G.R. No. L-49995 - Damasen vs. Herdo

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-49995)

Factual Background and Procedural Antecedents

In Civil Case No. 464, on August 27, 1970, Judge Juan Aquino dismissed the damages suit. The decision’s dispositive portion ordered the plaintiff to pay actual damages in the amount of P1,000.00, plus another P1,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages, and costs of the proceedings. No appeal was taken by either party.

On August 8, 1974, Quimang moved for execution, and Judge Aquino granted it over petitioner’s objection. Petitioner then sought relief via certiorari before the Court of Appeals. That petition was dismissed on October 29, 1974 “without costs” (CA-G.R. No. SP-03530). Petitioner’s subsequent review at this Tribunal was also denied on March 7, 1975 for lack of merit (G.R. No. L-39836).

On November 7, 1978, Judge Hernando granted execution upon private respondent’s instance. On November 21, 1978, the judge “noted and approved” ex parte a Bill of Costs charging, among others, attendance of defendant and counsels and attorney’s fees in the total amount of P2,720.00.

Petitioner sought reconsideration. On January 9, 1979, Judge Hernando issued the questioned order. He disallowed some items but still approved substantial attorney’s fees, reasoning that the attorney’s fees were justified “because exemplary damages were awarded,” invoking Article 2208 No. 1.

The Petition for Certiorari and Preliminary Injunction

Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction challenging the January 9, 1979 approval and modification of the bill of costs, particularly the inclusion of P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees as part of judicial costs. The Court granted due course to the petition and issued a Restraining Order on April 2, 1979, enjoining respondents from enforcing the assailed order.

In support of the petition, petitioner argued that Judge Hernando committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by taxing items contrary to secs. 6 and 10 of Rule 142. Petitioner further contended that the judge misconstrued Article 2208, par. 1, of the Civil Code as an exception to Rule 142, and that the judge could not substantially alter or modify the final decision by ordering additional costs not warranted by law and the facts.

Governing Rules on Judicial Costs and Attorney’s Fees

The Court began by characterizing judicial costs as statutory allowances to a party for expenses incurred in the action. It stressed that costs relate only to parties and to the amounts paid by them. It also reiterated the general rule that costs are allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of course unless otherwise provided in the Rules of Court.

The Court applied Section 10 of Rule 142, which enumerates the costs recoverable in an action pending in a Court of First Instance, and limits recovery to specified items. It then examined Section 6 of Rule 142, which expressly provides that no attorney’s fees shall be taxed as costs against the adverse party, except as provided by the rules of civil law, while clarifying that the rule does not apply to fees charged by counsel against the client.

On the strength of Rule 142, the Court held that attorney’s fees are not normally taxable as costs because they are not included within the expenses and costs of the trial or proceeding.

Error in the Trial Court’s Reliance on Article 2208

Judge Hernando had sustained the taxation of P2,500.00 attorney’s fees as judicial costs by stating that exemplary damages were awarded, and by invoking Article 2208 No. 1.

The Court found that approach erroneous for a decisive reason. Although exemplary damages had been awarded in the damages suit, attorney’s fees were not awarded in the judgment. The dispositive portion, while ordering payment of moral and exemplary damages and costs, did not include any specific grant of attorney’s fees in its decretal portion.

The Court emphasized that counsel’s fees require a form of judicial discretion for adjudication in a judgment. By contrast, the taxation of costs is characterized as a ministerial duty that may involve some judgment or discretion, but does not allow the court in a bill of costs proceeding to grant attorney’s fees where the judgment itself did not expressly award them.

The Court further explained that the bill of costs is initially acted upon by the Clerk of Court, with the parties retaining the opportunity to appeal from the clerk’s taxation. This structure presupposes adherence to the costs recoverable under the Rules and the judgment’s specific awards. The Court found it improper to adjudicate attorney’s fees as costs after the judgment when the court’s discretionary determination on attorney’s fees had not been embodied in the judgment’s dispositive portion.

