Case Summary (G.R. No. 79962)
Petitioner
Lucio R. Cruz asserted that money received from Salonga were payments for a pakyaw (fish-purchase) agreement and for an ensuing sublease, not loans. He denied having borrowed money from Salonga and maintained that the parties’ agreements and payments were contractual considerations for pakyaw and sublease arrangements.
Respondent
Conrado Q. Salonga sued for collection and damages, alleging loan accommodations to Cruz evidenced by receipts (notably a receipt for P35,000 dated May 4, 1982, Exhibit D) and additional payments. Salonga claimed that only part of the alleged loan had been repaid and that Cruz failed to deliver agreed fish harvests and liquidate indebtedness.
Key Dates and Documentary Evidence
- May 4, 1982: Receipt for P35,000 signed by Cruz (Exhibit D).
- May 14, 1982: Receipt acknowledging P28,000 as pakyaw consideration (Exhibit I).
- August 15, 1982; September 4, 19, 30, 1982: Receipts of P8,000 (Exh. E), P500 (Exh. F), P3,000 (Exh. G), and P3,750 (Exh. H) respectively, alleged by the parties to be payments for sublease.
- Pre-trial stipulation: August 24, 1984 — parties entered a partial stipulation of facts detailing the pakyaw and sublease agreements and enumerating amounts received.
- The trial court rendered judgment for Cruz; the Court of Appeals reversed; the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and modified the trial court award as described below.
Applicable Law
- 1987 Philippine Constitution (procedural backdrop for adjudication).
- Parol evidence rule as codified in the Rules of Court: Sec. 7, Rule 130 (as quoted in the record; later renumbered in the Revised Rules on Evidence) — limits evidence of terms to written agreements but lists exceptions (mistake, intrinsic ambiguity, failure to express true intent, validity).
- Rules governing admission and timing of objections to evidence (Rule 132 Sec. 36 as cited).
- Rule 10, Sec. 5, Rules of Court — amendment to conform pleadings to evidence and treatment of issues tried by consent.
- Controlling precedents cited in the decision (e.g., Abrenica v. Gonda; Co Tiamco v. Diaz) regarding waiver of objections and allowance of evidence not strictly within pleadings.
Procedural History
- Salonga filed a complaint for collection and damages in the regional trial court, alleging loans to Cruz supported by receipts.
- Cruz answered, asserting the payments were for pakyaw and sublease agreements; he admitted receiving certain sums but denied they were loans.
- At pre-trial (Aug. 24, 1984) the parties executed a partial stipulation of facts that acknowledged the pakyaw and sublease arrangements and enumerated several payments.
- Trial court (Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.) found in favor of Cruz, concluding the transactions were pakyaw and sublease and rendered judgment for Cruz for P3,054 (plus litigation expenses and attorney’s fees).
- Court of Appeals reversed, treating the receipts as evidencing loans and finding Cruz indebted to Salonga, awarding Salonga a larger sum.
- The Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and reversed the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court’s characterization of the transactions and adjusting the monetary award to P3,084 in favor of Cruz (plus costs).
Material Facts and Stipulations
- The parties’ business relationship involved pakyaw transactions whereby Salonga would purchase the fish harvest in certain areas of the pond administered by Cruz. They also entered a verbal sublease agreement for one year beginning August 15, 1982, for which consideration of P28,000 was agreed.
- Cruz admitted receiving P35,000 on May 4, 1982 (Exh. D) and an aggregate P15,250 between August 15 and September 30, 1982 (Exhs. E–H). Salonga claimed additional sums (P28,000 by Exh. I and a lost receipt for P4,000).
- The pre-trial partial stipulation expressly stated that specified sums were received pursuant to pakyaw and sublease agreements and that certain harvests occurred in August 1982.
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
- Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding parol evidence as to Exhibits D and I and in concluding the transactions were loans rather than pakyaw and sublease agreements.
- Whether Exhibit I, not pleaded as a cause of action, should have been disregarded.
- Whether the parties’ pre-trial stipulation of facts was binding on the parties and the court.
Supreme Court’s Legal Analysis — Parol Evidence and Character of Receipts
- Nature of Exhibit D: The Court held Exhibit D (receipt for P35,000) was not a written agreement embodying all contractual terms; it was a mere receipt — a casual memorandum or written acknowledgment of money received — and therefore not within the strict four-corners bar of the parol evidence rule. The Court relied on established authority that receipts normally are not intended as exclusive memorials of the transaction and thus parol evidence may be introduced to explain them.
