Title
Danon vs. Brimo
Case
G.R. No. 15823
Decision Date
Sep 12, 1921
Broker Julio Danon sought commission for finding buyers for a factory, but the Supreme Court ruled he was not the procuring cause of the sale, absolving the defendant.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 15823)

Nature of the Action and Claim

The plaintiff brought the action to recover the sum of P60,000, alleging that the defendant employed him as a broker for the sale of its factory “Holland American Oil Co.” in August 1918. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant offered to sell the factory for P1,200,000, payable in cash, and that the defendant promised him a commission of five per cent if the sale was consummated or if the plaintiff found a purchaser ready, able, and willing to buy the property for the stated price.

The defendant answered with a general denial. After trial, the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario rendered judgment for the plaintiff for P60,000, with costs. The defendant appealed.

Appellate Evaluation of the Agreement and Authority

The Supreme Court noted that the proof regarding the plaintiff’s authority and the terms of the brokerage arrangement was “extremely unsatisfactory.” The evidence consisted solely of testimony from the plaintiff and from the defendant’s manager, Antonio A. Brimo. The Court observed that neither witness appeared entirely free from prevarications, yet it also stated that, giving weight to the trial court’s findings and considering the inherent probability of the testimony, it approximated the truth.

Based on this assessment, the Court found: (1) that in a conversation around the middle of August 1918, Brimo informed the plaintiff that he desired to sell the factory for P1,200,000; (2) that Brimo agreed to pay a commission of five per cent provided the plaintiff could sell the factory for that amount; and (3) that no definite period of time was fixed within which the plaintiff was to effect the sale.

The Court also treated it as probable that the plaintiff knew another broker, Sellner, was also negotiating for the same property. The Court inferred that the plaintiff’s efforts were directed at foreclosing competition by being the first to find a purchaser and consummate the sale.

Whether the Plaintiff Performed the Brokerage Obligation

The Supreme Court focused next on whether the plaintiff performed all requirements under the contract to entitle him to the promised commission. The Court held that the proof of performance was no less unsatisfactory.

The plaintiff’s reported conduct after the initial interview was that he went to Mauro Prieto, president of the Santa Ana Oil Mill, and offered to sell the defendant’s factory at P1,200,000. The Santa Ana Oil Mill allegedly needed such a factory. Prieto instructed the manager, Samuel E. Kane, to see Brimo and ascertain whether Brimo truly intended to sell and, if so, to obtain permission to inspect the premises. The manager inspected the factory and, presumably, reported favorably.

Prieto then asked for an appointment with Brimo to perfect the negotiation. However, during this time Sellner had found a purchaser who ultimately bought the factory for P1,300,000. For that reason Prieto, as the prospective purchaser allegedly introduced by the plaintiff, never came to see Brimo to perfect the proposed negotiation.

Under the Court’s reading of the record, the plaintiff’s accomplishment amounted to finding a person who might have bought the factory if the defendant had not already sold it to someone else. The Court held that the evidence did not show that Santa Ana Oil Mill had definitely decided to buy at the fixed price of P1,200,000. It found that the board of directors had not resolved to purchase the property, and even assuming Prieto could legally purchase without prior formal authorization, Prieto did not claim that he had definitely and formally agreed to buy the factory at the stated price. The Court emphasized that Prieto’s testimony reflected that no offer of P1,200,000 had been made by him, and that the proposed deal did not proceed because the defendant was already treated as sold.

Plaintiff’s Theory and the Unconsummated Negotiations

The plaintiff claimed that the sale to Santa Ana Oil Mill failed because Brimo refused to sell to a Filipino firm and preferred an American buyer. The plaintiff further asserted that after learning of that attitude he sought another purchaser and found Mr. Leas, who allegedly delivered a letter offering to buy the factory at P1,200,000, good for twenty-four hours.

The Court stated that this portion of the plaintiff’s narrative—particularly the circumstance of the defendant’s ultimate sale to another party—was consistent with an admitted fact: that Sellner entered while Brimo was reading Leas’s letter and the deal was closed at P1,300,000.

Thus, although the plaintiff had produced persons who showed interest and whose negotiation would possibly have progressed, the Court concluded that the contractual brokerage outcome was not achieved on the stipulated terms.

Governing Legal Principles on Broker’s Entitlement to Commission

The Supreme Court treated the action as one seeking “reasonable value” of services rather than damages for breach of contract. It noted the plaintiff’s testimony that the “reasonable value” was framed as five per cent of the price at which it was sold, and it asked what benefit the plaintiff conferred on the defendant that justified the claim of P50,000 (as stated in the trial testimony excerpt within the decision) under his theory of brokerage.

The Court held that the plaintiff’s services did not contribute toward bringing about the actual sale. It ruled that the plaintiff was not the “efficient agent” or “procuring cause” of the sale. In support, the decision cited principles drawn from American jurisprudence, including the rule that a broker must bring the minds of the buyer and seller to an agreement on the price and terms and that commissions do not accrue until that result occurs. The Court further quoted doctrines emphasizing that a broker is not entitled to commission for unsuccessful efforts, and that the broker bears the risk of failure unless the failure results from the employer’s fault, such as a capricious change of mind after the purchaser ready and willing on the prescribed terms is produced, or where the principal seeks to escape commissions in bad faith by terminating or revoking authority when success is near.

The Court also relied on the principle that where no definite time is fixed, either party may terminate the brokerage at will subject to good faith, and that the seller retains the right to sell independently before the bargain is made. It invoked the stated rule that a principal who has employed a broker can himself sell to a purchaser whom he has procured without aid from the broker.

Application to the Facts and Reversal

Applying these doctrines, the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff could not recover commission. It stressed that the contract required more than naming or introducing a person who might be wil

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