Title
Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Villalon-Pornillos
Case
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183
Decision Date
Mar 15, 2022
A former judge dismissed for gross misconduct, including corruption and undue delays, sought clemency but was denied due to lack of remorse and reformation.

Case Summary (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183)

Factual Background of the Administrative Case

The anonymous complaint alleged a “notorious history” of graft and corruption by “fixing” cases and “selling” decisions or orders connected to election protests involving mayoralty races in San Rafael, Baliuag, and Angat. Among the allegations were claims that respondent received or extorted money and that she maintained amorous relationships with persons connected to her court, including her driver and bodyguards. It further alleged that she borrowed money from staff and other court officers to cover up corruption and that she displayed ill-gotten wealth, including renting a taxi for extended periods and acquiring a new vehicle. It also alleged infrequent attendance to court and various personal circumstances.

When the complaint reached the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for investigation, the OCA found that portions of the allegations—particularly those of corruption, extortion, and amorous relationships—were grounded in hearsay and rumors. The OCA, however, confirmed more specific and evidence-supported findings. It found that respondent obtained loans from court personnel and lawyers. A lawyer with a law office in Malolos City, who disclosed her information conditionally and anonymously, stated that respondent obtained a loan of P5,000.00 which remained unpaid. A court employee likewise related that respondent had obtained loans ranging from P500.00 to P1,000.00 in 1991 to 1992.

The OCA also confirmed attendance-related deficiencies. It found that respondent reported to court only for 20 days during the period from September 1, 2005 to October 11, 2005, covering twenty-nine working days. It further noted that she arrived late and almost always left before 4:30 p.m., suggesting not only tardiness but also patterns of noncompliance with expected court attendance and management.

Judicial Audit and the Supreme Court’s Earlier Administrative Disposition

Upon review of the OCA findings, the Court directed the OCA, through a Resolution dated January 17, 2006, to conduct a judicial audit to conclusively determine whether respondent could be held administratively liable for: (a) habitual tardiness; (b) failure to report to court during all working days of the week; and (c) apparent poor records management. The Court then received the judicial audit report and rendered its final administrative ruling on July 7, 2009.

In Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Judge Villalon-Pornillos, the Court found respondent guilty of Gross Misconduct. The finding was anchored on a violation of Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, specifically paragraph 7 involving the borrowing of money from a lawyer in a case pending before her court. The Court also found that this misconduct was aggravated by undue delay in rendering decisions or orders and by violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars. The Court’s penalty was severe: respondent was dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in the government service. The decision further declared that upon service, respondent would be deemed to have vacated her office and that her authority to act as judge would be considered automatically terminated.

Respondent’s First Attempt at Clemency and Its Denial

Approximately seven years after her dismissal, respondent filed on August 8, 2016 a petition for absolute pardon from the “dismissal from the service sentence,” accompanied by a letter to the Office of the President dated August 4, 2016. She later wrote the OCA on November 3, 2016 to inform it of the transmittal of her petition for judicial clemency to the Court. On December 28, 2016, respondent filed a further letter with the Court reiterating her plea for judicial clemency. She framed her narrative around what she considered an unfounded punishment based on charges and findings rooted in mere gossip.

In a Resolution dated February 14, 2017, the Court denied the petition for judicial clemency. The Court emphasized the absence of proof of remorse and reformation. It underscored that the records did not show respondent’s exhibition of remorse for past misdeeds more than eight years earlier. It noted that aside from submitting to the Court’s disciplinary authority, respondent did not demonstrate repentance, did not show acceptance of the Court’s judgment, and in fact expressed views that implied she saw nothing wrong with her actions. The Court observed that respondent’s petition reflected impenitence, self-righteousness, and even vindictiveness, which made her undeserving of judicial clemency.

The Second Petition for Judicial Clemency and the Present Claims

On October 6, 2020, respondent filed the subject petition for judicial clemency, captioned as a petition with a prayer for the reopening of the administrative case for the reception of “improperly excluded evidence.” She likewise maintained that her dismissal was null and void for violating her constitutional right to due process, and she sought review of the Court’s July 7, 2009 decision. She alleged that she had been “summarily dismissed,” and she even characterized the earlier decision as void because she claimed she had not been afforded the opportunity to be heard, had not been provided a fair trial, and had been denied the right to cross-examine the complainants.

Respondent later filed a Manifestation on March 17, 2021, continuing to assert that she had been summarily dismissed and barred from government work. She attached to this Manifestation her original petition for judicial clemency dated October 6, 2020.

The Court’s Ruling on the Second Petition

The Court denied the petition. The Court reiterated that respondent still failed to exhibit remorse for the misdeeds for which she had been dismissed. The Court further observed that respondent continued to insist that she was summarily dismissed and relied on due process objections aimed at the integrity of the earlier proceedings.

In assessing respondent’s entitlement to clemency, the Court cited its jurisprudence emphasizing that judicial clemency must be preceded by an apology that, in turn, must be preceded by a full and unconditional acceptance of the wrong committed and of the justness of the penalty imposed. The Court also invoked the requirement that the petitioner present evidence of remorse and the capacity to reform, and it stressed that the claimant must persuade the Court that the long period of dismissal has moved the erring officer to reform, exhibit remorse, repent, and develop the ability to again meet the standards demanded from court officers.

The Court explained that these requisites are rooted in the core consideration for granting judicial clemency, namely, the preservation of public confidence in the courts. In that connection, the Court restated doctrine that judges must comport themselves in a manner free of any whiff of impropriety, not only in official conduct but also in private behavior, because judicial ethics are essential to sustaining public faith in the judicial system. The Court reiterated

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