Title
De Jesus vs. Quiolay
Case
G.R. No. 45569
Decision Date
Mar 31, 1938
Bank liquidator seeks foreclosure; defendant claims debt settled via deeds. Court invalidates one deed, upholds another, conditions dismissal on partial payment, leaving remaining debt unresolved.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 45569)

Procedural History and Trial Court Action

The Bank Commissioner filed the foreclosure action to enforce the mortgage and recover the amount due. After the defendant interposed his amended answer denying the material allegations, he filed a cross-complaint. In the cross-complaint, he sought a declaration that a deed of conveyance executed on March 7, 1935 (marked Exhibit B) was null and void on the asserted ground that it did not reflect the true intention of the parties, and he simultaneously asserted the validity and binding effect of an earlier deed of conveyance executed in July 1934 (marked Exhibit A), purportedly covering the same mortgaged properties as payment of all his indebtedness.

During the pendency of the case and before trial, the defendant proposed a compromise: the plaintiff would accept the conveyance of the mortgaged properties intended to be made in favor of the bank in payment of the defendant’s indebtedness to date, and, after court approval, the foreclosure suit (civil case No. 45482) would be dismissed. A deed was prepared and submitted, but the plaintiff refused to sign it, stating that the parties’ agreement was for the properties to be given in payment of only P60,000, plus P2,000 as attorney’s fees. That proposed deed was later marked Exhibit A. The parties later executed the final deed dated March 7, 1935, marked Exhibit B, and the case proceeded on the dispute as to which deed represented their true agreement and legal effect.

Issues Raised on Appeal

On appeal, the defendant raised five errors. The Court limited its resolution to three interrelated questions: (1) whether Exhibit A was valid; (2) whether Exhibit B was valid and truly represented the parties’ intent; and (3) what legal effect Exhibit B had on the foreclosure case.

Validity of Exhibit A

The Court found it “undoubted” that the plaintiff agreed to compromise the foreclosure case at the instance of the defendant by means of a conveyance of all the mortgaged properties and other credits against other persons. However, the Court held that this compromise was not for the purpose of paying the entire indebtedness then at P175,609.36. Instead, the compromise was intended to result in payment of only P60,000.

The defendant insisted that the plaintiff accepted his proposition that the conveyance would be in payment of the defendant’s whole indebtedness. The evidence, as assessed by the Court, did not support that assertion. The Court concluded that Exhibit A was not signed by the plaintiff or by the defendant himself, and for that reason it held that Exhibit A was invalid and did not bind the plaintiff.

Construction and Binding Nature of Exhibit B

After the plaintiff rejected the proposed instrument underlying Exhibit A, the parties drafted Exhibit B, and both parties signed and ratified it before a notary public. The Court rejected the defendant’s attempt to negate his consent. It found no basis for the contention that the defendant did not know the contents of Exhibit B when he signed, nor for the claim that he believed Exhibit B was the same document as Exhibit A or that it carried identical stipulations.

The Court found that the defendant gave consent to Exhibit B with full knowledge of its contents, and it characterized Exhibit B as an amendment of the earlier draft rejected by the plaintiff. Consequently, the Court held that Exhibit B expressed the true intention of the parties and was entirely binding upon them.

The Court then considered key stipulations embodied in Exhibit B. The agreement recited that the plaintiff, by virtue of a statutory power, would accept the conveyance of the defendant’s interests in specified real properties in Manila and Pasay, Province of Rizal, free from liens and encumbrances. It also required the defendant, as part of partial settlement, to pay P2,000 as attorney’s fees. Further, it stipulated that the properties and credits conveyed would be in payment of P60,000 on account of the defendant’s indebtedness, and it provided that the parties could petition for dismissal of civil case No. 45482.

Crucially, the Court read the deed as making the compromise effective only upon satisfaction of conditions precedent, namely: (a) approval by the Court of First Instance of Manila having cognizance of the liquidation proceeding (civil case No. 40704, entitled “In re Liquidation of the Mercantile Bank of China”), (b) payment by the defendant of the P2,000 attorney’s fee, and (c) registration of the conveyance in the offices of the Registers of Deeds of Manila and Rizal.

Legal Effect of Exhibit B and Conditions for Dismissal

Applying the deed’s conditional structure, the Court held that the dismissal of the foreclosure suit depended on those conditions. The record showed that the plaintiff obtained the court’s approval of the deed and that the conveyance was registered in the relevant registers of deeds. The Court also found that the defendant paid only P1,000 of the P2,000 specified in clause 2. Thus, while approval and registration were already accomplished, payment of the full attorney’s fees remained incomplete by P1,000.

Because the instrument was a compromise entered into by the parties to put an end to the foreclosure action, the Court held it had the force of res judicata as between them under articles 1809, 1816 of the Civil Code. The Court further held that, if the defendant complied with the remaining obligation to pay the P1,000 balance of the attorney’s fee, he would be entitled to demand dismissal since, in that event, all conditions on which the compromise depended would be realized. The Court invoked article 1114 of the Civil Code to support the legal consequence of fulfillment of a condition precedent.

The Court rejected the defendant’s insinuation that the plaintiff failed to establish non-payment of the full P2,000. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff conceded payment of P1,000; the deed itself, marked Exhibit B, served as authentic proof of the obligation for the remaining P2,000 payment. If the defendant claimed he had paid more than the P1,000 admitted by the plaintiff, the Court held that it was incumbent upon him to prove such additional payment. The defendant did not do so. Thus, the plaintiff was not required to prove a defense that, in essence, consisted of payment beyond what was conceded.

Scope of the Court’s Ruling as to Matters Not Adjudicated

The Court emphasized that the parties’ deed was silent regarding the defendant’s remaining balanc

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