Title
D.M. Consunji, Inc. vs. Jamin
Case
G.R. No. 192514
Decision Date
Apr 18, 2012
Jamin, a 31-year DMCI laborer, was dismissed at 55 after project completion. Courts ruled him a regular employee, not project-based, and declared his dismissal illegal due to lack of notice and just cause. DMCI's appeal was denied as untimely.
construction company
laborer
regular employee

Case Summary (G.R. No. 192514)

Factual Background

DMCI treated Jamin as a project employee, repeatedly hiring him whenever it required manpower for particular construction projects and phases. The termination of Jamin’s engagement on March 20, 1999 was, according to DMCI, the consequence of the completion of the SM Manila project, after which Jamin was not rehired. Jamin alleged that the termination was unjust and without authorized cause, particularly noting his age of 55 and his alleged lack of independent source of livelihood, and asserting nearly 31 years of continuous service. To support his claim of continuous service, Jamin also relied on project schedules DMCI allegedly submitted to the labor arbiter and added that he worked for several additional DMCI projects not covered in DMCI’s submitted schedules.

Filing of the Illegal Dismissal Complaint and DMCI’s Defense

Jamin filed his complaint on April 5, 1999 against DMCI and its President/General Manager, David M. Consunji, claiming illegal dismissal and seeking, among other items, attorneys’ fees. DMCI denied liability. It argued that Jamin was hired on a project-to-project basis from 1968 until the completion of SM Manila on March 20, 1999, after which DMCI ended his engagement. DMCI maintained that it submitted reports to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) every time it terminated Jamin’s services.

Compulsory Arbitration Rulings

In a decision dated May 27, 2002, Labor Arbiter Francisco A. Robles dismissed Jamin’s complaint for lack of merit. The labor arbiter sustained DMCI’s theory that Jamin was a project employee whose services ended with the completion of the specific project or phase for which he was engaged. The labor arbiter also noted that each time DMCI rehired Jamin, it executed a contract of employment and that upon completion of the relevant project phase or the project itself, DMCI served notice of termination to him and a termination report to the DOLE regional office. The labor arbiter further emphasized that Jamin had to apply for rehiring.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in a decision dated April 18, 2007, dismissed Jamin’s appeal and affirmed the labor arbiter’s findings. The NLRC later denied reconsideration in a resolution dated May 30, 2007.

Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

Jamin then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. On February 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals’ Special Fourth Division reversed the compulsory arbitration rulings. It held that Jamin was a regular employee, not merely a project employee.

The Court of Appeals anchored its conclusion on two principal considerations: first, Jamin’s repeated and successive rehiring for DMCI’s projects; and second, the nature of his tasks—activities necessary or desirable in DMCI’s construction business. Relying on the Court’s earlier rulings, the Court of Appeals held that the pattern of rehiring and the recurring need for Jamin’s services evidenced the necessity and indispensability of his work. It further reasoned that while Jamin initially entered DMCI as a project employee, the circumstances of his engagement made his employment regular or, at the very least, showed that it had ripened into regular employment. The Court of Appeals also treated the project employment contracts as not definitive of actual employment status, consistent with the Court’s explanation in Liganza v. RBL Shipyard Corporation.

In addition, the Court of Appeals considered DMCI’s failure to submit termination reports to the DOLE regional office “everytime” Jamin’s employment was terminated. It viewed this as contrary to the standards under DOLE Policy Instructions No. 20 and treated DOLE Department Order No. 19 (Series of 1993)—which superseded the earlier instructions—as confirming that termination reports served as indicators of project employment. Finding that Jamin had been dismissed without a valid cause and without due process, the Court of Appeals ordered immediate reinstatement with backwages, without loss of seniority rights and other benefits.

DMCI’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 3, 2010.