- Admissibility of parol evidence for Exhibit I: Exhibit I (acknowledgment of P28,000 as pakyaw consideration) contained a statement of fact acknowledging receipt and reference to pakyaw, but the Court emphasized the distinction between factual statements in an instrument and the terms of a contractual act. A factual acknowledgment (amount received, for example) can be explained or supplemented by parol evidence without offending the parol evidence rule when the writing is not the complete memorial of the agreement’s terms.
- Timing and waiver of objections: The Court reasoned that the Court of Appeals erred further by ignoring parol evidence when Salonga failed to timely object to the introduction of parol evidence at trial. Under the rules cited, objections to oral evidence must be made when the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent; failure to object operates as waiver and permits the court to consider the evidence. The Supreme Court thus found Salonga had effectively waived the protection of the parol evidence rule by not objecting at trial.
- Consistency with the pre-trial stipulation: The partial stipulation — admitted by both parties at pre-trial — explicitly characterized certain payments as consideration for pakyaw and for the sublease. The Court reiterated that admissions in the pleadings or stipulations bind the parties and the court, absent modification to avoid manifest injustice. The trial court properly relied on that stipulation and the corroborating testimony to characterize the transactions as pakyaw and sublease payments rather than loans.
Supreme Court’s Analysis — Pleading and Admission of Exhibit I
- The Court addressed the objection that Exhibit I was not pleaded as a cause of action. It explained that courts may allow evidence on matters not strictly alleged in pleadings when the opposing party has not shown prejudice and when issues were tried by express or implied consent. Under Rule 10, Sec. 5, the pleadings may be treated as amended to conform to the evidence. The record showed no prejudice or surprise sufficient to bar consideration of Exhibit I or related testimony; therefore, its adjudication did not constitute reversible error.
Computation and Monetary Determination
- The Court accepted the aggregate of payments credited to Salonga as follows: Exh. D (May 4) P35,000; Exh. E (Aug. 15) P8,000; Exh. F (Sept. 4) P500; Exh. G (Sept. 19) P3,000; Exh. H (Sept. 30) P3,750; lost receipt P4,000 — total P54,250. Less credit of P6,000 that Salonga had received from Cruz yields P48,250 paid by Salonga to Cruz.
- The Court computed the agreed pakyaw and sublease obligations as P28,000 (pakyaw) + P28,000 (sublease per annum) = P56,000 gross. Because the one-year sublease was pre-terminated two months short, the sublease amount was reduced pro rata by P4,666 (2/12 of P28,000), yielding P23,33
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 79962)
Case Caption and Citation
- Reported at 270 Phil. 299, First Division, G.R. No. 79962, decided December 10, 1990.
- Parties: Lucio R. Cruz (petitioner) versus Court of Appeals and Conrado Q. Salonga (respondents).
- Ponente: Justice Cruz (note: ponente not related to petitioner or his counsel).
- Lower courts involved: Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City (trial court); Court of Appeals (respondent court).
Summary of Facts
- Conrado Q. Salonga (private respondent/plaintiff below) filed a complaint for collection and damages against Lucio Cruz (petitioner/defendant below) in the RTC of Lucena City.
- Salonga alleged that in the course of their fish buying-and-selling transactions, Cruz borrowed P35,000, evidenced by a receipt dated May 4, 1982 (Exhibit D) which reads: "5/4/82 Received the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Cash from Rodrigo Quiambao and Conrado Salonga on the day of May 4, 1982 Sgd. Lucio Cruz."
- Plaintiff claimed only P20,000 of the P35,000 had been paid, leaving a balance of P15,000; and that in August 1982 the parties agreed that Cruz would grant Salonga exclusive right to purchase harvests of certain fishponds leased by Cruz in exchange for loan accommodations, after which Salonga delivered loans totaling P15,250 (evidenced by four receipts) and an additional P4,000 for which a receipt was lost.
- Cruz denied any loan arrangement. He admitted receipt of P35,000 on May 4, 1982, and aggregate P15,250 on various occasions from August 15 to September 30, 1982, but asserted these sums were consideration for a "pakyaw" agreement and payment for a sublease (bubuwisan) of fishponds he leased from owner Nemesio Yabut.
- Cruz contended Salonga actually owed him unpaid rentals for a 10-month occupation and also owed an additional P4,000 from a separate fish purchase; Cruz also asserted P28,000 was the consideration for the pakyaw and that P7,000 of the P35,000 was advance payment for the sublease.
