Corpus, Jr. vs. Pamular

Factual Background

On June 4, 2008, Angelito Espinosa was shot at Corpuz Street, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, and later died of his injuries. The next day an information for murder was filed against Carlito Samonte, who was arrested in flagrante and who admitted the killing at arraignment but pleaded self-defense. Various affidavits and supplemental affidavits were later submitted to the prosecutor, including an affidavit by Alexander Lozano dated June 30, 2008, which implicated Mayor Amado Corpus, Jr. as the person who allegedly handed a gun to Samonte and ordered the killing.

Prosecutorial Reinvestigation and Conflicting Resolutions

Following the additional affidavits, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation. Initially, a Resolution dated October 7, 2008 by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edison V. Rafanan dismissed the complaint against Corpus, which was later set aside by Acting First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Floro Florendo. On January 26, 2009, Florendo found probable cause to indict Corpus and directed the filing of an amended information. On the same date, Assistant Prosecutor Edwin S. Bonifacio issued a review resolution reinstating the dismissal of the complaint against Corpus, creating conflicting prosecutorial positions.

The Amended Information and Trial Court Action

The amended information, filed by the prosecutor, charged Carlito Samonte and Amado Corpuz, Jr. with murder alleging that they were “conspiring and confederating together” in the killing. The amended information retained the prosecution’s theory that Samonte willfully shot the victim but added Corpus as a co-accused on the theory of conspiracy. Judge Ramon D. Pamular of Branch 33 held a hearing on February 13, 2009. On February 26, 2009, he issued an Order admitting the amended information, finding probable cause, ordering issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus, and denying a motion to defer or suspend arraignment.

Petition for Certiorari and Temporary Restraining Order

Mayor Amado Corpus, Jr. and Carlito Samonte filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court on March 3, 2009, seeking to enjoin the RTC order and the warrant of arrest and to prevent further proceedings. The Supreme Court required respondents to comment and granted a temporary restraining order on March 9, 2009 enjoining the implementation of the assailed RTC Order and the warrant.

Parties’ Principal Contentions

Petitioners argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion by proceeding with the amended information and issuing the warrant despite the pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice; that the arraignment should have been suspended under Rule 116, Sec. 11(c); that the insertion of the conspiracy allegation was a substantial amendment prejudicial to Samonte after arraignment under Rule 110, Sec. 14; and that the judge did not personally make the factual determination of probable cause required by Art. III, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution. The prosecution and Mrs. Espinosa countered that the addition of Corpus and the allegation of conspiracy were mere formal amendments that did not alter the prosecution’s theory and did not prejudice Samonte, that the sixty-day suspension period under Rule 116 had lapsed, and that the trial judge personally examined the records and conducted a hearing before issuing the warrant.

Procedural Objection and Rule on Motion for Reconsideration

The Supreme Court first addressed a procedural objection that petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration with the trial court before invoking certiorari. The Court reiterated that a motion for reconsideration is ordinarily a condition sine qua non for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Sec. 1, and that exceptions to this requirement are limited and must be justified by concrete, compelling reasons. The records showed no plausible reason for petitioners’ omission; the Court characterized their failure to move for reconsideration as fatal to their certiorari remedy.

Executive and Judicial Determinations of Probable Cause

The Court reviewed the distinction between the executive determination of probable cause made during preliminary investigation by the prosecutor and the judicial determination to be made by the judge when issuance of a warrant is sought. It reiterated jurisprudence that, once an information is filed and the court adjudges probable cause, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person upon issuance of a warrant, and that the judge must personally satisfy himself or herself that probable cause exists based on the evidence presented.

Suspension of Arraignment and the Sixty-Day Rule

The Court examined Rule 116, Sec. 11(c) which allows suspension of arraignment upon a petition for review to the Department of Justice, but provides that the suspension may not exceed sixty days from filing. The Court found that the RTC erred in denying petitioners’ motion to suspend arraignment, but that the sixty-day period had lapsed in this case; consequently the denial of suspension became moot and the trial court was permitted to proceed with arraignment and other proceedings.

Substantial Versus Formal Amendment of an Information

The Court reviewed the law on amendment of information under Rule 110, Sec. 14, and the doctrine distinguishing formal from substantial amendments. It reiterated that a substantial amendment is one that alters the nature of the offense, affects the essence of the charge, requires a new defense, or is otherwise prejudicial to the accused after plea. The Court applied the test declared in People v. Casey: whether a defense under the original information would still be available after the amendment and whether evidence for that defense would remain applicable.

Application to the Conspiracy Allegation

Applying those principles, the Court concluded that the insertion of the allegation that the accused were “conspiring and confederating together” did not change the prosecution’s basic theory that Samonte willfully shot the victim and therefore was, in abstract, a formal amendment. The Court relied on precedent holding that an allegation of conspiracy that maintains the same prosecution theory is formal. However, the Court also held that because Samonte had already been arraigned and had pleaded, the amendment would prejudice his right to prepare his defense—his plea of self-defense would not be compatible with a newly alleged conspiracy—which rendered the post-plea amendment impermissible as to him. By contrast, Corpus, who had not yet been arraigned, could not invoke the post-plea protection and therefore could not rely on Rule 110’s prohibition against substantial amendments.

Judge’s Personal Determination of Probable Cause

The Court considered petitioners’ challenge that the judge did not personally determine probable cause as constitutionally required. It surveyed Soliven, Lim v. Felix, and related jurisprudence to explain that while the issuing judge need not personally take testimony in every case, the judge must personally evaluate the prosecutor’s resolution and its supporting evidence and go beyond a mere certification when necessary. The record showed that Judge Pamular personally examined the amended information and supporting documents and conducted a hearing on February 13, 2009 wh