Cueco vs. Secretary of Justice

Factual Background

Petitioner was born in Dapa, Surigao, on February 16, 1923. He stated by affidavit dated May 15, 1951 that his parents were Benito Dy Cueco, Chinese (now deceased), and Julita Duyapat, Filipina, a native of Surigao. The affidavit recited that he was married to Rosalinda Villanueva, a Filipina, and had four legitimate children. The affidavit included a renunciation of allegiance to the Republic of China, a declaration of acceptance of the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines, and an oath to obey, support and defend the Constitution and laws of the Philippines. Petitioner likewise took the corresponding oath of allegiance on May 15, 1951. Petitioner sought cancellation of his alien certificate of registration on the ground that he had exercised the election of Philippine citizenship provided in Article IV, Section 1(4) and Commonwealth Act No. 625.

Administrative Proceedings

The Commissioner of Immigration referred petitioner’s request to the Secretary of Justice, who, by Opinion No. 129 dated June 18, 1957, held that petitioner’s mother’s Philippine citizenship had not been sufficiently established, that petitioner’s election of Philippine citizenship was legally ineffectual, and that petitioner did not thereby become a Filipino citizen. Petitioner sought rehearing and reconsideration. After administrative hearing, the Secretary of Justice denied the petition for reconsideration on January 27, 1959.

Trial Court Proceedings and Relief Sought

On January 9, 1960, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Manila to compel respondents to recognize his election of Philippine citizenship and to cancel his alien’s certificate of registration. Respondents answered and challenged petitioner’s right to the writ. After proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment for petitioner. Respondents appealed to this Court.

Legal Issue Presented

The central legal question was whether petitioner properly effected an election of Philippine citizenship under Article IV, Section 1(4). The Court framed the statutory requisites as twofold: (a) that the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) that the election must be made “upon reaching the age of majority.”

Parties’ Contentions

Petitioner relied on a baptismal certificate and a photograph to prove that his mother, Julita Duyapat (alternately named Julita Gonzaga in the baptismal entry), was a Filipina born in General Luna, Surigao, on July 30, 1881. He also offered proof that he was referred to as a Filipino in his birth certificate, his marriage contract and the birth certificate of his children, that he married a Filipina, and that he enlisted in the Philippine guerrilla forces in December 1942. Respondents, through the Secretary of Justice, maintained that the proof of the mother’s citizenship was insufficient and that petitioner’s election, made on May 15, 1951, was not made “upon reaching the age of majority” and therefore was legally ineffectual.

The Court’s Analysis of Proof of Maternal Citizenship

The Court observed that the writ of mandamus issues to compel performance of a clear legal duty and not to control the exercise of judgment in construing law or applying facts. The Court cited Policarpio vs. Veterans Board, 99 Phil. 791, and Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. Antholtz, 51 Phil. 796, for that principle, and cited Viuda e Hijos de C. Zamora vs. Wright, 53 Phil. 613, and Ng Gioc Lin vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 85 Phil. 842, for the same proposition. On the record, the Court held that a baptismal certificate and a photograph were insufficient to establish conclusively that petitioner’s mother was a citizen of the Philippines and therefore insufficient to satisfy the first statutory prerequisite.

The Court’s Analysis of the Timeliness of Election

The Court treated next the second requisite. Petitioner attained majority on February 16, 1944. His election occurred on May 15, 1951, when he was 28 years old, more than seven years after reaching majority. The Court acknowledged the prevailing construction that “upon reaching the age of majority” may mean a reasonable time thereafter. The Secretary of Justice had fixed three years as a reasonable period, subject to extension under special circumstances such as where the person had always considered himself a Filipino. Petitioner claimed continuous belief in Filipino status and offered the evidentiary items already noted. The Court pointed out, however, that petitioner enlisted with a unit of Chinese volunteers, registered with the Bureau of Immigration as a Chinese, and knew as early