G.R. No. 243968 - De Alban vs. Commission on Elections

Case Summary (G.R. No. 243968)

Antecedents and Factual Background

De Alban filed a senatorial CoC for the 2019 elections. On October 22, 2018, the COMELEC Law Department motu proprio filed to declare him a nuisance candidate, alleging lack of bona fide intention to run and inability to sustain a nationwide campaign financially.
De Alban asserted bona fide intention based on proposed government platforms (education, agriculture, health, housing), social media campaigning, a paid campaign website, and support statements from groups; he also cited frequent travels as evidence of financial capacity.
On December 6, 2018, the COMELEC First Division declared De Alban a nuisance candidate, focusing on the financial rigors of a senatorial campaign and concluding he failed to establish financial capacity, especially as an independent. Reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC En Banc on January 28, 2019. De Alban then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Procedural Posture and Relief Sought

De Alban sought judicial relief to set aside the COMELEC’s cancellation of his CoC and to include his name among senatorial candidates. He argued: (1) Section 69 of the OEC does not apply to senatorial elections under the 1987 constitutional order; (2) RA No. 6646 impliedly repealed COMELEC’s motu proprio power under Section 69; (3) the phrase “by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run…” is unconstitutionally vague and violative of due process, equal protection, and suffrage rights; and (4) COMELEC lacked factual and legal grounds to declare him a nuisance solely because financial capacity is not a CoC requirement.

Threshold Justiciability: Mootness and Exception

The Court recognized that the 2019 elections had concluded, rendering the petition moot insofar as inclusion on the 2019 ballot would be ineffectual. However, the Court invoked the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception because nuisance-candidate issues recur in periodic elections and often evade timely judicial review. The Court therefore proceeded to decide the constitutional and legal issues.

Statutory Text and Scope of Section 69, OEC

Section 69 authorizes the COMELEC “motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party” to refuse due course to or cancel a CoC when the CoC was filed: (a) to put the election in mockery or disrepute; (b) to cause confusion among voters by similarity of names; or (c) by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run and thus prevent a faithful determination of the electorate’s true will.
Section 2 of the OEC declares it shall govern all elections of public officers “and, to the extent appropriate, all referenda and plebiscites,” supporting the OEC’s continuing applicability.

Relationship Between OEC and RA No. 6646

RA No. 6646 reproduced procedural provisions governing nuisance candidates (Section 5) but omitted the explicit words “motu proprio.” The Court declined to find an implied repeal of the COMELEC’s motu proprio authority absent irreconcilable conflict. Legislative history indicates the omission was procedural rather than intended to strip COMELEC of its summary authority; debates reflected divergent views but did not show intention to revoke Section 69’s motu proprio power. The Court therefore held Section 69’s motu proprio power remains operative.

Precedent and Constitutional Backdrop Supporting COMELEC Authority

The Court cited prior jurisprudence recognizing COMELEC’s authority to prevent nuisance candidacies as consistent with its mandate to ensure free, honest, orderly elections and to avoid logistical confusion and vote dilution. The 1987 Constitution explicitly tasks COMELEC to recommend measures to prevent and penalize nuisance candidates (Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(7)), and the Constitutional Commission deliberations anticipated nuisance candidacies as an electoral evil. These constitutional and jurisprudential foundations support the COMELEC’s authority to act against nuisance candidates.

Vagueness, “Clearly” Standard, and Judicial Construction

The Court rejected the vagueness challenge to the phrase “by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate…” Judicial doctrine allows statutes with imprecise language to be saved by proper construction where the statute specifies a standard, even if defectively phrased. The insertion of “clearly” in the legislative history was emphasized as a limiting word to confine COMELEC action to cases where absence of bona fide intention is evident. Legislative debates and constitutional discussions confirm the phrase supplies adequate notice and prevents unbridled enforcement discretion when construed in context.