Pertinent Jurisprudence on Proof and Exceptional Nature of Attorney’s Fees

The Court also relied on doctrines from Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd. vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc., stating that even where Article 2208 authorizes attorney’s fees in contemplated cases, it does not dispense with the necessity of proving the amount of attorney’s fees. It further cited Estate of Buan vs. Camaganacan for the proposition that the award of attorney’s fees remains exceptional and requires express findings of fact by the court to justify the grant.

In the present case, the Court concluded that attorney’s fees could not be taxed as part of costs in the bill of costs proceeding. It therefore limited recoverable costs to those allowed by the Rul

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-49995)

Segundina M. Damasen (petitioner) sought certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul the Order dated January 9, 1979 of Judge Harold M. Hernando, then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I.
Judge Harold M. Hernando (respondent) issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 464, entitled “Segundina Damasen vs. Cecilia Quimang”, for damages.
Cecilia Quimang (respondent) was the private respondent in this proceeding and the defendant in the damages suit.
The challenged order approved, with modification, the Bill of Costs submitted by Quimang and objected to by Damasen.

Parties and Procedural Posture

The petition was for Rule 65 certiorari with preliminary injunction to set aside the taxation and approval of items in the Bill of Costs.
The petitioner questioned the January 9, 1979 order that approved a portion of the bill of costs after her objections.
The Court granted a Restraining Order on April 2, 1979 enjoining enforcement of the assailed order.
After due course, the Court resolved the petition by setting aside the approval of the bill of costs and limiting recoverable costs.

Key Factual Allegations

An Information was filed on October 10, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Abra against Cecilia Quimang for Grave Oral Defamation under Criminal Case No. 170.
Segundina Damasen was the complainant in the criminal case.
Quimang was convicted of Slight Oral Defamation by decision dated September 27, 1966, rendered by the same trial court.
Quimang appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Because the trial court judgment did not award damages to Damasen, Damasen filed an independent damages action, Civil Case No. 464, on November 3, 1966.
The Court of Appeals later acquitted Quimang in the criminal case.
In the damages suit, a decision dated August 27, 1970, authored by Judge Juan Aquino, dismissed the action and ordered Damasen to pay Quimang actual damages of P1,000.00, plus moral and exemplary damages of P1,000.00 each, and costs of the proceedings.
No appeal was taken from the August 27, 1970 decision by either party.
Quimang moved for execution, and on August 8, 1974, execution was granted over Damasen’s objection.
Damasen filed certiorari in the Court of Appeals challenging the order of execution, but the Court of Appeals dismissed it on October 29, 1974 “without costs”.
Damasen’s further review was denied by the Supreme Court on March 7, 1975 for lack of merit.
Upon Quimang’s instance, Judge Hernando granted anew execution in the damages suit on November 7, 1978.
On November 21, 1978, Judge Hernando “noted and approved” ex parte a Bill of Costs that included, among others, attorney’s fees of P2,500.00, and other enumerated items totaling P2,720.00.
Damasen moved for reconsideration, and on January 9, 1979, Judge Hernando resolved objections by reducing some items and approving attorney’s fees of P2,500.00 on the ground that exemplary damages were awarded.

Issues Presented

The petition raised whether Judge Hernando gravely abused discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving parts of the Bill of Costs as judicial costs.
The petition also asked whether attorney’s fees could be taxed as costs despite the limitations of Rules of Court, Rule 142 after the damages judgment had become final and executory.
The petition further challenged whether the order could legally add or modify costs not warranted by the governing rules and the facts of the case.

Controlling Procedural Rules

The Court treated the assailed order as one involving taxation of costs governed by Rule 142.
Section 10 of Rule 142 limited costs recoverable in Courts of First Instance to enumerated items and expressly barred recovery of “and no other.”
Section 6 of Rule 142 provided that “[n]o attorney’s fees shall be taxed as costs against the adverse party, except as provided by the rules of civil law,” and also clarified that the rule did not affect fees charged by an attorney to a client.
The Court recognized the general structure of cost taxation as starting with taxation by the Clerk of Court, with judicial review available through appeal to the Court, in accordance with Section 8, Rule 142.
The Court emphasized the distinction between adjudication requiring judicial discretion and taxation of costs, which it characterized as a matter of a more ministerial function, ev