Case Summary (G.R. No. L-38955-56)
Factual Background
On February 15, 1974, CMC renewed for another three years, or until February 15, 1977, its collective bargaining agreement with CELA, which was an affiliate of petitioner CCLU. The copy of the agreement was attached to the petition and was acknowledged on February 21, 1974. However, three days before February 15, on February 12, 1974, FFW filed with the NLRC a “Petition for Certification Election at the Continental Manufacturing Corporation,” docketed as NLRC Case No. LR-2751. A copy was furnished to CMC on February 22, 1974. Thereafter, on February 25, 1974, a copy of the CMC-CELA collective bargaining agreement was filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations for certification, and the agreement was certified on March 4, 1974.
On February 28, 1974, CMC filed an answer to the LR-2751 petition praying for dismissal on the ground of the contract-bar rule. In a parallel sequence, REDSON and RELA entered into a collective bargaining agreement signed on March 4, 1974, but stated to be effective as of February 16, 1974. This agreement was filed with the NLRC on March 7, 1974 and certified on March 14, 1974.
Meanwhile, FFW filed on February 25, 1974 a “Petition for Certification Election at Redson and Company, Inc.,” docketed as NLRC Case No. LR-2883. REDSON was furnished a copy of that petition on March 7, 1974. On March 18, 1974, REDSON filed its answer praying for dismissal principally on contract-bar grounds based on its collective bargaining agreement with RELA. Petitioners and the concerned labor organizations filed motions to dismiss: a motion dated April 23, 1974, and a supplemental motion dated May 8, 1974.
NLRC Decision and Subsequent Proceedings
The NLRC issued a decision dated April 26, 1974. It consolidated the two certification election cases because they raised identical issues. The NLRC granted the petitions and directed the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct certification elections within ten days from receipt of the decision. Petitioners received the copy of the decision on May 11, 1974. On May 15, 1974, petitioners filed a “Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal” from the NLRC decision, and on May 16, 1974, they filed an appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
As the certification elections approached, petitioners received on July 6, 1974 a telegram dated July 5, 1974 from the Bureau of Labor Relations requesting attendance at a pre-election conference scheduled for July 15, 1974. On July 12, 1974, petitioners filed a motion to cancel the pre-election conference. Petitioners alleged that the NLRC proceeded to schedule the certification election on July 23, 1974 despite the decision not yet having become final and despite the pendency of the appeal and the motion to cancel.
Petition to the Court and the Temporary Restraining Order
To prevent the July 23, 1974 election, petitioners filed on July 18, 1974 the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. They sought a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the NLRC from acting on the cases. On July 22, 1974, the Second Division of the Court ordered respondents to comment, set the matter for a hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, and allowed the certification election on July 23, 1974 to proceed. At the same time, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from opening the ballot boxes, canvassing votes, or announcing results.
The Parties’ Positions
Respondents CMC and REDSON, through counsel, asserted that the scheduled certification elections for July 23, 1974 were cancelled pending further orders from the NLRC at a pre-election conference. They also argued that each employer had signed a collective bargaining agreement with the corresponding union prior to the certification petitions, and that both NLRC cases had been argued in memoranda for dismissal because the collective bargaining agreements were already certified as of February 15, 1974 and no certification election could be entertained during the life of the bargaining contracts. Respondents further stated that the employers received the NLRC decision on May 11, 1974, and that the Secretary of Labor denied the appeal in a resolution dated May 29, 1974. They added that after filing their manifestation on July 10, 1974, they would honor the collective bargaining agreements and would comply with whatever resolution the Court would issue regarding whether an election should be held during the life of the certified contracts.
Respondent FFW contended that petitioners could not avail themselves of certiorari and prohibition because they allegedly did not raise jurisdictional issues in their motions to dismiss and because they allegedly did not move to require FFW to prove its claimed membership. FFW also maintained that neither the NLRC nor the Secretary of Labor acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction, and asserted that the certification elections had been cancelled.
The Solicitor General’s Office, acting for the NLRC and the Secretary of Labor, refuted the petitioners’ allegations that the respondents lacked jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issues Raised and the Court’s Rulings
The Court treated the petition as raising several matters, grouped in the decision into distinct contentions.