Pre-trial Partial Stipulation of Facts
- During pre-trial (August 24, 1984) counsel stipulated to several facts:
- Salonga entered into a pakyawan contract with Cruz for fishes contained in the fishpond Cruz was leasing from Nemesio Yabut, with a verbal contract for P28,000 sometime in May 1982.
- Due to necessity, Cruz requested Salonga to advance not only P28,000 but P35,000 so Cruz could meet obligations to Yabut.
- P35,000 was delivered by Salonga and received by Cruz, evidenced by Exhibit D (receipt dated May 4, 1982).
- Pursuant to the pakyaw, Salonga harvested fishes in August 1982.
- Immediately thereafter, the parties verbally agreed and Cruz subleased the fishpond to Salonga for P28,000 for a one-year period beginning August 15, 1982.
- Nemesio Yabut took back the fishpond from Cruz on June 15, 1983.
- Cruz received from Salonga sums in compliance with the sublease: P8,000 on August 15, 1982 (Annex B / Exh. E); P500 on September 4, 1982 (Annex C / Exh. F); P3,000 on September 19, 1982 (Annex D / Exh. G); and P3,750 on September 30, 1982 (Annex E / Exh. H).
Documentary Evidence (Exhibits)
- Exhibit D: Receipt dated May 4, 1982 acknowledging receipt by Lucio Cruz of P35,000 from Rodrigo Quiambao and Conrado Salonga.
- Exhibit I: Receipt dated May 14, 1982 in Filipino acknowledging receipt of P28,000 as the value for the pakyaw agreement, signed by Lucio Cruz (purports to cover pakyaw value and duration until August 1982).
- Exhibits E, F, G, H: Receipts for sublease payments — P8,000 (Aug. 15, 1982), P500 (Sept. 4, 1982), P3,000 (Sept. 19, 1982), P3,750 (Sept. 30, 1982), respectively.
- Lost receipt claimed by Salonga for P4,000 (alleged additional payment).
- Record also contained an admission that the private respondent had received P6,000 from the petitioner on an unspecified date.
Parties' Positions at Trial
- Private respondent (Salonga):
- Claimed initial P35,000 was a loan, that only P20,000 had been repaid leaving P15,000 unpaid.
- Alleged additional deliveries (P15,250 evidenced by receipts and a lost P4,000 receipt) were loans.
- Claimed he also paid P28,000 separate from Exh. D as consideration for the pakyaw (Exh. I dated May 14, 1982) and that he had paid an additional P4,000 (lost receipt).
- Denied owing Cruz P4,000 for lease of other portions.
- Petitioner (Cruz):
- Admitted receipt of P35,000 on May 4, 1982 and aggregate P15,250 between Aug 15 and Sept 30, 1982, but contended these were payments for pakyaw and sublease, not loans.
- Stated out of the P35,000, P28,000 covered the pakyaw payment and P7,000 was advance for sublease.
- Denied receipt of another P28,000 on May 14, 1982; characterized Exh. I as instrument evidencing pakyaw agreement and fixing duration, not a separate payment.
- Corroborated by witness Sonny Viray, who prepared the May 4, 1982 receipt and testified that P28,000 of the P35,000 was payment for pakyaw and P7,000 was advance rental.
Trial Court Findings and Ruling (RTC)
- Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. found transactions were pakyaw and sublease agreements, each with consideration of P28,000, totaling P56,000.
- Accepted that Salonga had paid Cruz P35,000 (Exh. D), P8,000 (Exh. E), P500 (Exh. F), P3,000 (Exh. G), P3,750 (Exh. H), and P4,000 (lost receipt).
- Credited the admission that petitioner paid respondent P6,000 and deducted it from total amounts paid.
- Because the one-year sublease was pre-terminated two months early, rentals were reduced proportionately.
- Judgment: Trial court ruled in favor of petitioner (Cruz) and ordered private respondent (Salonga) to pay the sum of P3,054.00 plus P1,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorney’s fees, and costs.
Court of Appeals Ruling and Reasoning
- Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and ordered petitioner Cruz to pay Salonga P24,916.00 plus P1,500.00 as litigation expenses and attorney’s fees.
- Reasoning included:
- Exhibit I (May 14, 1982) is clear in its non-reference to the transaction behind Exhibit D; its four corners do not reveal it was an explanation of Exh. D.
- It found reliance by trial court on alleged self-serving testimony of defendant and his witnesses improper in face of documentary receipts both parties adopted.
- Treated the