Title
Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Manila Lodge No. 761 of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks
Case
G.R. No. L-11176
Decision Date
Jun 29, 1959
A non-profit fraternal club, Manila Lodge No. 761, contested privilege taxes on liquor and tobacco sales to members, claiming non-profit status. The Supreme Court ruled in its favor, exempting it from taxes as sales were incidental to social purposes, not profit-driven.

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-11176)

Key Dates

Assessments issued (first): November 19, 1953 (P1,203.50 for 4th quarter 1946–1953).
Supplemental assessment issued: covering 1954–1955 (P332.00).
Appeal to Court of Tax Appeals: June 1, 1955.
Decision of the Supreme Court (appeal): June 29, 1959.

Applicable Law and Administrative Materials

Primary statutory provisions invoked: Sections 178 and 193 (subsections (i), (k) and (n)) of the Tax Code (entitled generally under Title V, “Privilege Taxes on Business and Occupation”), and Section 194 (definitions) as quoted in the record. The Revised Administrative Code (section 1464) was the source of an earlier classification, and a 1921 Bureau of Internal Revenue ruling asserted that clubs selling exclusively to members should pay the corresponding privilege tax. The appropriate constitution for the period and legal context is the 1935 Philippine Constitution.

Uncontested Facts

  • Manila Lodge No. 761 is a duly incorporated fraternal, civic, non‑stock, non‑profit club.
  • The Lodge maintained a clubhouse where it sold liquor, fermented liquor, cigars and cigarettes only to members and their guests.
  • Sales were on a very limited scale and produced only a margin intended to cover operational expenses; there was no intent to obtain profit.
  • BIR agents discovered nonpayment of fixed privilege taxes for retail liquor dealers, retail dealers in fermented liquor, and retail tobacco dealers for the periods in question.
  • The Collector assessed the Lodge for fixed taxes under section 193; the Conference Staff of the BIR upheld the assessment; the Court of Tax Appeals ruled in favor of the Lodge; the Collector appealed.

Issues Presented on Appeal

The Collector advanced the following principal assignments of error:

  1. That the Court of Tax Appeals erred in reversing the Collector’s decision that assessed fixed privilege taxes against the Lodge.
  2. That the CTA erred in holding that the Lodge’s liability for privilege taxes attaches only if it is engaged in the “business” of selling liquor and tobacco.
  3. That the CTA erred in holding that a fraternal, civic, non‑stock, non‑profit organization selling to members and guests at cost or with minimal margin is not liable for fixed privilege taxes applicable to retail dealers.
  4. That the CTA erred in holding the BIR’s administrative construction (the 1921 ruling) inconsistent with the Revised Administrative Code and the Tax Code.

Statutory Texts Central to the Dispute

  • Section 178 (Payment of privilege taxes): a privilege tax must be paid before any “business or occupation” specified can lawfully be begun or pursued; the tax on business is payable for each separate establishment; one occupation does not become exempt by being conducted with another for which tax has been paid.
  • Section 193 (Amount of tax on business): prescribes fixed taxes for various categories, including (i) retail liquor dealers, (k) retail dealers in fermented liquors, and (n) retail tobacco dealers.
  • Section 194 (Words and phrases defined): provides definitions for terms such as “retail liquor dealer,” “retail dealer in fermented liquors,” and “tobacco dealer,” but these definitional phrases are situated within the same statutory framework that repeatedly references “business.”

Court of Tax Appeals’ Reasoning (as quoted)

The CTA interpreted the Tax Code in context and concluded that the privilege taxes of section 193, read together with section 178 and the Title V heading, apply to persons engaged in the “business” of selling the enumerated goods. The CTA relied on ordinary dictionary definitions and judicial authorities to construe “business” as activities engaged in with a view to profit or livelihood. Because the Lodge’s sales were limited, exclusive to members and guests, and intended only to cover operational expenses without profit, the CTA concluded the Lodge was not engaged in the business of selling liquor and tobacco and therefore not liable for the fixed privilege taxes.

Supreme Court’s Analysis of the Statutory Language and Context

The Supreme Court affirmed the CTA’s approach to statutory construction. Key points of analysis included:

  • The phrase “retail liquor dealers,” “retail dealers in fermented liquors,” and “retail tobacco dealers” in section 193 must be read in the integrated context of the Tax Code, especially section 178 and the Title V heading (“Privilege Taxes on Business and Occupation”).
  • Section 193 is entitled “Amount of tax on business” and is an implementation of section 178’s general rule that privilege taxes are imposed only on specified businesses or occupations. The Court emphasized that “business” appears repeatedly in section 178 and in the Tax Code’s structure.
  • The Court reasoned that the ordinary and legal meaning of “business” denotes habitual or regular activity carried on with a view to profit or livelihood. Because section 193 uses the term within that overall framework, the enumerations in section 193 are properly understood to target those engaged in trade or commerce for profit, not nonprofit fraternal organizations making incidental, non‑profit sales to members and guests.

Treatment of Statutory Definitions in Section 194

The Collector argued that the specific definitions in section 194 (defining “retail liquor dealer,” “retail dealer in fermented liquors,” and “tobacco dealer”) should control and automatically bring clubs selling such products within the taxed categories. The Court rejected a compartmentalized reading: while the definitions in section 194 are relevant, they must be read and given effect in harmony with the other provisions (sections 178 and 193) and the statutory scheme as a whole. Thus, the Court held that the defined phrases denote persons engaged in the business of retailing the specified products, not nonprofit clubs whose sales are incidental and not conducted for profit.

Administrative Ruling of 1921 and Legislative Reenactment Argument

The Collector relied on a 1921 BIR ruling that clubs selling exclusively to their members should pay the corresponding privilege tax, asserting that the doctrine had legislative approval via reenactment of section 1464 as section 193. The Court addressed this argument by:

  • Noting that even if a BIR ruling existed, its application must be consistent with the statute

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