Title
DAP Mining Association vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 92328
Decision Date
Jun 6, 2001
Petitioner DAP Mining Association contested Chico Mines' control over mining claims, alleging breach of trust. BMGS nullified their contract; petitioner's delayed appeals and defective relief petition led to dismissal, affirming finality of BMGS decision.
relief from judgment
prescribed period
necessary affidavits of merit
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 92328)

Factual Background

On 04 July 1971, petitioner entered into a contract with Chico Mines, Inc. for the occupation, possession, control, operation, and exploitation of seventy-one (71) mineral lode claims in Baguio and Itogon. Petitioner claimed it had located, staked, occupied, and registered the claims with the Mining Recorder of the Bureau of Mines and Geodetic Sciences (BMGS). As provided by the agreement, the mining claims were transferred and registered in the name of Chico Mines in the Mining Recorder’s Office of District I, Baguio City.

On 21 October 1971, the parties executed a trust agreement superseding the earlier contract. The trust agreement gave Chico Mines absolute authority to explore, develop, and exploit the lode claims, with an obligation to pay petitioner a straight royalty of three and one-half (3-1/2) percent of monthly smelter returns from all ores extracted from the mineral claims.

On 11 November 1980, petitioner filed with the BMGS a petition for cancellation of the 21 October 1971 contract, alleging non-fulfillment of the agreement’s terms and breach of trust by the respondent mining company. Respondent denied material allegations and asserted that it was not a party to the agreement and did not authorize anyone to sign for it, and further argued that petitioner was disqualified from filing any declaration of location of mineral claims.

BMGS Decision and Failure to Timely Appeal

On 07 May 1981, the BMGS rendered a decision declaring the contract of 21 October 1971 null and void. The BMGS held that the mining claims were deemed abandoned by petitioner prior to the execution of the trust agreement and that, on 06 August 1971, the claims were registered in the name of respondent company. Petitioner received a copy of the BMGS decision on 12 May 1981.

Petitioner did not file an appeal within the reglementary period. Under Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 463, any party dissatisfied with the Director of Mines could appeal to the Secretary within five (5) days from receipt of the decision, and the Secretary’s decision could be appealed to the President within five (5) days from receipt. Petitioner instead filed on 01 June 1981 a set of “Multiple Alternative Motions,” seeking reconsideration of the 07 May 1981 BMGS decision. On 30 July 1981, the BMGS denied the motions for having been filed out of time, applying Section 131 of the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order, as amended, which implemented Presidential Decree No. 463. Petitioner received the denial on 13 August 1981.

Petition for Relief from Judgment and Subsequent Administrative Developments

On 25 August 1981, petitioner filed with the Ministry of Natural Resources a petition for relief from judgment, docketed as MNR Case No. 4855. On 07 July 1982, the Ministry dismissed the petition for being filed out of time, noting that it was interposed beyond sixty (60) days from the time petitioner learned of the order sought to be set aside. Petitioner later sought reconsideration. On 28 July 1982, it filed a motion for reconsideration, but the narrative then shifted after several years.

On 22 July 1985, more than three years after the dismissal of the relief petition, Deputy Minister of Natural Resources Arnold Caoili issued an order setting aside the 07 July 1982 MNR order. The Deputy Minister reversed the BMGS decision of 07 May 1981, relieved petitioner of its effects, cancelled the operating contract between petitioner and respondent, and directed the Mining Recorder of Baguio City to cancel the “ROSE” claims registered in respondent’s name and to transfer and register the claims in petitioner’s name upon payment of registration costs and other obligations.

Respondent company then challenged the order, filing a motion to declare the 22 July 1985 order null and void. In a decision dated 23 August 1986, Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto Maceda annulled the Deputy Minister’s order. The Minister’s thesis was that when Deputy Minister Caoili acted on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the BMGS decision of 07 May 1981 had already become final and executory. As a result, the order dated 23 August 1986 effectively revived the 07 July 1982 Ministry decision that had denied petitioner’s petition for relief. Petitioner received a copy of the Minister’s decision on 04 September 1986 and appealed to the Office of the President. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal, and petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before this Court, which the latter referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. On 20 November 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s petition with costs. The appellate court found no jurisdictional error attributable to the questioned officials. It also agreed with the Solicitor General that petitioner’s motions for reconsideration and appeal were in accordance with law and evidence and that the BMGS decision had long become final and executory.

The Court of Appeals invoked doctrines emphasizing the strict observance of reglementary periods: it cited decisions such as Agricultural & Industrial Marketing, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Santos vs. CA to support the view that perfection of an appeal within the prescribed time is jurisdictional, and that certiorari cannot take the place of a lost appeal.

The Court of Appeals also addressed petitioner’s argument that it was error to rule its petition for relief was filed out of time. It found that petitioner received the BMGS decision on 12 May 1981, yet it did not appeal within the five-day period under Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 463. Petitioner filed its “Multiple Alternative Motions” on 01 June 1981, which the Court of Appeals treated as effectively seeking reconsideration after the decision had already become final. It further found that petitioner then filed the petition for relief from judgment on 25 August 1981, which was well beyond the prescribed time counted from petitioner’s learning of the BMGS decision.

The Parties’ Contentions on Timeliness

Petitioner insisted that the petition for relief was wrongly declared out of time. The Court of Appeals rejected that insistence by focusing on the statutory and procedural deadlines. It reasoned that petitioner filed the “Multiple Alternative Motions” after the reglementary period for appeal had elapsed and, consequently, the 07 May 1981 BMGS decision had already become final and executory. It then ruled that the later petition for relief was itself time-barred.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Court of Appeals grounded its ruling on the combined operation of Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 463 and the time limitations for a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 3. It held that petitioner failed to file an appeal within the five-day period from receipt of the BMGS decision, given receipt on 12 May 1981 and the filing of the “Multiple Alternative Motions” only on 01 June 1981, or after the lapse of about twenty (20) days. Because the appeal period had lapsed, the Court of Appeals treated the BMGS decision as no longer subject to disturbance through the chosen procedural route.

The Court of Appeals further held that petitioner’s petition for relief was filed beyond the sixty (60) days allowed from the time petitioner learned of the judgment or final order to be set aside and also exceeded the bounds of the rule’s extraordinary character. It noted that petitioner filed the petition for relief on 25 August 1981, after more than the passage of one hundred five (105) days from the receipt of the BMGS decision on 12 May 1981. It also observed that the petition for relief did not meet other essential requirements because it was not accompanied by the affidavits of merit showing fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, as well as the facts showing petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense. The Court of Appeals described a petition for relief as a special remedy meant to grant a last chance only in exceptional cases and characterized the periods set for it as extraordina

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