Case Summary (G.R. No. 93177)
Key Dates and Procedural Posture
The consolidated petitions arise from actions taken following the December 1–9, 1989 coup attempt. Office Order No. 16 (Jan. 14, 1990) created the PTI Panel; subpoenas and charge sheets were issued by late January 1990. Multiple petitions (G.R. Nos. 93177, 95020, 96948, 97454) were consolidated because they involved substantially the same parties and related issues. Trial and interlocutory rulings by GCM No. 14 and orders of the RTCs (including provisional releases and habeas corpus decisions) were reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Applicable Law and Constitutional Framework
The Court applied the 1987 Philippine Constitution in its analysis. Relevant military law provisions relied on in the record include Articles of War (particularly Art. 8 on general courts-martial, Art. 18 on challenges, and Art. 71 on pre-trial investigations), Commonwealth Act No. 408 (Articles of War), Presidential Decrees (P.D. No. 39 and P.D. No. 1498), Proclamation No. 2045 (termination of martial law), and procedural doctrines on certiorari/habeas corpus jurisdiction. The Court also referenced Article III, Section 13 (right to bail) and Article VIII, Section 5 (RTC jurisdiction) of the 1987 Constitution as they relate to the issues raised.
Issues Presented
The consolidated matters raised several principal issues: (1) whether the PTI Panel conducted the pre-trial investigation required by Art. 71 and whether the absence or inadequacy of that investigation deprived the GCM of jurisdiction; (2) whether GCM No. 14 was properly constituted pursuant to Art. 8; (3) whether accused officers retained the right to peremptory challenges under Art. 18 of Com. Act No. 408 given P.D. No. 39 and the termination of martial law; (4) whether civil courts (RTC) had jurisdiction to entertain petitions in the nature of certiorari, mandamus, habeas corpus and to order provisional releases of accused military officers; and (5) whether the private respondents were entitled to release because of delay or denial of bail.
Pre-Trial Investigation (Art. 71): Facts and Court’s Assessment
The PTI Panel issued subpoenas directing accused officers to submit counter-affidavits and warned that failure to do so would be deemed a waiver of the right to submit controverting evidence. The accused filed motions (including a Motion for Summary Dismissal and later a motion for reconsideration) instead of timely submitting counter-affidavits; the PTI Panel denied dismissal and, after the accused failed to comply within the extensions given, recommended referral of the charges to the General Court-Martial. The Supreme Court found that the accused were afforded opportunities to present their side and that their failure to submit counter-affidavits—despite explicit warnings—precluded a claim that they were denied due process at the PTI stage.
Jurisdictional Effect of Failure to Conduct or Adequacy of PTI
Relying on precedent cited in the record (notably Arula v. Espino and related authority), the Court reiterated that pre-trial investigation requirements under Art. 71 are directory rather than jurisdictional. Accordingly, even irregularity or failure in pre-trial procedures does not, by itself, divest a general court-martial of jurisdiction; such defects bear on regularity and may support remedies only if there is substantial injury to the accused. The Court therefore concluded that GCM No. 14 retained jurisdiction notwithstanding the procedural disputes over the PTI.
Constitutionality and Validity of Convening GCM No. 14 (Art. 8)
Petitioners contended that General Order No. M-6 convening GCM No. 14 was not valid because it lacked the Chief of Staff’s signature. The Court observed that the order explicitly stated it was issued “By Command of General De Villa,” that the Summary Disposition Form showed actual constitution by Gen. De Villa, and that he had not disavowed or revoked the order. The Solicitor General’s position and the absence of any indication of spuriousness led the Court to uphold the validity of the convening order and the constitution of GCM No. 14.
Right to Peremptory Challenge: Art. 18, P.D. No. 39, and Effect of Proclamation No. 2045
Art. 18 of Com. Act No. 408 originally provided a right to one peremptory challenge to each side. P.D. No. 39 (issued during martial law) eliminated peremptory challenges, allowing only challenges for cause. The Court examined the historical context: P.D. No. 39 was promulgated as part of the martial law-era reorganization of military tribunals. With President Marcos’s issuance of Proclamation No. 2045 terminating martial law (Jan. 17, 1981), the Court applied the statutory construction principle cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (when the reason for the law ceases, the law itself ceases). The Court held that the withdrawal of the peremptory challenge under P.D. No. 39 became ineffective with the dismantling of martial law’s apparatus; consequently, the right to peremptory challenge under Art. 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was revived and must be recognized. The Court ordered that petitioners be allowed to exercise peremptory challenges accordingly.
Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Over Military Proceedings and Extraordinary Writs
Petitioners argued that RTCs lacked authority to interfere with court-martial proceedings and to order releases. The Court reaffirmed that civil courts generally do not supervise routine court-martial errors and that certiorari lies only on jurisdictional grounds or grave abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, the Court recognized that civil courts, including RTCs, possess concurrent jurisdiction to hear petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and habeas corpus, and may intervene where the military body acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse. The absence of a statute confining such review exclusively to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court meant the RTCs could act within their constitutional powers.
Right to Bail: Majority Analysis and Reversal of RTC Release Orders
The RTC had granted provisional liberty and ordered GCM No. 14 to entertain bail applications, reasoning that Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution (right to bail for “all persons” with narrow exception) applied to military personnel. The Solicitor General and military respondents argued traditionally that the military has not recognized bail as an exception owed to the exigencies of discipline and national security, particularly in mutiny cases. The Supreme Court majority concluded that, as a matter of law and circumstance in these consolidated cases, the RTC orders granting provisional release and directing the GCM to conduct bail proceedings were erroneous. The Court held that the private respondents should not have been ordered released and therefore reversed and set aside the RTC orders granting provisional liberty and habeas corpus-based release. The majority emphasized national security considerations and the special nature of military discipline in upholding the reversal.
