Title
Daco vs. Cabajar
Case
G.R. No. 222611
Decision Date
Nov 15, 2021
A Tagbanua indigenous leader challenges another’s ancestral land claim; Supreme Court upholds native title, dismissing tax-based ownership and enforcing IPRA jurisdiction.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 222611)

Factual Background

Respondent alleged that petitioner, accompanied by barangay tanods, forcibly entered and began construction on Isla Malajem (Black Island) on October 12, 2012, despite protests by members of the Tagbanua Council of Elders who claimed native title and continuous possession of the island for subsistence activities, notably the gathering of balinsasayaw or edible bird nest. Respondent asserted that he was authorized by the Council of Elders to file a complaint for violation of Section 10 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act, and that the Tagbanua applied for a Certificate of Ancestral Domain covering the area, during which an “Assumption Over Ancestral Domain” had been issued in their favor. Petitioner countered that he paid municipal taxes for the island and submitted tax declarations in his deceased father’s name as evidence of ownership.

Proceedings Before the NCIP Regional Hearing Office

The complaint was filed with the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples Regional Hearing Office (Regional Hearing Office). The Regional Hearing Office conducted an ocular inspection, at which petitioner did not appear. On January 12, 2015, the Regional Hearing Office ruled that it had jurisdiction and found that Isla Malajem formed part of the Tagbanuas’ ancestral domain or ancestral land and that the Tagbanuas had native title since time immemorial. The Regional Hearing Office permanently enjoined petitioner to vacate the ancestral domain and awarded damages of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P150,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Court of Appeals Proceedings

Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal outright for multiple procedural defects: failure to pay docket and legal fees and to file a motion to litigate as pauper; failure to state full names of co-petitioners and to show a Special Power of Attorney; absence of explanation for non-personal service; defects in the jurat of the Affidavit of Service; outdated Integrated Bar of the Philippines details for petitioner’s counsel; and failure to attach pertinent pleadings and documents. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by resolution dated December 14, 2015.

Petition for Review and Procedural Posture Before the Supreme Court

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals’ March 6, 2015 and December 14, 2015 Resolutions. Respondent filed a Comment. The Supreme Court required petitioner to reply and issued a show cause order to counsel for failure to file a timely reply; petitioner eventually filed a Reply attributing delay to counsel’s old age and sickness. The Supreme Court framed the primary issues as: whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on procedural grounds; whether the NCIP had jurisdiction over the complaint; and whether petitioner had a legitimate claim of ownership or possession over Isla Malajem.

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for technicalities and maintained that Isla Malajem belonged to his family by virtue of long possession and tax declarations, and that the complaint was criminal in nature and fell within the jurisdiction of the trial courts. Respondent maintained that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the defective petition, that counsel’s negligence suggested a dilatory motive, that the complaint was civil and grounded on Tagbanua customary law within the NCIP’s competence, and that petitioner’s tax declarations were insufficient and appeared spurious.

Jurisdictional Analysis Under the IPRA and NCIP Rules

The Court examined Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act, which grants the NCIP jurisdiction “over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs” provided the parties have exhausted remedies under their customary laws and secured a certification from the Council of Elders. The Court contrasted the rule in Unduran v. Aberasturi, where NCIP jurisdiction applied only to disputes among members of the same ICC/IP and where certification and exhaustion of customary remedies were prerequisites. The Court found that, unlike in Unduran, both parties here are Tagbanua members and the dispute concerns land within the Tagbanua ancestral domain, satisfying the first requirement for NCIP jurisdiction. The Court further observed that the NCIP’s own Rules (Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2003) permit exceptions to the certification requirement, and Rule IV, Section 14 exempts the certification where the relief sought seeks to prevent “grave, imminent and irreparable damage or injury.” The complaint alleged forcible entry and acts likely to cause imminent and irreparable harm to the Tagbanua’s possession and livelihood. The Council of Elders had also authorized respondent to file the complaint. For these reasons, the Court concluded that the Regional Hearing Office properly exercised jurisdiction.

Penal Character of Section 10 and Concurrent Remedies

The Court addressed petitioner’s argument that the complaint was criminal and therefore outside NCIP competence. The Court analyzed Section 10 and Section 72 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act, noting that Section 72 contemplates penalties administered in accordance with customary laws and also preserves the right to avail of protection of existing laws. The Court explained that the penal aspects of Section 10 do not preclude the NCIP from adjudicating violations under customary law or from awarding civil relief while preserving the option to seek remedies in regular courts. The Court relied on prior rulings recognizing the NCIP as the primary government agency to resolve ICC/IP disputes but acknowledged that jurisdiction with regular courts remains concurrent in certain circumstances, citing Lim v. Gamosa and Unduran v. Aberasturi.

Ancestral Domain, Native Title, and Sufficiency of Evidence

The Court recited statutory definitions in Section 3(a) and 3(b) and Section 56 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act, and reiterated that ancestral lands derive from native title and are presumed to have been held by ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, citing Republic v. Cosalan and Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. The Court observed that a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title is a formal recognition and not the source of ownership, citing Lamsis v. Dong-e, and that pending CADT issuance does not defeat a community’s native title. The Court further noted that municipal Resolution No. 39, series of 1996, recognized Isla Malajem as ancestral land of the cultural minorities of Barangay Panlaitan and San Isidro. The Court evaluated petitioner’s proof of ownership—tax declarat

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