Title
Supreme Court
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
Case
G.R. No. 171396
Decision Date
May 3, 2006
In 2006, President Arroyo declared a national emergency (PP 1017) citing rebellion threats. The Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality but ruled against warrantless arrests, prior restraint on freedoms, and legislative overreach, emphasizing constitutional rights and checks on executive power.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 171396)

Procedural Posture

Within days, seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed in the Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and GO 5. The Solicitor General urged dismissal for mootness after PP 1021, and raised standing objections. Petitioners alleged grave abuse of discretion, usurpation of legislative/emergency powers, violations of Bill of Rights guarantees and illegal implementation by AFP/PNP.

Justiciability and Mootness

The Court held that the petitions were not moot despite PP 1021’s lifting of the emergency declaration. Petitioners had alleged illegal acts committed under PP 1017 and GO 5, justifying judicial review under the “exceptions” to mootness: grave constitutional issues, paramount public interest, need for guidance of bench/bar, and capability of repetition yet evading review.

Locus Standi Rulings

Applying both the “direct injury” test and the “transcendental importance” doctrine, the Court found all petitioners to have standing:

  • Professors and legislators alleged direct illegal arrests and usurpation of legislative powers.
  • Media entities alleged warrantless raids and prior restraint.
  • Labor, civil-liberties groups and concerned citizens asserted violations of assembly rights.
  • Even where direct injury was not shown, the Court relaxed standing requirements due to the cases’ public importance. The President was not impleaded, consistent with her immunity from suit during tenure.

Review of Factual Bases

Under Section 1, Article VIII and Lansang v. Garcia, the Supreme Court may review the factual basis for the President’s exercise of “calling-out” power only to determine whether the decision was arbitrary or totally bereft of factual support, not to substitute its own judgment. The Solicitor General presented detailed intelligence on mutinous officers, bomb plots, alliances between insurgents and dissident military elements, demonstrating sufficient factual basis. Petitioners offered no contrary allegations, and the Court found no “grave abuse of discretion” in issuing PP 1017.

Calling-Out Power vs. Martial Law

Section 18, Article VII vests the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to “call out the armed forces” to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. This is distinct from the far more drastic powers to suspend habeas corpus or declare martial law, each with strict constitutional checks. The Court concluded PP 1017 properly invoked the “calling-out” power without crossing into martial-law territory.

Ordinance Power and Proclamations

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the President issues executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders and general or special orders (military). Proclamations “declaring a status or condition” have the force of executive orders. GO 5, as a “general order” implementing PP 1017, is a valid exercise of military‐chain authority to AFP/PNP subordinates.

Legislative Power and “Decrees”

PP 1017’s operative clause commanded the AFP “to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.” The Court held that the term “decrees” could only refer to pre-existing presidential decrees with statutory effect (e.g., those issued under Martial Law by Marcos), not to new lawmaking power. The President under the 1987 Constitution has no authority to issue decrees with the force of law; legislative power belongs exclusively to Congress. Any new decrees issued by the President would be ultra vires.

Emergency “Takeover” Power

Section 17, Article XII allows the State, in times of national emergency, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The Court held that this provision contemplates congressional action—“reasonable terms prescribed by it”—and does not authorize the President unilaterally to exercise takeover powers. Without congressional legislation delegating that authority, PP 1017’s reference to Section 17 cannot trigger a valid executive takeover.

Scope of “Acts of Terrorism”

GO 5 directed AFP and PNP to suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence. The Court observed that “acts of terrorism” have not been defined or criminalized by Congress, unlike lawless violence, which is recognized in constitutional text. As a result, the term is too vague and open to arbitrary enforcement. The Court struck GO 5’s “acts of terrorism” portion as unconstitutional for lack of statutory definition and potential violation of due-process and free-speech safeguards.

Constitutional Freedoms and As-Applied Challenge

Petitioners David, Llamas and KMU members suffered warrantless arrests, dispersals of assemblies, searches and seizures, and press intrusions allegedly in the name of PP 1017 and GO 5. The Court emphasized that neither PP 1017 nor GO 5 authorizes unconstitutional acts:

  • Freedom of Assembly (Art. III, Sec. 4): only upon “clear and present danger” may the right be curtailed. Blank
    • ...continue reading

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