Authority of the NLRC and the “Contract-Bar Rule” as Modified by Certification Requirements
Petitioners first argued that the NLRC had no authority to modify the contract-bar rule by requiring that a collective bargaining agreement must be certified before it could constitute a bar to a certification election. The decision acknowledged that the contract-bar doctrine aims at stability of industrial relations by generally operating as a bar to certification elections during the life of a collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration. It then rejected petitioners’ theory for reasons grounded on the NLRC’s rule-making authority and on the chronology of filings and certifications.
The Court relied on NLRC rules that required filing of labor agreements for certification and prohibited the NLRC from entertaining representation issues affecting the administration of a certified collective bargaining agreement. It also relied on implementing instructions governing when petitions may be filed, including a rule that where a petition is filed during the life of a collective bargaining agreement that is certified, it must be dismissed without prejudice to refiling within a prescribed period before expiration.
The Court then addressed the source of NLRC authority. It traced the NLRC’s rule-making power to Presidential Decree No. 21, which created the NLRC and granted it original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes that could otherwise lead to strikes and lockouts under Republic Act No. 875, and which also enjoined the NLRC to promulgate rules governing collective bargaining.
Petitioners invoked General Order No. 3 and alleged conflict with existing jurisprudence. The Court held that General Order No. 3 did not make existing law unchangeable. It reasoned that the order expressly permitted executive departments and agencies to function not strictly in accordance with then existing law if the President or a duly authorized representative so ordered. It further reasoned that even if the pre-existing doctrine were assumed to permit non-certified agreements to bar elections, petitioners lacked a factual basis to complain because the crucial bargaining agreements in question had not yet been certified at the time of the filing of the corresponding certification petitions.
Specifically, the FFW petition in LR-2751 was filed on February 12, 1974, but the CMC-CELA collective bargaining agreement had not been filed for certification as of that date and was acknowledged only on February 21, 1974. For LR-2883, the petition was filed on February 25, 1974, while the REDSON-RELA collective bargaining agreement had been signed only on March 4, 1974 and acknowledged only on March 7, 1974, meaning that as of the petition filing date there was not yet an agreement in the relevant form and timing necessary to invoke a bar under the Court’s analysis.
Compliance with Republic Act No. 875 Even Assuming Certification Was Not Necessary
The Court also rejected petitioners’ legal objections by invoking provisions of Republic Act No. 875. It cited Section 12(b) for the rule that once a certification election has been made, the court should not order certification in the same unit more than once in twelve months, and Section 12(d) for the concept that an employer may seek an election if no certification election has been held during the twelve months preceding the employees’ request. The Court observed that the certification election petitions in both NLRC cases alleged that there had been no certification election in the company for the last twelve months, and that the employers did not deny those allegations.
The Court further relied on Section 12(c), which required the Court to order an election where a petition was filed by at least ten percent of the employees in the appropriate unit. In LR-2751, FFW alleged representation of sixty percent of employees and workers in CMC. In LR-2883, it claimed representation of more than ten percent of the employees in REDSON.
Duration and Substantial Benefits of the Collective Bargaining Agreements
Petitioners next asserted that because the collective bargaining agreements had substantial benefits and reasonable duration, there was no reason for them to be required to be certified to act as bars. The Court held that, in light of NLRC’s authority and the express provisions of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 875, the argument lacked merit. It further stated that even if certification were not necessary for the agreements to operate as bars, elections could still be ordered under Republic Act No. 875 under the allegations made in the petitions.
Alleged Favoritism Toward FFW and Union “Raidin
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-38955-56)
Parties and Procedural Posture
- Petitioners were the Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions (CCLU), Continental Employees and Laborers Association (CELA), and Redson Employees and Laborers Association (RELA), which all claimed to be legitimate labor organizations.
- Respondents included the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Secretary of Labor, and also the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), Continental Manufacturing Corporation (CMC), and Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation (REDSON).
- Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the NLRC’s jurisdiction and actuations in NLRC Case Nos. LR-2751 and LR-2883, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to stop a certification election scheduled for July 23, 1974.
- The Court required respondents to comment and initially allowed the certification election to proceed only after issuing a temporary restraining order that barred the opening of ballot boxes, canvassing of votes, and announcement of results.
- The petition was filed while petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and/or appeal and their appeal to the Secretary of Labor were still pending, and the pre-election conference was also unresolved at the time.
Key Factual Allegations
- On February 15, 1974, CMC renewed its collective bargaining agreement with CELA for three years until February 15, 1977, and petitioners attached it as Annex A and claimed it was acknowledged on February 21, 1974.
