G.R. No. 244649 - Daep vs. Sandiganbayan, 4th Division

Case Summary (G.R. No. 244649)

Facts

The Information was filed on August 3, 2016. It alleged that, from March to April 2004 (or sometime prior or subsequent thereto), petitioners, acting as municipal officials and members of a Bids and Awards Committee, willfully and unlawfully caused undue injury to the government and gave unwarranted benefits to Hexaphil Agriventures, Inc. by awarding a contract for the purchase of four thousand two hundred eighty-five bottles of Hexaplus liquid fertilizer through direct contracting, and by causing the disbursement of P2,999,500.00 to Hexaphil.

The Information further alleged that Hexaphil’s entitlement to transact with the government was defective and that procurement requirements were not met, describing irregularities and purported fraud, including: Hexaphil’s alleged lack of registration with the Department of Trade and Industry; revocation of its SEC registration; absence of business/permit records in Laguna where it supposedly held office; and the alleged identification of Hexaphil by the BAC members and by Daep at the inception of the procurement process, including the alleged pre-preparation of a purchase request indicating the Hexaplus brand prior to release of the first tranche on April 5, 2004.

Preliminary Investigation and Assertions of Delay

Before the Information was filed, petitioners were subjected to preliminary investigation arising from a complaint connected to the “Fertilizer Fund Scam.” Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause on August 16, 2016, arguing that they did not conspire and did not give unwarranted benefits to Hexaphil through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. They also argued that there was inordinate delay in the filing of the case such that it should be dismissed. Petitioners stated that the complaint against them was filed on May 16, 2011, they timely filed counter-affidavits on September 12, 2011, but the Office of the Ombudsman issued its resolution only on October 22, 2014.

In a Resolution dated February 1, 2017, the Sandiganbayan denied the urgent motion. It ruled that probable cause existed to charge petitioners under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and held that there was no inordinate delay in the filing of the case. It noted that although the Ombudsman took approximately three (3) years to terminate the preliminary investigation, the prosecution had explained that the case involved complex issues, voluminous documents, and various witnesses.

Petitioners sought reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied in a Resolution dated April 6, 2018. On June 14, 2018, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss before the Sandiganbayan again raising the alleged violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases. Petitioners reiterated that the underlying facts arose in 2004, yet the complaint was filed only in 2011 and the Information was filed in 2016.

In a Resolution dated October 16, 2018, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Dismiss, describing it as the third motion filed by petitioners to dismiss the case on the same ground of inordinate delay and finding no need to reiterate the same arguments. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 27, 2018, prompting the present Rule 65 petition.

Petitioners’ Position

Petitioners argued that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to dismiss the case for inordinate delay. They maintained that the complaint was filed in 2011 but the Information was filed only in 2016, and thus the delay furnished a sufficient ground to dismiss.

Petitioners further alleged that the prosecution failed to provide convincing and sufficient reasons for the delay in terminating the preliminary investigation. They claimed undue prejudice, stating that their witnesses were no longer available and that some documents they could have used for their defense could not be found anymore.

The People’s Position

The People, through the OSP, countered that there was no inordinate delay amounting to a violation of petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases. The OSP invoked the balancing-of-interest approach, considering: (one) the length of delay; (two) the reasons for delay; (three) whether the accused asserted the right or failed to assert it; and (four) the prejudice caused by delay.

The OSP argued that the case was part of a series of investigations arising from the “Fertilizer Fund” scam involving misuse of a large Department of Agriculture fund under the GMA Program, involving high and low ranking officials as well as bogus or dummy private entities. According to the OSP, the time between preliminary investigation and the filing of the Information was attributable to the complexity of financial interests and business dealings, the number of parties investigated, and the review of voluminous documents related to the claims and defenses.

The OSP also asserted that its heavy caseload justified the timing. On prejudice, the OSP argued that petitioners’ claims were self-serving and unsubstantiated. It emphasized that petitioners were on bail and could move as they pleased. The OSP insisted that a mere mathematical count of the period was not enough to establish a constitutional violation.

Sole Issue

The Supreme Court framed the sole issue as whether petitioners’ right to speedy disposition of cases was violated.

Applicable Constitutional and Jurisprudential Standards

The Court held that the right to speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. It explained that the right is not limited to accused persons in criminal proceedings. It extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative matters, and applies to both judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.

The Court recognized that the right is commonly invoked in fact-finding and preliminary investigations conducted by the Ombudsman because, although such proceedings do not constitute the criminal prosecution proper, the respondent may already be prejudiced and the Ombudsman is constitutionally expected to act promptly on complaints filed before it.

The Court noted that the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 did not set a specific period within which action must be deemed “prompt,” even though rules of court and Ombudsman rules provide periods for preliminary investigations. The Court reiterated its jurisprudence that a mere mathematical reckoning of time is insufficient and that termination beyond rule periods, by itself, does not automatically equate to a violation. The right is a relative and flexible concept, and violation occurs only when delay is inordinate, attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive circumstances, or when postponements are unjustified or when without cause, long periods pass without the case being tried.

The Court synthesised and applied the mode of analysis clarified in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan: it distinguished speedy disposition from speedy trial; treated initiation as the filing of a formal complaint prior to preliminary investigation, excluding time spent on fact-finding; required the Court to determine the burden of proof based on when the right was invoked within time periods set by issuances; required the prosecution to justify delay once the burden shifts; warned against mechanical delay measurement; recognized exceptions involving malicious or politically motivated prosecution and waiver through acquiescence; and required timely invocation or else deemed waiver.

