Title
De la Victoria vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 95275-76
Decision Date
Jul 23, 1991
A 1988 mayoral election dispute in Albuera, Leyte, where Sixto De la Victoria contested Genoveva Mesina's win. After Mesina's death, her heirs sought to intervene, but the Supreme Court ruled they lacked standing, upholding De la Victoria's victory.
mayoral election protest
deceased protestee
transmissible right

Case Summary (G.R. No. 95275-76)

Factual Background

In the mayoralty contest, De la Victoria garnered 5,093 votes while Mesina obtained 5,103 votes; the third candidate, Loly C. Fian, received 982 votes. On February 3, 1988, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Mesina as duly elected municipal mayor of Albuera, Leyte. Her running mate, Aquilino Cantiga, Jr., became vice-mayor.

De la Victoria filed pre-proclamation cases (SPC Nos. 88-560 and 88-614) in the COMELEC. While those cases remained pending, he filed an election protest Ex Abundante Cautela in the RTC on October 21, 1988, docketed as Election Protest No. B-44, naming Mesina as protestee and seeking, among other reliefs, damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Mesina answered and filed counterclaims for damages and attorney’s fees.

On July 22, 1989, Mesina died. Her vice-mayor, Aquilino Cantiga, Jr., assumed the mayorship by operation of law. Neither Mesina’s heirs nor counsel informed the trial court of the death.

On May 16, 1990, De la Victoria withdrew from the COMELEC En Banc his pre-proclamation complaints, and the COMELEC granted his motion. On June 18, 1990, the incumbent Mayor, Aquilino Cantiga, Jr., filed a verified “Petition to Intervene” in the election protest. On June 20, 1990, De la Victoria filed a “Manifestation/Motion” waiving his claim for damages and costs against Mesina. The trial court granted the waiver.

On June 22, 1990, Mesina’s counsel filed a Notice of Death and Motion for Substitution by Mesina’s heirs, requesting that the motion be heard on July 2, 1990. De la Victoria opposed substitution, arguing that Mesina’s heirs were not the real parties in interest and invoking Lomugdang vs. Javier and Vda. de Mesa vs. Mencias to support the idea that, after waiver, the heirs had no continuing legal interest.

RTC Proceedings and the July 17, 1990 Decision

When the RTC considered the substitution motion, it treated De la Victoria’s waiver of claims for damages and costs as defeating any legal basis for substitution, ruling that the heirs’ motion had become moot and academic. The RTC’s handling culminated in a decision promulgated on July 17, 1990 in Election Protest No. B-44, declaring that De la Victoria was the actual winner of the municipal mayoralty election by a margin of 134 votes over the deceased protestee, Mesina.

Appeals and Intervention Issues before the COMELEC

Two days later, on July 19, 1990, Mesina’s heirs appealed to the COMELEC through a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to restrain the trial court from rendering any decision or conducting further proceedings. On July 20, 1990, Mesina’s heirs filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court. De la Victoria moved to disregard the notice of appeal, asserting the heirs lacked standing because they did not appeal the RTC’s July 2, 1990 order denying substitution.

On July 23, 1990, the RTC denied the notice of appeal and ordered it expelled from the record. The RTC reasoned that the intervenor—Vice-Mayor Cantiga, who succeeded to the mayoralty by operation of law—was the real party in interest to continue the election protest. It further held that, given De la Victoria’s waiver of damages, Mesina’s heirs had no remaining legal interest to defend.

On July 24, 1990, De la Victoria moved for execution of the RTC decision. The trial court granted execution on July 25, 1990, and De la Victoria was sworn into office as mayor the same day.

Meanwhile, Mesina’s heirs filed in the COMELEC a petition in SPR No. 9-90 to challenge the trial court’s decision and to obtain injunctive relief. The COMELEC initially denied a TRO on that date, but set the case for hearing for preliminary determination of the sufficiency of the allegations in the main issue raised. On August 6, 1990, the heirs filed another petition in SPR No. 11-90, seeking, in addition to certiorari, mandamus, and praying that execution be stopped. On August 13, 1990, the COMELEC issued a status quo order directing De la Victoria to answer the petition and setting preliminary injunction hearing on August 23, 1990.

On September 27, 1990, the COMELEC set aside the RTC orders dated July 2, 1990 (denying substitution) and July 23, 1990 (denying due course to the heirs’ notice of appeal). It declared the writ of execution null and void, and ordered elevation of the case records to it pursuant to Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on appeals from election protests decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction.

Issues Raised before the Supreme Court

De la Victoria then sought Supreme Court intervention through a petition for certiorari with request for a temporary restraining order. The petition presented two principal questions: first, whether Mesina’s heirs could be considered real parties in interest in an election protest even after the vice-mayor was allowed to intervene and even after the protestant waived his claim for damages and costs; and second, whether the heirs could appeal the trial court’s decision.

The Parties’ Positions

De la Victoria’s stance was that the heirs had no legal standing because Mesina’s claim to the contested office did not survive her death in a manner that could be transmitted to her heirs. He maintained that, with his waiver of damages, the heirs had no remaining interest that could justify continuation of the case either by intervention or by appeal. He further insisted that Vice-Mayor Aquilino Cantiga, Jr., by operation of law, was the proper real party in interest in the continuation of the election contest.

Mesina’s heirs argued that they were entitled to substitution and to appeal despite the protestant’s waiver. They pursued certiorari and prohibition in the COMELEC and sought to restrain or nullify execution of the RTC decision.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Supreme Court

The Court held that the answer to both questions had to be in the negative. It reasoned that Mesina’s claim to the contested office was not a transmissible right that devolved upon her surviving spouse and children after her death. The Court invoked the principle that public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs, citing Santos vs. Secretary of Labor, 22 SCRA 848.

The Court further explained that the heirs’ interest in the election protest outcome was limited to no more than defending Mesina against the protestant’s claim for damages and costs, but the protestant had already waived that claim. Since the only remaining interest was aligned with a waived damages aspect, the heirs could no longer justify substitution to protect a right that had already been relinquished. The Court relied on Vda. de Mesa vs. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533, where the Court had ruled that the protestee’s widow’s or heirs’ interest in the outcome was confined to the possible award of costs and that, once that could no longer justify substitution—especially when the protestant had waived—the widow effectively withdrew from the litigation “altogether.” The Court emphasized that the ruling in Vda. de Mesa was not merely an obiter dictum.

At the core of the Court’s real-party-in-interest analysis was the effect of Mesina’s death on succession. Upon Mesina’s death on July 22, 1989, Aquilino Cantiga, Jr. automatically became the real party in interest because his accession to the mayoralty by operation of law meant that his right to hold office would be put in jeopardy by the election protest’s outcome. The Court cited Lomugdang vs. Javier, 21 SCRA 403, explaining that the vice-mayor elect had status as real party in interest in the continuation of proceedings because if the protest succeeded and the protestee was unseated, the vice-mayor would succeed to the vacant office. The Court reiterated the same doctrine in Unda vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 94090, October 19, 1990), where the vice-mayor’s statutory succession placed his right to the mayoralty directly in issue in the election contest, rendering the status of real party in interest non-disputable.

The Court also addressed the COMELEC’s handling of the procedural trajectory. It found persuasive the observations of the Solicitor General that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the private respondents’ petitions for certiorari filed in SPR Nos. 9-90 and 11-90 because they were filed beyond the five-day period under Section 22, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The Court also noted that the COMELEC allegedly issued a “permanent” and final injunction without the required bond, contrary to Rule 30, Section 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

However, the Court held that these procedural defect

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