- Three days before February 15, 1974, FFW filed a petition for certification election at CMC with the NLRC on February 12, 1974, docketed as NLRC Case No. LR-2751, and furnished a copy to CMC on February 22, 1974.
- On February 25, 1974, a copy of the CMC-CELA collective bargaining agreement was filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations for certification, and the agreement was certified on March 4, 1974.
- On February 15, 1974, REDSON and RELA signed a three-year collective bargaining agreement, and it was filed with the NLRC on March 7, 1974, with certification on March 14, 1974.
- On February 25, 1974, FFW filed a petition for certification election at Redson and Company, Inc. with the NLRC, docketed as NLRC Case No. LR-2883, and REDSON received a copy of that petition on March 7, 1974.
- REDSON filed an answer on March 18, 1974 seeking dismissal primarily on the theory that the petition was barred by the collective bargaining agreement with RELA.
- On April 23, 1974, CELA-CCLU and RELA-CCLU filed motions to dismiss, and on May 8, 1974 they filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.
- The NLRC rendered a decision dated April 26, 1974 consolidating the two certification election petitions because they raised identical issues, granted both, and directed the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct elections within ten days from receipt.
- Petitioners received the NLRC decision on May 11, 1974, filed a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal on May 15, 1974, and appealed to the Secretary of Labor on May 16, 1974.
- Petitioners received a telegram requesting attendance in a pre-election conference on July 15, 1974, and on July 12, 1974 they moved to cancel the pre-election conference.
- Despite petitioners’ claimed lack of finality and asserted non-receipt of the Secretary of Labor’s disposition on their appeal, the NLRC scheduled the certification election on July 23, 1974, prompting the instant petition on July 18, 1974.
- Respondents contended that the election schedule was subject to the pre-election conference and asserted that elections were cancelled until further orders in view of proceedings before the Bureau of Labor Relations and NLRC.
NLRC Decision and Certification Elections
- The NLRC’s April 26, 1974 decision consolidated the certification petitions for LR-2751 and LR-2883.
- The NLRC granted both petitions and ordered certification elections to be conducted within ten days from receipt of the decision by the Bureau of Labor Relations.
- Petitioners treated the NLRC’s scheduling of the election on July 23, 1974 as an implementation before final resolution of their appeals.
- The Court ultimately dismissed the petition and lifted the temporary restraining order, with costs against petitioners.
Issues Raised
- Petitioners raised the core contention that the NLRC lacked authority to modify the “contract-bar rule” by requiring certification of a collective bargaining agreement before it could constitute a bar to a certification election petition.
- Petitioners further argued that because the collective bargaining agreements were of reasonable duration and allegedly provided substantial benefits, certification should not be required to make them bars.
- Petitioners alleged that the NLRC favored FFW and allowed it to raid petitioners’ local unions.
- Petitioners claimed NLRC committed irregularities by taking cognizance of the certification petitions despite no resort to the grievance procedure allegedly provided in the collective bargaining agreements.
- Petitioners contended that the NLRC decision was void because it was allegedly not personally and directly prepared by NLRC Commissioners and Chairman.
- Petitioners complained that they were deprived of their day in court because the parties seeking certification elections allegedly were not required to prove claimed membership percentages.
- Petitioners asserted that the NLRC attempted to implement its decision even before petitioners received a copy of the alleged resolution or decision on their motion for reconsideration and/or appeal.
- Respondent FFW opposed the petition by invoking procedural and substantive limits on certiorari and arguing that petitioners failed to raise certain issues in the NLRC proceedings.
- The Solicitor General, for respondents NLRC and the Secretary of Labor, refuted petitioners’ allegations of jurisdictional defects or grave abuse of discretion.
Statutory and Regulatory Framework
- The case turned on the interplay between NLRC certification election rules and the statutory framework under Republic Act No. 875 (1953), specifically Section 12.
- Petitioners’ dispute focused on NLRC Rules and Regulations issued on October 18, 1972 under its organization and functions, particularly:
- Section 30, requiring all collective bargaining agreements and related dispute-settling agreements to be filed with the Commission for certification.
- Section 31, prohibiting the Commission from entertaining representation issues during the life of a certified collective bargaining agreement.
- The Court also relied on Labor Relations Implementing Instruction No. 2 (December 21, 1972), especially:
- Section 3, requiring that where a collective bargaining agreement is certified, the petition for certification election may be filed within sixty (60) days prior to expiration; and providing that petitions filed during the life of a collective bargaining agreement without a certified agreement are to be dismissed without prejudice to refil