Title
De La Pena vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 81827
Decision Date
Mar 28, 1994
A land dispute over Lot 5714 in Davao del Norte involving conflicting homestead applications, transfers of rights, and boundary issues. De la Pena's claim for reconveyance was dismissed due to lack of ownership and insufficient evidence of fraud. Res judicata did not apply, and damages were deemed improper.
boundary dispute
reconveyance claim
petitioner
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 81827)

Factual Background

The controversy began with land possession in Sulongvale, Sulop, Davao del Norte (previously Padada, Tanwalang, Davao). Ciriaco Reducto occupied a twenty-four (24)-hectare parcel designated as Lot No. 5714 and filed Homestead Application No. 192495 (E-100806) with the Bureau of Lands. Another applicant, Potenciano Nazaret, filed a similar application for the same lot, which resulted in B. L. Conflict No. 57 (N) in the Bureau of Lands.

Before the conflict was resolved, Ciriaco executed a “Deed of Relinquishment” dated 21 July 1946, transferring possessory rights over six (6) hectares (later increased to eight (8)) of Lot 5714 to petitioner. Petitioner then entered the administrative proceedings when the transferred portion remained included in the homestead applications of Ciriaco Reducto and Nazaret. After field verification, the Director of Lands directed petitioner to apply for the portion within sixty (60) days after survey, warning that failure to do so would cause him to lose his preferential right.

Petitioner did not file the application within the required period. Meanwhile, on 7 March 1950, Ciriaco transferred rights over an additional one and one-half (1 1/2)-hectare portion of Lot 5714 to Michael Doble, who later sold his rights in 1956 to Ricardo Tan, who was Herotido Tan’s father. The portion eventually acquired by Ricardo Tan later became the western boundary of petitioner’s land. On 24 and 25 August 1970, a survey was conducted and a subdivision plan was prepared and approved. Under this survey, petitioner’s acquired portion was designated Lot No. 5714-D, while the portion bought by Ricardo Tan was identified as Lot No. 5714-C. The survey revealed that petitioner’s actual occupied land was larger by three-fourths (3/4) of a hectare than what he had bought and paid for, while the area ceded to Doble (and later acquired by Tan) was “very much smaller” than what he had bought. Although the 3/4-hectare portion fell within the area acquired by Doble in 1950, petitioner cultivated it without objection from Doble.

When Ricardo Tan acquired the lot on 2 March 1956, he built a fence to reclaim the disputed area, but petitioner destroyed it repeatedly, which precipitated a boundary dispute. On 5 May 1975, Ricardo Tan transferred his rights over Lot 5714-C to his son, Herotido Tan, by “Affidavit of Relinquishment.” The conflict over the 3/4-hectare portion continued. The parties attempted to resolve it through relocation surveys but failed to agree on a common surveyor, prompting each to hire his own. Petitioner’s surveyor conducted a relocation survey on 18 April 1977, while respondent’s surveyor conducted one five (5) days later. It was determined that the disputed portion lay within Lot 5714-C of private respondent. Respondent then built a fence barring petitioner from entering the disputed area, causing the destruction of sugarcane and bananas planted by petitioner.

On 29 April 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against Ricardo Tan in the Municipal Trial Court of Sulop. When the case was discovered to involve the registered ownership of private respondent—Lot 5714-C under OCT No. P-7923, issued pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 dated 15 September 1975—the complaint was amended to implead Herotido Tan.

Forcible Entry Proceedings and Initial Rulings

The Municipal Trial Court ruled for petitioner. It found that petitioner had prior possession of the disputed 3/4-hectare portion and had been prevented from entering by the fence constructed by private respondent. The court stressed that ownership was not at issue because the action was for forcible entry; rather, the issue involved prior, physical, and uninterrupted possession. The court ordered private respondent and those claiming under him to vacate the litigated portion and restore possession to petitioner. The decision was affirmed on appeal by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of Davao del Sur.

The Reconveyance Suit and the Trial Court’s Findings

During the pendency of the forcible entry case, petitioner filed the present action for reconveyance with damages on 18 July 1977 before the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur and Davao City. Petitioner alleged that respondent fraudulently registered the 3/4-hectare portion through respondent’s free patent application by stating that the land applied for was “not claimed or occupied by any other person.” Petitioner also denied that a 1970 survey was conducted, asserting that any survey conducted was only a “table survey.”

The trial court rejected petitioner’s denial of the 1970 survey because petitioner was already estopped from contesting it after he offered Subdivision Plan CSD-11-001883-D as evidence. The court then held that the disputed portion was not part of petitioner’s 1946 purchase; hence, petitioner was not entitled to reconveyance. It declared petitioner a mere trespasser and planter in bad faith, finding that he was enjoying government property without applying for it within the period set by the Director of Lands and without paying taxes thereon. Petitioner’s claim for P5,000.00 as actual damages for destroyed sugarcane and bananas was denied. Instead, the court granted respondent’s counterclaim and ordered petitioner to pay P6,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, P15,000.00 for moral damages, and the costs of the proceedings.

The Parties’ Contentions on Appeal and in the Petition

Petitioner elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals, reiterating fraud and misrepresentation and arguing that the judgment in the forcible entry case constituted res judicata on the reconveyance action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to substantiate the alleged fraud and misrepresentation. It found that respondent complied with the requirements for the issuance of a free patent and original certificate of title: a free patent application submitted with the affidavits of the applicant and two witnesses and with notice of application; an ocular inspection by the Land Examiner; a recommendation for approval; and the promulgation of the order for issuance of the free patent from which the original title could be issued.

On the res judicata issue, the Court of Appeals explained that petitioner’s favorable outcome in the forcible entry case did not automatically entitle him to a favorable reconveyance judgment. It emphasized the different issues: forcible entry focused on prior physical possession, while reconveyance turned on lawful ownership or possession de jure. Petitioner then filed the petition before the Supreme Court.

Disposition and Deletion of Certain Damages

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and adopted the conclusions of the trial court and Court of Appeals. The Court further held that petitioner had absolutely no standing to maintain the reconveyance suit. The Court reiterated the settled principle that reconveyance is available only to an owner whose property had been erroneously titled in another’s name.

The Court found that petitioner did not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Petitioner’s asserted right was only a “preferential right” to acquire ownership arising from actual occupation since January 1947. The Court held that such possession did not ripen into ownership. It further stated that title to alienable public lands may be established through open, continuous, and exclusive possession for at least thirty (30) years, and that the dispute over the 3/4-hectare portion began even before the free patent and OCT were issued in 1975, as early as 1956 between petitioner and respondent’s father. Thus, petitioner’s possession fell short of the statutory period.

Because petitioner was not the owner, he could not question titles legally issued by the State. The Court added that where the claimant has not obtained title, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines, to whom the land would revert if it were established, through appropriate proceedings, that the free patent could be annulled for legal noncompliance by the grantee. The Court also ruled that petitioner, not being an applicant or grantee, could not seek reconveyance.

Despite affirmance of the denial of petitioner’s substantive claim, the Court deleted the award for attorney’s fees, moral damages, and expenses of litigation. It agreed with petitioner that such awards were improper because they were based solely on an action later declared unfounded without a showing of deliberate intent to prejudice the other party. The Court underscored that the right to litigate is “so precious” that a penalty should

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