Title
De Jesus vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 127857
Decision Date
Jun 20, 2006
Heirs disputed a 5-hectare land inherited from parents; uncle claimed sale but signatures forged. Courts ruled deed null, ordered partition, affirmed by Supreme Court.
dispute
parcel of land
nullification

Case Summary (G.R. No. 127857)

Facts and Antecedents

Respondents de Jesus filed a petition on 3 June 1991 before the trial court seeking the partition of land left by their deceased grandparents. They alleged that they were the legitimate children of Fermin de Jesus and, by right of representation in intestate succession, were entitled to their shares in the estate of Juan de Jesus. Their position was that ownership of the property had never been transferred or partitioned among the legal heirs.

The petition was anchored on the genealogical and succession facts that: (a) Juan de Jesus died on 7 December 1964; (b) Fermin de Jesus died on 24 September 1979; and (c) as of the filing of the petition, the title to the property remained in the name of Juan de Jesus. Respondents de Jesus emphasized that the property remained unpartitioned and that they were entitled to their rightful shares.

Petitioner Pastor de Jesus resisted the petition. He asserted that respondents de Jesus were no longer entitled to their father’s share because Fermin allegedly sold his property right to Pastor de Jesus, and also sold jointly with only sister Consolacion, for the consideration of P10,000.00, evidenced by the notarized Deed of Sale dated 13 September 1979. He acknowledged that the Deed of Sale had not yet been registered with the Registry of Deeds.

Trial Court Proceedings and Decision

The trial court ordered the Deed of Sale to be submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination to determine its genuineness and due execution. Respondents de Jesus presented witnesses including Alicia de Jesus Oakes, Ronaldo de Jesus, and NBI Handwriting Expert Zenaida Torres. Petitioner Pastor de Jesus presented witnesses including Consolacion, Atty. Marcos C. Diasen, Jr., Zenaida Tuazon, and himself.

After trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 28 October 1994, declaring null and void the extrajudicial settlement with simultaneous sale dated 13 September 1979. It directed the partition of the property in pro indiviso equal shares among petitioner Pastor de Jesus, respondents de Jesus, and Consolacion Resurreccion de Jesus Abando, and it appointed commissioners to effect partition and report back by a set deadline. The trial court also ordered payment of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs, and required a copy of the decision to be furnished to the Register of Deeds.

Appeal in the Court of Appeals

Petitioner Pastor de Jesus appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred: (a) in not giving weight to evidence he offered to prove due execution of the Deed of Sale; (b) in relying on the expert witness rather than on testimonies of disinterested and knowledgeable witnesses; and (c) in declaring the Deed of Sale null and void without substantial basis.

The Court of Appeals found no merit. It upheld the trial court’s reasoning that the genuineness of Fermin’s signature was central to the case, and it relied on discrepancies noted through visual comparison and expert findings. It observed that a close look at the signature above the name Fermin de Jesus revealed a disparity with the signature on page two (2) of the Deed of Sale. The appellate court further noted that expert witness Zenaida Torres concluded that the signatures on page two (2) and the standard signatures were not written by one and the same person. The Court of Appeals therefore found sufficient evidence to declare Fermin’s signature as a forgery.

The Court of Appeals also reasoned that even without the expert’s testimony, it had valid grounds to doubt due execution. It pointed to inconsistencies in Consolacion’s testimony about Fermin’s physical condition at the time of execution, noting contradictions regarding whether Fermin was strong despite alleged hopeless illness and whether Fermin was fetched with a wheelchair when alighting from a helicopter. The appellate court treated these contradictions as significantly impairing Consolacion’s credibility and as consistent with other testimony describing Fermin as already weak and thin, necessitating stretcher or bodily carrying.

On petitioner’s credibility, the Court of Appeals observed that during a pre-trial conference petitioner admitted to being in possession of the original copy of the Deed of Sale, but later, when pressed to produce the original, he claimed that Fermin had left him only a duplicate copy. The appellate court thus concluded that respondents de Jesus had rebutted the general rule on notarized documents.

The Court of Appeals’ Modification

While the Court of Appeals declared the notarized Deed of Sale null and void, it did so with a modification. It ruled that the Extrajudicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Estate of Deceased Person dated September 13, 1979 was declared null and void only insofar as the one-third (1/3) share of Fermin de Jesus was concerned. The appellate court otherwise affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issues Raised in the Petition for Review on Certiorari

Petitioner Pastor de Jesus filed a petition under Rule 45. He maintained that the testimony of the parties and their witnesses to the notarized agreement, including that of the notary public who notarized it, deserved greater weight than the opinion of an expert witness denying authenticity of a signature. He further asserted in a supplemental petition that the presumption of regularity of notarized documents had not been rebutted.

Respondents de Jesus countered that the petition merely reiterated issues already raised before the Court of Appeals. They also contended that the extrajudicial settlement suffered from grave infirmities and could not be treated as a duly executed document.

Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Rule 45 Limitations

The Court held that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court could only resolve questions of law. The Court reiterated that it was not a trier of facts and that a question of law must not require re-examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. It also stressed that it would not reweigh evidence unless the lower courts’ findings were totally unsupported, glaringly erroneous, or amounted to palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court viewed respondents de Jesus’ theory that Fermin’s signatures were forged as a matter of fact that had already been raised and satisfactorily ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It emphasized that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, when affirming those of the trial court, are generally final and conclusive when borne out by the record and supported by substantial evidence.

Evidentiary Standards for Forgery and Notarized Instruments

The Court acknowledged that notarized documents carry evidentiary weight as public documents and generally enjoy a presumption of regularity. Yet, it held that the presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

The Court described the evidence presented to establish forgery. Respondents de Jesus presented both family witnesses, Alicia de Jesus Oakes and Ronaldo de Jesus, who were familiar with Fermin’s handwriting and testified that the signature on page one was not Fermin’s signature, while the signature on page two was. They also presented handwriting expert Zenaida Torres, who found that the purported signature of Fermin on page two was not written by the same person whose signatures appeared as standard signatures of Fermin.

The Court summarized the expert’s noted differences, including variations in the bar on the letter “F,” differences involving the letter “E,” the formation (or failure to form) the letter “W” when certain strokes were covered, the tremor or shaky appearance in the crown in the “F,” and the fundamentally different appearance of the letter “R” on page two compared to specimen signatures. It also noted that although the expert initially testified that she could not make a definite opinion about Fermin’s abbreviated signature on page one because longhand specimens could not serve as a basis for comparative examination, she clarified on cross-examination that there were indications the page one signature and the standard signatures were not written by the same person.

Experts Are Helpful, Not Controlling; Courts May Independently Compare Handwriting

The Court held that while expert opinions on handwriting are not necessarily binding, the role of handwriting experts is to provide the court with data for its own independent determination. It explained that courts may determine forgery through visual comparison and independent examination of documentary evidence, referencing Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes a court to make comparison of disputed handwriting with writings admitted or proven to be genuine.

In applying these principles, the Court stated that the courts below did not rely solely on expert testimony. They conducted their own examination of the signatures and concluded that the disparity between the signatures on page one and page two was readily noticeable upon inspection. The Court also noted the lower courts’ observation that many specimen signatures did not bear Fermin’s printed name and that Fermin consistently signed in full rather than in the abbreviated style appeari

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