Title
De Chavez vs. Office of the Ombudsman
Case
G.R. No. 168830-31
Decision Date
Feb 6, 2007
University officials accused of corruption, including unauthorized fee collections, nepotism, and falsification; Ombudsman found probable cause, upheld by Supreme Court.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 168830-31)

Factual Background

On 7 November 2001, private respondent Nora L. Magnaye, a Professor IV of Batangas State University (BSU), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative complaint charging the petitioners and other BSU officials with Grave Misconduct, Oppression, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interests of the Service, Falsification of Official Documents, Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty, and Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). The case was docketed as OMB-1-01-1036-K.

The generative facts, as later summarized in the Ombudsman’s record, alleged, among others, that the petitioners caused the collection and receipt of graduation fees for SY 2000-2001 without issuing official receipts and without remitting the same to BSU; failed to conduct public bidding for the rental of caps and gowns by giving the contract to relatives; required and received P200.00 from each graduating student for a comprehensive examination without authorization by the BSU Board of Regents; collected internet fees without issuing official receipts despite the absence of internet facilities; collected a Related Learning Experience Fee (RLEF) from students without official receipts; and engaged in personnel and administrative acts alleged to have been undertaken without requisite authority and approvals. The complaint also imputed that the petitioners prevented the elected student federation president from sitting in the Board of Regents, increased BSU miscellaneous fees without approval, and transmitted appointments to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) without BSU Board of Regents approval.

On 13 November 2001, Magnaye filed a second complaint with the Ombudsman imputing criminal liability to the same group of BSU officials for violations of Section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, Falsification of Official Documents, and Estafa. This criminal complaint was docketed as OMB-1-01-1083-K.

Petitioners denied the allegations. In their Joint Counter-Affidavit dated 30 January 2002, they maintained, in substance, that the BSU did not collect graduation fees in the manner alleged; that students allegedly fixed, collected, and disbursed their contributions for commencement exercises; that no public bidding occurred because BSU allegedly did not enter into a contract with any supplier; that receipts signed by Lontok, Sr. were merely acknowledgments relating to funds requested for a supplier; that internet fee collections were allegedly supported by accountable forms; that internet fee collections in BSU Lipa City Campus allegedly ceased; that RLEF collections allegedly involved the cashier’s office; and that various questioned personnel and administrative actions were allegedly validated by appropriate authorities and boards.

Magnaye, in her Reply dated 8 March 2002, attached a photocopy of an Audit Report dated 7 February 2001 by State Auditor IV Milagros D. Masangkay, which found, as described in the text, that graduation fees were not yet issued official receipts and were not taken up in the books of the college, in violation of P.D. No. 1445 and relevant provisions cited therein, and that the failure resulted in an understatement of cash and trust liabilities of about P3,342,550.00.

Separately, Magnaye accused the petitioners of grave oppression and harassment by giving her unsatisfactory performance ratings for specific periods, which she claimed were retaliatory.

Ombudsman’s Joint and Supplemental Resolutions

After a clarificatory hearing and the submission of position papers, the Ombudsman, through Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Joy N. Casihan-Dumlao, with concurrence from Director Joaquin F. Salazar and Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez, issued a Joint Resolution dated 14 February 2005 in OMB-1-01-1036-K and OMB-1-01-1083-K. The Joint Resolution recommended that petitioners De Chavez, Lontok, Sr., and Mendoza be indicted for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, while recommending the dismissal of the complaints against Ligaya and Lontok, Jr., and other named BSU officials for lack of probable cause.

The Joint Resolution thus did not uniformly indict all petitioners; it distinguished between those it recommended for indictment and those it would dismiss at that stage.

After review, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo issued a Supplemental Resolution dated 12 July 2005, partially approving the Joint Resolution but modifying its findings. The Supplemental Resolution directed, among others, that further fact-finding be conducted on Ligaya for probable malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, based on alleged collection and misappropriation involving P200.00 each from BSU students as payment for RLEF without official receipts and with alleged misappropriation, and the need to establish the total amount collected.

More significantly, the Supplemental Resolution found petitioners De Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Lontok, Jr., and Mendoza liable for violations expanded beyond those in the Joint Resolution. It stated findings of liability under Section 3(e) and (h) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 315(2)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. It further found petitioners De Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Lontok, Jr., and Ligaya guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, and imposed the penalty of Dismissal from the Service, with accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

Issues Raised on Petition

The petitioners challenged the Supplemental Resolution through their Rule 65 petition. They raised two core issues.

First, they argued that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction when it “found” them liable for criminal offenses. They contended that the Supplemental Resolution did not merely determine probable cause but instead prematurely declared their criminal liability and thereby rendered trial “futile,” which allegedly conflicted with Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing the right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial.

Second, they argued that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not dismiss two separate but identical criminal complaints on the ground of forum shopping.

Petitioner Mendoza also filed a Petition in Intervention dated 12 December 2005, which the Court allowed in a resolution dated 28 August 2006.

The Parties’ Arguments and the Court’s Approach

On the first issue, the petitioners anchored their attack on the Ombudsman’s language, particularly the use of the phrase “liable for violation,” arguing that the Ombudsman exceeded its limited authority and in effect determined guilt. They further questioned the directive to conduct further fact-finding on Ligaya for probable malversation, alleging inconsistency with an earlier supposed finding of guilt relating to the RLEF collection.

The Court rejected these arguments. It emphasized that petitioners took “mountain on the use of the words ‘liable for’.” It reasoned that the Ombudsman’s powers under the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 include the authority to investigate and prosecute public officials over acts appearing illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient, and that the Ombudsman may conduct preliminary investigation to determine whether probable cause exists—without conducting a trial on the merits. Preliminary investigation, the Court stressed, is inquisitorial and aims to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the respondent is guilty, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court applied the presumption of regularity in official functions under Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Revised Rules of Evidence, holding that the Ombudsman is presumed to have used its powers within its legal limits. It treated the Ombudsman’s use of “liable for” as referring to exposure to a contingency and as consistent with a finding of probable cause, not a final declaration of guilt. It also noted the textual contrast between the criminal-stage language and the administrative-stage adjudication language where guilt and penalties were expressly imposed.

On the second issue, the Court applied the forum shopping test requiring identity of: (1) parties, (2) rights or causes of action, and (3) reliefs sought. It held that although parties and circumstances were essentially similar, the rights or causes of action and the reliefs sought differed. The complaint filed on 7 November 2001 was administrative in nature, with causes of action consisting of administrative offenses and with relief seeking dismissal and related administrative consequences. The complaint filed on 13 November 2001 was criminal, with causes of action based on specific penal provisions and with relief seeking penal sanctions such as imprisonment and related confiscation or forfeiture and perpetual disqualification. Hence, the Court concluded that the forum shopping argument was vacuous.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court grounded its rejection of the “premature guilt” theory in the legal nature of Ombudsman proceedings for probable cause. It held that preliminary investigation binds suspects over for trial and does not pronounce guilt. It reasoned that the use of “liable” in probable cause determinations does not equate to guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court further held that the Ombudsman’s probable cause determination was based on the sworn complaints, sworn statements and notarized affidavits, and official documents submitted by the private respondent, and that a clarificatory hearing was conducted with participation by the private respondent and almost all petitioners.

The Court also addressed the petitioners’ challenge to the directive for further fact-finding on Ligaya

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