Case Summary (G.R. No. 219744)
Factual Background
The testator, Valente Z. Cruz, executed Exhibit "E" as his alleged last will and testament. Three instrumental or attesting witnesses signed the instrument: Deogracias T. Jamaoas, Jr., Dr. Francisco Panares, and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr. Atty. Teves also served as the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. Petitioner opposed probate on the grounds that the will was procured through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence, that the testator was not fully informed as to the contents and the properties disposed thereby, and that the will was not executed in accordance with law.
Trial Court Proceedings
The Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted Exhibit "E" to probate despite petitioner’s objections. The trial court found compliance sufficient with the formal requisites for a valid will and allowed probate, naming Manuel B. Lugay as executor in accordance with the instrument. Agapita N. Cruz filed a petition to review the probate by certiorari, which the Supreme Court gave due course.
Legal Issue
The decisive issue presented was whether the last will and testament was executed in accordance with law, specifically whether the will was attested and subscribed by at least three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other, and whether the testator and the witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will as required by Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code. The controversy focused on whether the notary public who acknowledged the will could also be counted as one of the three attesting witnesses.
Parties' Contentions
Petitioner contended that the will failed to comply with Articles 805 and 806 because the notary public could not be one of the attesting witnesses and also acknowledge the will before himself; hence only two witnesses in fact appeared before the notary. Private respondent Lugay, relying on the trial court’s reasoning and authority from American jurisprudence including 57 American Jurisprudence, p. 227, argued for substantial compliance and urged that the notary’s signature could be treated as satisfying the requirement of three attesting witnesses even if he also performed the notarial acknowledgment.
Legal Reasoning of the Court
The Court sustained petitioner’s contention and reversed the trial court. The Court first held that a notary public who acknowledged the will cannot be considered the third instrumental witness because he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. The Court parsed the statutory phrase "acknowledged before" by reference to authorities, stating that to acknowledge is to avow, assent, or admit, and that "before" denotes being in front of another. The Court cited Javellana v. Ledesma, 97 Phil. 258, 262, and Castro v. Castro, 100 Phil. 239, 247, for the meaning of acknowledgment. The Court observed the absurdity of a single person appearing before himself to admit his signature and emphasized the unitary personality of the notary, which precluded such a split role.
Policy and Functional Considerations
The Court emphasized the public function of a notary public to guard against illegal or immoral arrangements, citing Balinon v. De Leon, 50 O. G. 583. It reasoned that allowing the notary to act both as attesting witness and as acknowledging officer would place him in a position of personal interest in the validation of the will and would undermine the protective purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud as noted in the Report of the Code Commission. The Court distinguished American authorities cited by the respondent, observing that the cases where a notary was permitted to sign as a witness involved situations in which the notary acted only as an attesting or subscribing witness and not simultaneously as the acknowledging officer as req
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 219744)
Parties and Procedural Posture
- Agapita N. Cruz was the petitioner and the surviving spouse of the decedent who opposed the probate of the will.
- Hon. Judge Guillermo P. Villasor was the presiding judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of Cebu, whose allowance of probate was appealed.
- Manuel B. Lugay was the respondent and proponent of the will who acted as supposed executor.
- The petition sought review by certiorari of the Court of First Instance of Cebu's judgment admitting to probate the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz.
- The appeal was prosecuted after the trial court allowed the probate despite the petitioner's objections.
Key Factual Allegations
- The instrument propounded as the last will and testament was marked as Exhibit "E".
- Petitioner alleged that Exhibit "E" was procured by fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence.
- Petitioner further alleged that the testator was not fully informed of the contents and the properties disposed by the instrument.
- The will bore the signatures of three instrumental witnesses: Deogracias T. Jamaoas, Jr., Dr. Francisco Panares, and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr.
- Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr. also acted as the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged.
Issues Presented
- Whether the last will and testament was executed in accordance with law, specifically Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code.
- Whether a Notary Public who signs as one of the attesting witnesses may also validly acknowledge the instrument before himself and thereby satisfy the requirement that the witnesses appear before the notary to acknowledge the will.
Contentions of the Parties
- Petitioner contended that the will was invalid for lack of proper witnessing and acknowledgment and for vitiating facts of fraud and undue influence.
- Respondent Manuel B. Lugay contended that there was substantial compliance with witnessing requirements and invoked 57 American Jurisprudence as authority for practical upholding of wills.
- Respondent argued that the Notary Public could be treated as one of the required attesting witnesses even though he also notarized the acknowledgment.
Statutory Framework
- Article 805 of the new Civil Code requires at least thre