Court’s Chronology-Based Determination

Applying these standards, the Court examined the chronology. The Ombudsman’s Task Force Abono filed a complaint on May 16, 2011. Preliminary investigation commenced in August 2011, with an order requiring counter-affidavits within ten (10) days. Petitioners filed counter-affidavits in September 2011. A Resolution finding probable cause was issued by the Special Panel on October 22, 2014, and was approved by the Ombudsman on February 10, 2015. The Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on August 3, 2016.

The Court observed that the Special Panel issued its Resolution more than three (3) years after the complaint was filed and after counter-affidavits were submitted. The Ombudsman approved the Resolution months later, and then the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on August 3, 2016. The Court therefore held that preliminary investigation was officially terminated beyond the period provided by the rules. On that basis, it ruled that the burden shifted to the prosecution to establish that: it followed the prescribed procedure; the complexity and volume of evidence made delay inevitable; and no prejudice was suffered as a result of delay.

Burden of Proof: Compliance, Complexity, and Lack of Prejudice

First, the Court held that petitioners did not dispute that the Special Panel followed the proper procedure for preliminary investigation. After the complaint was filed, petitioners were required to submit counter-affidavits. After submission, the Special Panel issued its finding of probable cause, and then submitted the Resolution to the Ombudsman for approval. The Court thus found no irregularity in the preliminary investigation proper.

Second, the Court found the case complex. It characterised the complaint as arising from the “PHP 728 Million Fertilizer Scam” related to the GMA Program under R.A. No. 8435, and compared the situation with decisions involving similarly themed Fertilizer Fund scam prosecutions, in which the Court had considered the lapse of several years as

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 244649)

Petitioners Carmencita C. Daep, Ameife L. Lacbain, Arnold B. Calcina, and Ernesto M. Millena assailed before the Supreme Court the Sandiganbayan’s denial of their Motion to Dismiss for alleged violation of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
The People of the Philippines filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions dated October 16, 2018 and November 27, 2018 in SB-16-CRM-0459, which denied petitioners’ dismissal plea.
The Supreme Court limited its resolution to the sole issue of whether petitioners’ constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated.

Parties and Procedural Posture

Petitioners were charged in the Sandiganbayan with an offense under Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
Petitioners initially sought relief through a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and later moved to dismiss on the ground of inordinate delay.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause in a Resolution dated February 1, 2017.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated April 6, 2018.
Afterward, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss again invoking inordinate delay, which the Sandiganbayan denied in a Resolution dated October 16, 2018, noting it was the third motion on the same ground.
Petitioners’ subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 27, 2018, prompting the present proceedings before the Supreme Court.

Key Factual Allegations

The Information charged petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in relation to an alleged procurement irregularity involving Hexaphil Agriventures, Inc. (Hexaphil).
The Information alleged that from March to April 2004 (or sometime prior or subsequent thereto), in the Municipality of Manito, Province of Albay, petitioners, then public officers, committed the offense in the discharge of their official functions and by taking advantage of official positions with alleged evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and/or gross inexcusable negligence.
The Information specifically alleged that petitioners caused undue injury to the government and gave unwarranted benefits to Hexaphil by awarding a contract for the purchase of 4,285 bottles of Hexaplus liquid fertilizer at P700.00 per bottle through direct contracting, and by causing the disbursement of public funds amounting to P2,999,500.00.
The Information alleged that the contract and disbursement were unwarranted because of Hexaphil’s ineligibility, the alleged absence of conditions justifying resort to the alternative procurement mode, and several alleged irregularities and instances of fraud.
The alleged irregularities included that Hexaphil was not registered with the Department of Trade and Industry, its SEC registration was revoked, it supposedly had no record of business or permit registration in Laguna, BAC members and accused Daep purportedly identified Hexaphil at the inception of procurement, and the purchase request already indicated the Hexaplus brand prior to the release of the first tranche.
Petitioners disputed conspiracy and unwarranted benefits, and they asserted that they did not conspire and that they did not engage in the conduct imputed in the Information.

Ombudsman Investigation Timeline

On May 16, 2011, the Task Force Abono, Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Ombudsman filed a complaint against petitioners and other persons related to the “Fertilizer Fund Scam.”
On August 3, 2011, preliminary investigation commenced, and an order required respondents to file counter-affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt.
Petitioners filed their counter-affidavits sometime in September 2011.
On October 22, 2014, the Special Panel on Fertilizer Fund Scam issued its Resolution finding probable cause.
The Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman only on February 10, 2015.
On June 16, 2015, petitioners’ counsel filed a Formal Entry of Appearance with Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, and raised for the first time the issue of inordinate delay.
On August 3, 2016, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan viewed the total lapse, acknowledging delay beyond the periods in the Rules, but ultimately treated it as justified by case complexity and circumstances.

Constitutional and Legal Framework

The right to speedy disposition of cases is anchored on Section 16, Article III of the Constitution.
The constitutional right is not limited to accused persons in criminal proceedings and extends to parties in civil and administrative matters, including proceedings before judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.
The Court recognized that the right is commonly invoked in fact-finding and preliminary investigations because respondents may be prejudiced even before criminal prosecution proper.
The decision noted that R.A. No. 6770 did not provide a specific period beyond which an action becomes automatically “prompt” or noncompliant in the constitutional sense.
The Court acknowledged that the Rules of Court and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provide timetables for preliminary investigations, but jurisprudence teaches that the analysis is not purely mathematical.
The Court applied