lower court’s answer signed by Judge Mariano C. Melendres, the Supreme Court noted the internal steps taken in the divorce proceeding. It appeared that Atty. Emilio Benitez (later Judge of First Instance of Samar) filed on behalf of Simeon a motion on February 24, 1944 to declare Soledad in default for failure to file an answer. Judge Vicente de la Cruz postponed consideration of the motion on February 26, citing the lack of clarity in a telegram received by the clerk of court of Tacloban from the Sheriff of Vigan, and stating that it might be said that the defendant had filed an answer and that it had been mailed.

On March 18, 1944, three days after receipt of the sheriff’s return showing that Soledad had been summoned on January 20, Judge Froilan Bayona issued an order declaring Soledad in default and authorizing Simeon to adduce evidence. The Supreme Court observed that Soledad’s petition to dismiss, which she had sent from Ilocos Sur since January 31, was shown to have been in transit and must have been received between the date of the March 24, 1944 decision and the issuance of the April 1, 1944 order denying the dismissal motion.

Supreme Court’s Procedural Disposition: Noncompliance with Rule 67

The Supreme Court declared that it could not render a decision based solely on the facts it recited because petitioner failed to comply with section 5 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. The Court stressed that when a petition under Rule 67 involves acts or omissions of a court or judge, the petitioner must join, as parties defendant, not only the court or judge, but also the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings. The Court quoted the requirement that costs awarded in favor of the petitioner should be against the person or persons in interest only, and not against the court or judge.

Although the omission had not been questioned by the respondent lower court, the Court noted that Judge Melendres’ answer alleged that Simeon could not be located and that his former attorney had no interest in the case. The Court treated the trial court’s conduct as not amounting to an effective waiver that would bar correction of the defect, because the decision might adversely affect Simeon and it was in the interest of justice that he be

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-600)

The validity of a decision dated March 24, 1944 granting Simeon D. Luz a divorce from his wife Soledad Pena was placed in issue through a petition before the Court.
The petitioner Soledad Pena challenged the decision as void, asserting that it was rendered without giving her her day in court.
The respondent was the Court of First Instance of Leyte through its actions as gathered from the pleadings and orders in the record.
The Court resolved the matter on procedural grounds related to noncompliance with Rule 67, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, and directed the joinder of an indispensable party.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Soledad Pena was the petitioner who sought judicial review of the divorce decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
The Court of First Instance of Leyte was impleaded as respondent, with the case having originated in Leyte.
The record showed that the lower court’s response was signed by Judge Mariano C. Melendres.
The Court determined that it could not render a decision because of the petitioner’s noncompliance with Section 5 of Rule 67.
The Court nonetheless treated the case as submitted for decision based on the facts gathered from the petitioner’s allegations and the lower court’s acts, but held that the procedural defect prevented a ruling on the merits.
The Court ordered the joinder of Simeon D. Luz as party respondent and allowed him to file an answer.

Key Factual Allegations

On September 26, 1940, Simeon D. Luz married Soledad Pena in Manila, and they established their conjugal abode there.
On July 11, 1941, their son Cesar was born.
Simeon D. Luz alleged that on July 20, 1941, his wife abandoned him by leaving him and going to her mother at Sinait, Ilocos Sur, and that all efforts to make her return proved fruitless.
On September 22, 1943, Luz filed in the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint seeking divorce under Executive Order No. 141 dated March 25, 1943.
The divorce complaint was served at Sinait with summons and the copy of the complaint on January 20, 1944.
Soledad Pena filed a motion to dismiss on January 13 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The motion to dismiss was denied by Judge Froilan Bayona in an order dated April 1, 1944, which the defendant’s attorney received on May 12.
On May 12, the attorney mailed an answer to the complaint, and it was received by the court in Leyte only on June 23, after an asserted period of transit of one month and eleven days.
The attorney filed a petition for alimony pendente lite on August 19, praying for P250 a month.
On October 2, 1945, the attorney filed an ex parte motion requesting a copy of any order concerning alimony pendente lite, and on October 23, 1945, Judge Fernando Hernandez denied it because the case had already been decided on March 24, 1944 and because the decision appeared not to have been set aside.
On November 7, 1945, the attorney received the order of denial and, on the same date, filed a motion praying to set aside the decision, to admit the answer, and to grant alimony pendente lite, alleging under oath that he only then happened to know of the decision.
On February 9, 1946, the motion was denied by Judge Fernando Hernandez.
After denial, the attorney filed on March 1, 1946 a motion for trial on the merits, contending that the March 24, 1944 decision was a nullity for having been rendered without granting the defendant her day in court.
The lower court denied that motion on April 13, prompting the petition under review.

Default and Service History

The lower court’s answer showed that Atty. Emilio Benitez filed on February 24, 1944 a motion to declare the defendant in default for failure to file an answer.
On February 26, Judge Vicente de la Cruz postponed consideration of the default motion because the telegram received from the sheriff of Vigan was not very clear and because it could be said that the defendant had filed an answer and was mailed.
On March 18, 1944, after receipt of the sheriff’s return confirming that the