Title
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines vs. Cuenca
Case
G.R. No. 163981
Decision Date
Aug 12, 2005
UITC defaulted on a P600,000 surety bond; MICI paid Goodyear and sought reimbursement. PNCC, UITC's majority stockholder, was absolved as the corporate veil wasn't pierced, and it wasn't party to the indemnity agreement.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 163981)

Petitioner

PNCC was not an original party to MICI’s complaint for indemnity. It was later impleaded by way of a third-party complaint filed by Rodolfo Cuenca, alleging that PNCC had assumed Cuenca’s personal liability under a board resolution (certified minutes) and therefore should answer in indemnity to whatever liability the trial court would impose on Cuenca.

Respondents

MICI sued UITC and the Cuencas for reimbursement of the P600,000 it paid under the surety bond, seeking interest, attorney’s fees (20%), and costs. Rodolfo Cuenca filed a third-party complaint against PNCC asserting PNCC’s assumption of his liability by board resolution; UITC also participated as the main defendant.

Key Dates

  • Last renewal of the surety bond: May 15, 1983.
  • MICI payment to Goodyear: April 25, 1983 (P600,000).
  • UITC partial payment to MICI: August 26, 1983 (P150,000).
  • RTC decision: January 6, 1994 (holding UITC and PNCC jointly and solidarily liable; dismissing the case against the Cuencas).
  • Court of Appeals decision: October 28, 2003 (affirmed RTC).
  • Supreme Court decision date: August 12, 2005 (basis: 1987 Constitution for decisions post-1990).

Applicable Law

  • 1987 Constitution (applicable because the Supreme Court decision date is after 1990).
  • Rules of Court, Section 11, Rule 6 (definition and nature of a third-party complaint).
  • Civil Code provisions referenced by parties (including Article 2208 as argued by petitioner regarding attorney’s fees).
  • Established doctrines on corporate personality and piercing the corporate veil as expounded in Philippine jurisprudence cited by the Court.

Facts

UITC obtained a surety bond from MICI to guarantee its obligations to Goodyear. MICI required an indemnity agreement executed by UITC and two UITC officers (Edilberto signed in official and personal capacities; Rodolfo signed personally). UITC defaulted; Goodyear demanded payment from MICI, which eventually paid P600,000. MICI demanded reimbursement from UITC and the Cuencas; UITC remitted P150,000 as partial payment. MICI sued UITC and the Cuencas for indemnity. Rodolfo impleaded PNCC by third-party complaint, asserting PNCC had assumed his personal guarantee pursuant to a board resolution (certified excerpt from minutes). The RTC held UITC and PNCC jointly and solidarily liable and dismissed the complaint as to the Cuencas. The CA affirmed. MICI did not appeal the appealable judgment as to UITC or the dismissal vis-à-vis the Cuencas; PNCC alone brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Procedural Posture

MICI initiated the main action against UITC and the Cuencas. Rodolfo filed a third-party complaint against PNCC seeking indemnity. The trial court ruled for MICI against UITC and PNCC and dismissed claims against the Cuencas. The CA affirmed in toto but noted that MICI’s failure to appeal as to the Cuencas effectively waived MICI’s right to pursue them. PNCC alone appealed to the Supreme Court; the Supreme Court considered the petition and the appellate and trial court findings.

Issues Presented

Whether PNCC can be held jointly and solidarily liable with UITC under the indemnity agreement (1) on the basis of its status as majority stockholder of UITC and (2) on the basis that PNCC allegedly assumed Rodolfo Cuenca’s personal liability; and whether PNCC is liable for attorney’s fees and costs under the indemnity agreement.

Court of Appeals Holding (as summarized)

The CA held that (a) UITC had impliedly authorized its officers to obtain the surety bond and the indemnity agreement, making UITC liable; (b) UITC was estopped from contesting officer authority given the partial payment of P150,000; (c) because Edilberto and Rodolfo had signed also in personal capacity, they would ordinarily be personally liable but MICI’s failure to appeal resulted in a waiver of claims against them; (d) PNCC was liable because it was UITC’s majority shareholder (holding ~78% stock) and had, by board resolution, assumed guarantees incurred by its representatives in affiliated companies; and (e) attorney’s fees were proper because the indemnity agreement provided for them.

Supreme Court Ruling — Disposition

The Supreme Court granted PNCC’s petition in part and modified the CA decision by absolving PNCC of any liability under the indemnity agreement. The Court dismissed the third-party complaint against PNCC for lack of merit.

Supreme Court Reasoning — Third-party Complaint Doctrine and Finality

The Court emphasized the procedural nature and independence of a third-party complaint under Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court and related jurisprudence (e.g., Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Tempongko). A third-party complaint is separate from the main action and, when leave is properly granted, the court effectively renders two judgments: one on the plaintiff’s complaint and another on the third-party complaint. The Court noted controlling precedents establishing that when only the third-party defendant appeals, the main case’s judgment becomes final and executory; here, MICI did not appeal the CA’s affirmance of the RTC’s main-complaint disposition (which had dismissed the Cuencas), so the CA’s decision in the main action became final.

Supreme Court Reasoning — Corporate Separate Personality and Piercing the Veil

The Court rejected the CA’s approach of holding PNCC directly liable to MICI by virtue of majority shareholding and the delivery of materials to PNCC. It reiterated the fundamental doctrine that a corporation has a juridical personality distinct from its stockholders and that mere majority ownership does not justify disregarding corporate separateness. The corporate veil may be pierced only when the corporate form is used to defeat public convenience, perpetrate fraud, justify a wrong, or defend a crime; proof of such misuse must be clear and convincing. The C

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