Case Summary (G.R. No. 57883)
Petitioner
A group of incumbent judges and lawyers alleged that the Act’s automatic abolition of all inferior courts (except Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals) and the simultaneous termination of sitting judges’ tenure violated the constitutional guarantee of independence and security of tenure.
Respondent
The government defended the statute as a valid exercise of the Batasang Pambansa’s power to reorganize the judiciary, asserting good faith, necessity, and conformity with constitutional principles.
Key Dates
• August 7, 1980: Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization constituted.
• October 17, 1980: Committee report submitted.
• August 14, 1981: Batas Pambansa 129 enacted.
• October 1981: Supplemental pleadings and hearings.
• March 12, 1982: Supreme Court decision rendered.
Applicable Law
Constitution of the Philippines (1973, as amended 1981)
– Art X, Sec 1: Judicial power vested in Supreme Court and inferior courts “as may be established by law.”
– Art X, Sec 6: Administrative supervision of all courts by the Supreme Court.
– Art X, Sec 7: Members of the Supreme Court and inferior-court judges “shall hold office during good behavior until … seventy years” and defines the Supreme Court’s removal power.
Issue Presented
Whether Batas Pambansa Blg. 129’s sweeping abolition of existing inferior courts and termination of their judges en masse, replaced by new courts, contravened the 1973 Constitution’s guarantees of judicial independence and security of tenure.
Standing of Petitioners
The Court found petitioners had personal and substantial interest: Judge de la Llana faced direct injury from abolition of his court; other lawyer-petitioners claimed injury as court officers and taxpayers. The challenge was properly before the Supreme Court as an action for prohibition (judicial review of a statute).
Allegations of Arbitrariness and Bad Faith
Petitioners asserted the Act was tainted by lack of good faith—citing undue legislative delegation, arbitrary abolition of judicial offices, erosion of independence, and a disguised purge of “misfits.” They urged that judges could only be removed individually by the Supreme Court after discipline proceedings.
Legislative History and Purpose
A Presidential Committee (including three Supreme Court Justices) studied chronic docket congestion, case delays, and demands for modernization. Its October 1980 report warned the judiciary faced a crisis in efficiency and public faith. Cabinet Bill No. 42, largely following the Committee’s guidelines, underwent extensive public hearings and 590 pages of parliamentary debate before enactment as B.P. 129. The primary objectives were:
- Institutional restructuring (creation of intermediate appellate, regional, metropolitan, municipal, and circuit trial courts).
- Reallocation of jurisdiction to eliminate overlaps.
- Procedural reforms to expedite case disposition.
Power to Abolish Courts Versus Security of Tenure
– Precedent affirms that a legislature’s power to create courts “carries with it the power to abolish” them, provided the abolition is done in good faith and for public welfare. (Cruz v. Primicias, Jr.; Zandueta v. De la Costa.)
– Abolition of an office is distinguishable from removal for cause; abolition terminates the office itself, so no incumbent may remain.
– The test is whether abolition is bona fide and not a sham to oust particular judges.
Good Faith Found
The Court unanimously held that B.P. 129 arose from compelling public need, underwent rigorous study, full legislative process, and was not a disguise for arbitrary removal. The comprehensive background negated any plausible claim of bad faith.
Reconciling Overlapping Constitutional Provisions
– Art X, Sec 1 grants the legislature authority to reorganize inferior courts.
– Art X, Sec 7 secures judges’ tenure and vests removal power in the Supreme Court.
The Court harmonized these by recognizing abolition as an act of court creation/reorganization—distinct from disciplinary removal—and free from impairment of the Supreme Court’s statutory removal function
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 57883)
Facts
- Petitioners: Gualberto J. de la Llana (Presiding Judge, Branch II, City Court of Olongapo) and seven other judges/bar members.
- Respondents: Manuel Alba (Minister of Budget), Francisco Tantuico (Chairman, Commission on Audit), Ricardo Puno (Minister of Justice).
- Petition: For Declaratory Relief and/or Prohibition to enjoin implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (“Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980”).
- Impugned Law: Reorganized all inferior courts—from Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts (except Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals)—abolishing existing courts “automatically” upon presidential declaration and terminating incumbents’ offices.
Constitutional Provisions
- Article X, Section 1: Judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.
- Article X, Section 7: Justices and judges hold office during good behavior until age 70 or incapacitation; Supreme Court may discipline and dismiss inferior‐court judges by at least eight votes.
Standing and Jurisdiction
- Petitioners include actual incumbents of courts, who face direct injury by abolition of their offices.
- Members of the bar and officers of the court have personal and substantial interest as taxpayers/officers.
- Although styled as declaratory relief, Court treats petition as one for prohibition to bar executive implementation.
Petitioners’ Arguments
- Automatic abolition of courts and termination of incumbents violates judges’ constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure and judicial independence.
- Enactment was arbitrary, in bad faith, and involved undue delegation to the President (e.g., fixing compensation, timing of reorganization).
- Statute lacks clear time frame for completion; petition is not premature if rights already at stake.
Respondents’ Arguments
- Batasang Pambansa has plenary power under Art. X Sec. 1 to reorganize the judiciary, including creation/abolition of inferior courts.
- Legislation was enacted in good faith after presidential committee study, public hearings and extensive parliamentary debate.
- Delegation of authority on compensation is guided by clear statutory standards (Sec. 41; P.D. 985 as amended); time frame for implementation is specified (Sec. 43–44).
- Petition is premature; implementation not yet begun; remedy for actual injury exists once offices are abolished.
Amici Curiae Positions
- In support of petition’s dismissal (upholding constitutionality): Philippine Constitution Association; U.P. College of Law; Integrated Bar of the Philippines; Philippine Bar Association; U.P. Women Lawyers; Women Lawyers Assn.; Philippine Trial Lawyers Assn.
- In support of petition’s grant (striking down Act): Philippine Lawyers Assn.; Ambrosio Padilla; Jose W. Diokno.
Procedural History
- Aug. 7, 1980: Executive Order No. 611 created Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization (later amended by EO 619-A).
- Oct. 17, 1980: Committee report submitted, citing urgent need for major reform.
- Dec. 1980: Public hearings on Cabinet Bill No. 42 (basis of B.P. 129).
- A