Case Summary (G.R. No. 135385)
Petitioners’ Constitutional Arguments
Petitioners challenged Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 52(i), 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 of IPRA on the ground that they transfer to ICCs/IPs ownership or exclusive control over ancestral lands, domains and the natural resources therein—areas that under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution “belong to the State” and “shall not be alienated.” They further contended that IPRA’s broad definitions of “ancestral lands” and “ancestral domains” improperly include private lands, violate private landowners’ due process rights and disrupt the national economy by ceding large tracts of public domain to minority groups. Challenges were also directed at IPRA’s vesting of quasi-judicial jurisdiction in the all-ICC/ IP NCIP and its primacy for customary law in dispute resolution, as well as NCIP’s purported lateral autonomy under the Office of the President.
Procedural Posture and Interventions
After filing for prohibition and mandamus, petitioners secured orders requiring respondents to comment. The NCIP, DENR, DBM, Solicitor General, a broad coalition of ICC/IP leaders, the Commission on Human Rights and other NGOs each submitted defenses of IPRA. Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Following memoranda, the case was voted En Banc.
En Banc Resolution: Tie Vote and Dismissal
The Court’s judicial votes divided evenly (7–7) on whether IPRA violated the Constitution. Under Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a tie results in dismissal of the petition. Thus, the Court did not invalidate any provisions of IPRA, and the law remains in force.
Justice Puno’s Historical and Pragmatic Perspective
Justice Puno’s separate opinion traced the “regalian doctrine” to Spanish colonial law and its adaptation under the American regime and successive Constitutions. He examined indigenous customary land tenure—communal stewardship and inalienability—and concluded that IPRA is a novel yet consistent recognition of native title and customary rights, harmonizable with State ownership of the public domain and natural resources. He urges courts to respect both historical injustices against ICCs/IPs and the State’s constitutional control over resources.
Justice Vitug’s Emphasis on State Sovereignty
Justice Vitug argued that IPRA’s grant of ownership and control over ancestral domains to ICCs/IPs conflicts with the Constitution’s explicit vesting of public domain lands and all natural resources in the State. While acknowledging the need to protect ICCs/IPs, she maintained that full State control and supervision, as required by Section 2, Article XII, cannot be diminished by legislation, and that IPRA improperly severs large-scale resource development from sovereign oversight.
Justice Kapunan’s Call for Constitutional Harmony
Justice Kapunan focused on the primacy of the Constitution. He accepted the concept of native title recognized in CariAo v. Insular Government (1909) as a limited exception to State ownership, but insisted that IPRA must be read in light of Section 2, Article XII’s regalian doctrine. He deemed certain Implementing Rules ultra vires for extending ICC/IP ownership to natural resources and insisted that large-scale development remain under State auspices, with small-scale use allowed by congressional grace.
Justice Mendoza on Justiciability and Standing
Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition on the ground t
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 135385)
Background and Subject Matter
- Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, as citizens and taxpayers, filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus.
- They challenged RA 8371 (the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) as unconstitutional.
- Petitioners alleged IPRA provisions unlawfully deprived the State of ownership over public-domain lands, minerals and other natural resources (Regalian doctrine, Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution).
- They also questioned IRR provisions on NCIP’s structure and customary‐law adjudication as violative of presidential control and due-process guarantees.
Procedural History
- Sept. 29, 1998: SC required respondents to comment. NCIP filed comments (10/13/98) defending IPRA.
- DENR and DBM Secretaries, through the Solicitor General (10/19/98), prayed to uphold parts and strike others.
- Nov. 10, 1998: Intervenors Flavier, Bennagen and leaders of 112 indigenous groups moved to intervene in support of IPRA.
- Mar. 22 & 23, 1999: CHR and Haribon/Ikalahan also intervened for constitutionality. All motions granted.
- Apr. 13, 1999: Oral arguments heard. Parties and intervenors thereafter filed memoranda.
- Deliberation led to a 7–7 vote; tie resulted in dismissal under Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, Sec. 7.
Core Issues Presented
- Do IPRA’s definitions of “ancestral domains” (Sec. 3[a]) and “ancestral lands” (Sec. 3[b]) effect a constitutionally impermissible transfer of public-domain lands, minerals and other resources to indigenous peoples?
- Do IPRA’s substantive provisions (Secs. 5–8, 57–59, 63, 65–66) violate:
• Regalian doctrine of State ownership and control (Sec. 2, Art. XII)?
• Due-process or equal-protection guarantees (Art. III, Sec. 1)?
• Presidential control over executive agencies (Art. VII, Sec. 17)? - Are customary-law adjudication rules and NCIP’s composition/jurisdiction consistent with constitutional limits?
Petitioners’ Principal Contentions
- IPRA’s broad, inclusive definitions of ancestral domains (with waters, minerals, forests, even private land) and ancestral lands effect an unlawful abdication of State ownership (Regalian doctrine).
- IPRA’s grant of perpetual private ownership to indigenous peoples conflicts with constitutional limits on alienability of non-agricultu