The Petition and the Parties’ Contentions

DMCI sought Supreme Court review under Rule 45, arguing that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in annulling the labor arbiter and NLRC decisions. DMCI contended, first, that the Court of Appeals misapplied the phrase “usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade” when it declared Jamin regular, insisting that Article 280’s definition of a regular employee did not apply to project employment fixed for specific projects, citing Fernandez v. NLRC and D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. NLRC. Second, DMCI asserted that there was no “work pool” in its roster and that the Court of Appeals erred in insinuating Jamin’s membership in one based on Integrated Contractor and Plumbing Works, Inc. v. NLRC. DMCI also argued that Jamin failed to prove such membership. Third, DMCI maintained that its reportorial lapses to the DOLE—although treated by the Court of Appeals as indicative of project status—should not have been applied rigidly, as termination reports were only one of several indicators. Fourth, DMCI argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it failed to furnish due process notice because Jamin was not dismissed for cause; DMCI claimed that upon completion of the contract or project, it could terminate without incurring liability and, under implementing rules, no prior notice was required.

For his part, Jamin prayed that the petition be dismissed. He raised a preliminary procedural objection that the petition was filed out of time. Jamin asserted that DMCI received the Court of Appeals decision on March 4, 2010, and that DMCI filed its motion for reconsideration on March 22, 2010, which he characterized as three days beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period, thereby rendering the Court of Appeals decision final and executory. On the merits, Jamin supported the Court of Appeals ruling. He argued that DMCI misread Fernandez by omitting how the Court in that case treated gaps in hiring as evidence that the employee was hired only intermittently for specific projects. He also argued that the Court in Fernandez reiterated that the employer’s failure to report project termination to the nearest employment office proved the worker was not a project employee. As to the later D.M. Consunji, Inc. case he cited, Jamin maintained that DMCI improperly invoked it because the complainants there were not claiming regular employment at the time; they questioned termination before project completion and due process rather than employment classification per se. Finally, Jamin insisted that DMCI’s failure to submit termination reports was not a minor lapse. He argued that the NLRC itself recognized that no reports were filed after every phase completion, even if it viewed the requirement as statistical.

Procedural Issue: Timeliness of DMCI’s Appeal

The Supreme Court first addressed the procedural question of whether DMCI’s appeal was filed out of time. The Court held that the record supported Jamin’s contention. The Court found that DMCI received the Court of Appeals decision dated February 26, 2010 on March 4, 2010, as indicated in DMCI’s own motion for reconsideration. It rejected DMCI’s asserted date of March 5, 2010. The Court computed the last day to file a motion for reconsideration as March 19, 2010 (fifteen days from receipt), but DMCI filed the motion only on March 22, 2010, or three days late. The Supreme Court ruled that, because the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time, the Court of Appeals decision became final and executory. As a corollary, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was also late because DMCI had only fifteen days from notice of the decision, given that its motion for reconsideration was not filed in due time.

The Court declined to apply liberal treatment and disregarded the late filing. It cited Orozco v. Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, where technicality had been tempered to equitably resolve parties’ rights, but held that there was no reason to extend such liberality here, because the petition also failed to show any reversible error.

Merits: Whether Jamin Was a Regular Employee

Even assuming the case’s merits could be considered, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Court of Appeals’ reversal. It described how Jamin worked for almost 31 years for DMCI, initially as a laborer and largely as a carpenter. The Court emphasized that DMCI treated him as a project employee and that the documentary pattern appeared, at first glance, to support DMCI’s claim: Jamin signed contracts appointing him as field worker, temporary worker, casual employee, or project employee when DMCI needed services, and DMCI served termination papers upon completion of every project or phase. DMCI also asserted that it submitted termination reports to the DOLE listing Jamin.

The Supreme Court then agreed with the Court of Appeals that Jamin’s repeated and successive engagements, together with the necessity and desirability of his tasks in DMCI’s business, justified a finding of regular employment. The Court applied Liganza v. RBL Shipyard Corporation, where it held that even assuming initial hiring was for specific projects, repeated rehiring and continuing need for the worker’s services over more than eight years made the worker regular. The Supreme Court viewed Liganza as squarely applicable because DMCI had repeatedly, continuously, and successively engaged Jamin’s services from December 17, 1968 up to March 20, 1999, amounting to thirty-eight engagements as shown by DMCI’s project schedule, plus three additional projects claimed by Jamin that DMCI allegedly did not include.

In addressing alleged gaps in the timeline of employment, the Supreme Court noted that the employment history relied upon by DMCI revealed a gap of almost four years between the supposed c

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