Equal Protection, Right of Suffrage, and Reasonableness of Classification

The Court found no equal protection violation. Section 69 draws a reasonable classification between bona fide candidates and those whose CoCs are filed to frustrate the electorate’s will. The classification rests on real and substantial distinctions, is germane to the objective of orderly elections, is not confined to existing conditions, and applies equally to similarly situated candidates. The right to seek public office is a privilege, not an absolute constitutional right; restrictions must be objective and reasonable, which Section 69 embodies when properly applied.

Procedural Due Process Required Before CoC Cancellation

The COMELEC’s ministerial duty under the OEC is to receive and acknowledge a duly filed CoC (Section 76); cancellation invokes COMELEC’s quasi-judicial function and must satisfy procedural due process. Cipriano v. COMELEC and Timbol v. COMELEC were cited: where factual determinations bear on deprivation of candidacy, the candidate must be notified and afforded a fair opportunity to present evidence and refute allegations. In nuisance-candidate proceedings, due process means giving the candidate a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain or rebut. The COMELEC’s motu proprio power cannot be exercised in a manner that forecloses this procedural safeguard.

Application of Legal Principles to De Alban’s Case

The COMELEC Law Department based its motu proprio petition largely on the notion that De Alban’s declared occupation (“lawyer teacher”) suggested insufficient financial capacity to wage a nationwide senatorial campaign and that he lacked political machinery as an independent. The Court identified multiple errors in COMELEC’s approach:
- Financial capacity is not a statutory or constitutional qualification for candidacy; requiring proof of financial means equates to an impermissible property qualification. Maquera v. Borra and Marquez v. COMELEC preclude financial capacity as sole ground for nuisance declaration. Section 13 of RA 7166 sets expense limits but does not impose a minimum financial requirement.
- The COMELEC failed to identify specific acts or circumstances that clearly demonstrated lack of bona fide intention to run and did not explain how De Alban’s inclusion on the ballot would prevent a faithful determination of the electorate’s will.
- The COMELEC shifted the evidentiary burden improperly onto De Alban to prove capacity immediately upon filing, rather than proving the CoC was filed in bad faith.
- The COMELEC did not apply consistent standards (no rule specifying minimum proof of capacity), creating potential equal protection concerns and reflecting a “
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 243968)

Case Caption, Court and Date

En Banc decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in G.R. No. 243968, dated March 22, 2022.
Title as presented in the source: Angelo Castro De Alban, Petitioner, vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Comelec Law Department and Comelec Education and Information Department, Respondents.
Decision authored by Justice M. Lopez.

Central Legal Question

Whether the Commission on Elections (Comelec) may, motu proprio, refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) of a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
Whether the last phrase of Section 69 of the OEC — concerning “other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office ... and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate” — is constitutional, including challenges under due process, equal protection, and right of suffrage.
Whether Comelec’s cancellation of petitioner Angelo Castro De Alban’s CoC was supported by proper interpretation of law and substantial evidence.

Factual Background / Antecedents

Angelo Castro De Alban filed his CoC for senator in the May 13, 2019 elections as an independent candidate, listing his occupation as “lawyer and teacher.”
On October 22, 2018, the Comelec Law Department motu proprio filed a petition declaring De Alban a nuisance candidate, alleging lack of bona fide intent to run and inability to sustain the financial rigors of a nationwide campaign without proof of financial capacity.
De Alban asserted bona fide intention, proffering government platforms on education, agriculture, health, and housing, claimed capacity to wage a nationwide campaign via paid website, commissioned social media advertisements (Facebook), secured statements of support from groups, and alleged frequent domestic and international travels as evidence of financial capacity.
December 6, 2018: Comelec First Division declared De Alban a nuisance candidate, citing authorized expenses for senatorial aspirants and concluding De Alban failed to establish financial capacity to mount a nationwide campaign, especially as an independent.
Reconsideration denied by Comelec En Banc on January 28, 2019; En Banc emphasized the burdens and expenses of a national campaign, stated it was De Alban’s burden to prove bona fide intent and adequate resources, and reiterated that the Commission is not duty-bound to adduce evidence for the candidate.
De Alban filed this Petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by Comelec and challenged Section 69’s applicability to senatorial candidates, alleged implied repeal by RA No. 6646, and attacked the constitutionality of the phrase on bona fide intention for vagueness and for violating suffrage and equal protection.