Habeas Corpus Delay Claim and Court’s Observations on Promptness
With respect to the petition alleging detention without formal charges for more than a year, the Court found that, although there was a delay in investigation and in preparing charges (explained by the complexity and scale of the coup cases), the government had shown substantial compliance with due process and the right to a speedy trial in the circumstances. The Court nevertheless admonished military authorities that indefinite confinement is not sanctioned; Art. 71 requires prompt steps to try or dismiss charges, and those responsible for unnecessary delay may be subject to punishment.
Final Dispositions of the Consolidated Petitions
- G.R. No. 93177 (challenge to PTI and creation of GCM No. 14): petition dismissed f
Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 93177)
Procedural Posture and Consolidation
- Four separate petitions (G.R. Nos. 93177, 95020, 96948, 97454) were consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same incident.
- Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 (officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines) faced prosecution for alleged participation in the failed coup d'etat of December 1–9, 1989.
- The charges were violations of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
- Relief sought across petitions included certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, contesting the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel, the constitutionality/constitution of General Court-Martial No. 14 (GCM No. 14), denial of peremptory challenge, and orders of Regional Trial Courts (RTC) granting provisional liberty or habeas corpus.
Parties and Respondents
- Multiple petitioners consisting of senior and junior AFP officers (enumerated in the caption).
- Respondents included Gen. Renato S. De Villa (Chief of Staff, AFP), the PTI Investigating Panel (Col. Manuel S. Mendiola, Col. Virtud Norberto L. Dagza, Maj. Felix V. Baldonado, Maj. Estelito L. Pornea), and the members of General Court-Martial No. 14 (BGen. Demetrio Camua et al.).
- Additional consolidated captioned cases involved BGen. Demetrio Camua and others as petitioners against Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion (G.R. No. 96948) and AFP Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Rodolfo Biazon and others as petitioners against Judge Antonio P. Solano (G.R. No. 97454), reflecting the multiple procedural contests before civilian courts.
Core Factual Background
- The underlying event was the failed coup d'etat from December 1 to 9, 1989.
- Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990 constituted a PTI Panel to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948.
- The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990 directing personal appearance on 12 Feb 90 at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to submit counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses; the subpoena contained an express warning: failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of the right to submit controverting evidence; it also stated "DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS."
- Petitioners acknowledged receipt, on the same date, of copies of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims.
- At the first scheduled hearing (Feb 12, 1990), petitioners challenged proceedings, were given 10 days to file objections in writing, and filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.
- PTI Panel in a resolution dated February 27, 1990 denied the motion and gave petitioners five days from notice to submit counter-affidavits and affidavits of their witnesses.
- Petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration on March 7, 1990 and were given 7 days to reduce their motion to writing; they filed on March 14, 1990; the motion remained unresolved and they did not submit counter-affidavits prior to the PTI Panel’s recommendation to refer charges to GCM No. 14.
Pre-Trial Investigation (Article of War 71) and Due Process Contentions
- Petitioners contended the PTI Panel failed to conduct the pre-trial investigation mandated by Article of War 71 which requires charges to be signed under oath by a person subject to military law and that "No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made" with a right to cross-examine witnesses and examine available witnesses requested by the accused; the Article also mandates that forwarded charges be accompanied by a statement of the substance of testimony taken on both sides. (Full text of Art. 71 quoted in source.)
- Petitioners claimed the initial hearing was merely a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits; they argued they were thereby denied the full pre-trial safeguards of Article 71.
- The PTI Panel warned petitioners that failure to submit counter-affidavits would be deemed a waiver; petitioners nonetheless failed to submit counter-affidavits and their motion for reconsideration remained unresolved.
- The Court found petitioners were given multiple specific opportunities to present their defense (scheduled hearing Feb 12, 1990 and further deadlines culminating in March 7/13, 1990 dates) and concluded that failure to submit counter-affidavits was their own choice.
- The Court held due process was satisfied because petitioners had been accorded an opportunity to be heard and had expressly been warned that failure to act would be deemed a waiver; where opportunity is not availed, it is forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
Jurisdictional Effect of Failure to Conduct Pre-Trial Investigation
- The Court reiterated prior holdings (citing Arula v. Espino and quoting Humphrey v. Smith) that even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
- The Court described pre-trial investigation as directory, not mandatory, and thus not jurisdictional: irregularities in pre-trial investigation go to regularity, not to the jurisdiction of the court-martial.
- The Court cited Kapunan v. De Villa to resolve what law governs preliminary investigation and to conclude there was substantial compliance with Articles of War and related decrees where applicable; the Court recognized P.D. No. 77 (as amended) as suppletory and not invalidating charges for technical noncompliance.
Constitution, Authority to Convene General Court-Martial (Article of War 8) and General Order No. M-6
- Petitioners alleged GCM No. 14 was improperly constituted because General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, allegedly violating Article of War No. 8 which lists authorized appointing authorities for general courts-martial.
- The Court found that although General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, the order stated it was issued "By Command of General De Villa," and there was no showing the order was spurious or disavowed by Gen. De Villa.
- The Solicitor General presented a Summary Disposition Form indicating that Gen. De Villa actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members; Gen. De Villa did not disauthorize or revoke the order and sustained the order in his Comment.
- The Court concluded that GCM No. 14 was validly constituted.
Right to Peremptory Challenge (Article 18, Com. Act No. 408) and Effect of P.D. No. 39
- Article 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 408 originally provided for challenges for cause and, after amendment (Rep. Act No. 242, June 12, 1948), entitled each side to one peremptory challenge, except the law member who could be challenged only for cause (text and history referenced).
- Historical background (Martelino v. Alejandro) traced early reasons for not permitting peremptory challenges and the later ame