Petitioner’s Principal Arguments (De Alban)

Section 69 of the OEC, as enacted before the 1987 Constitution and prior to the modern Senate, does not apply to senatorial elections.
RA No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) implicitly repealed Section 69’s motu proprio power; Section 5 of RA 6646 restricts petitions to those filed by registered candidates running for the same position, thus removing Comelec’s motu proprio authority.
The phrase “by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run … and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate” is unconstitutionally vague, violating due process (lack of comprehensible standards), equal protection, and the right of suffrage as arbitrary and subjective.
The Comelec had no factual or legal ground to cancel his CoC solely because the CoC did not require declaration of financial capacity; he did present evidence (website receipts, Facebook impressions, support statements, travel) demonstrating capacity and bona fide intent.
He requests inclusion of his name in the senatorial list for 2019 elections.

Respondent’s Principal Arguments (Comelec / Office of the Solicitor General)

The OEC governs elections of all public officers and is not incompatible with RA No. 6646; RA 6646 did not abrogate Section 69’s motu proprio authority.
Section 69 is a constitutionally valid exercise of Comelec’s power to exclude nuisance candidates as a permissible limitation on the privilege of running for public office.
Comelec declared De Alban a nuisance candidate because of lack of financial capacity and absence of political machinery or organizational support to wage a nationwide campaign; such inability undermines bona fide intention.

Governing Statutory and Constitutional Provisions Quoted or Discussed

Section 69, Omnibus Election Code (text reproduced): Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition refuse to give due course to or cancel a CoC if shown that CoC was filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, to cause confusion by similarity of names, or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate lack of bona fide intention to run and thus prevent faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
Section 2 of the OEC: OEC “shall govern all elections of public officers and, to the extent appropriate, all referenda and plebiscites.”
Section 5, RA No. 6646: Procedure in cases of nuisance candidates — a verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate a nuisance under Section 69 shall be filed personally or through a duly authorized representative by any registered candidate for the same office within five days from the last day for filing CoCs.
RA No. 7166 Section 36 and RA No. 8436 (as amended by RA 9369): reiterations of OEC applicability to subsequent laws and automated election laws where not inconsistent.
Constitutional Commission deliberations: Article IX-C, Sec. 2 (7) on Comelec powers to recommend measures to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, malpractices, and nuisance candidates.
Section 73 and 76 of OEC referenced for ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge CoC and ministerial nature of receipt.

Mootness, Exceptions and Court’s Jurisdictional Finding

The Court recognized the petition’s principal relief (inclusion on the 2019 ballots) as moot and academic because the 2019 elections concluded and winners were proclaimed, rendering the requested relief practically unenforceable.
Court invoked established doctrine on mootness with exceptions allowing adjudication: grave constitutional violation, exceptional situation and paramount public interest, need to formulate controlling principles, and cases capable of repetition yet evading review.
The Court found this case falls within the fourth exception (capable of repetition yet evading review) because elections recur and nuisance-candidate issues will continue to reach the Court — justifying resolution despite mootness.

Applicability of the OEC and Section 69 to Senatorial Elections

Court concluded Section 69 applies to elections of all public officers, including senatorial candidates: Section 2 of OEC explicitly states it governs all elections of public officers; subsequent statutes (RA 6646, RA 7166, RA 8436/9369) either incorporate or reiterate OEC’s applicability where not inconsistent.
Citing Agujetas v. Court of Appeals and legislative and executive measures, Court held OEC remains the fundamental law on elections despite constitutional and statutory changes.

Interaction between Section 69 OEC and RA No. 6646 (Implied R