Title
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma
Case
A.C. No. 2474
Decision Date
Jun 30, 2005
Atty. Leo J. Palma disbarred for bigamy and grossly immoral conduct after marrying a second woman while still married, violating his oath as a lawyer.

Case Summary (A.C. No. 2474)

Key Individuals and Context

  • Complainant: Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (father of Maria Luisa Cojuangco)
  • Respondent: Atty. Leo J. Palma (then married to Elizabeth Hermosisima; later married Maria Luisa Cojuangco)
  • Other persons: Elizabeth Hermosisima (respondent’s first wife); Maria Luisa Cojuangco (complainant’s daughter)
  • Context: Complaint for disbarment based on respondent’s second marriage while his first marriage subsisted; disciplinary proceedings transferred from the OSG to the IBP under Rule 139-B.

Petitioner, Respondent and Procedural Posture

  • Complainant filed a disbarment complaint on November 8, 1982. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) conducted investigation; respondent sought suspension of disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of a civil case for declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The Court issued a restraining order on December 19, 1984 enjoining the OSG from continuing the disbarment proceedings. After Rule 139-B took effect, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) resumed the case in 1998. After multiple postponements by respondent, the IBP deemed the case submitted on January 24, 2002. The IBP Commission recommended suspension; the IBP Board reduced the penalty to one year suspension and transmitted the record to the Supreme Court, which on September 15, 2004 found respondent guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath, imposing disbarment. Respondent moved to vacate; the Court denied the motion.

Key Dates (selected)

  • Marriage to complainant’s daughter: June 22, 1982.
  • Disbarment complaint filed: November 8, 1982.
  • Restraining order issued by the Court: December 19, 1984.
  • IBP resumed case and required manifestations: October 19, 1998.
  • Case deemed submitted by IBP Commission: January 24, 2002.
  • IBP Report & Recommendation: March 20, 2003.
  • Supreme Court decision challenged by motion: Decision dated September 15, 2004; Motion to Vacate denied by resolution of the Court.

Applicable Law and Precedents Cited

  • Constitution applied: 1987 Philippine Constitution (decision date is after 1990).
  • Rules and statutes referenced: Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court (ground for disbarment); Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court (transfer of disciplinary cases to IBP) and Section 12 thereof regarding Board of Governors’ recommendations; Family Code provisions cited (e.g., Art. 68, Art. 220) and other authorities cited in the decision.
  • Precedential decisions relied upon: Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos; Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente; Montemayor v. Bundalian; Terre v. Terre; Cordova v. Cordova; Cuyegkeng v. Cruz; and related authorities as cited in the record.

Facts and Central Allegation

  • While married to Elizabeth Hermosisima, respondent married Maria Luisa Cojuangco on June 22, 1982. Complainant alleged grossly immoral conduct and abuse of trust given respondent’s role as complainant’s counsel and close associate, and the circumstances surrounding the marriage (including use of complainant’s resources).

Procedural History in Disciplinary Forum

  • OSG investigated; respondent unsuccessfully moved to suspend disciplinary proceedings pending a civil annulment/nullity case. A restraining order halted OSG hearings in 1984. After Rule 139-B, the IBP took jurisdiction. The IBP conducted multiple hearings from 1999–2002, during which respondent repeatedly sought postponements and ultimately failed to present his direct testimony in affidavit form when warned that failure would result in submission. The IBP Commission found respondent guilty and recommended a three-year suspension; the IBP Board adopted the finding but reduced the recommended penalty to one year and transmitted the record to the Supreme Court for final action.

Issues Raised in Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

  • (1) Complainant allegedly an improper party (not the offended party).
  • (2) Denial of due process because the case was deemed submitted without respondent’s direct testimony in affidavit form.
  • (3) Proceedings before the IBP were void because the Court’s 1984 restraining order had not been lifted.
  • (4) Laches due to the almost 14-year hiatus between the restraining order and IBP resumption.
  • (5) Finality and having served the IBP Board of Governors’ one-year suspension.
  • (6) Good-faith belief that respondent was free to remarry and therefore acted under an honest legal conviction.

Standing and Nature of Disciplinary Proceedings

  • The Court reaffirmed that disbarment proceedings are for public welfare and disciplinary in nature; the person who lodges the complaint need not be the offended party. Citing Rayos-Ombac and related authority, the Court explained that the identity or interest of the complainant does not bar the Court from investigating and disciplining a lawyer if the record proves deceit or grossly immoral conduct.

Due Process and Submission of the Case

  • The Court held that respondent was not denied due process. The disciplinary proceedings before the IBP spanned multiple settings; respondent sought eight postponements out of fifteen hearings from February 2, 1999 to January 24, 2002 and failed to present his direct testimony in affidavit form despite warnings that failure would result in submission. The Court emphasized that due process in administrative proceedings is satisfied by a meaningful opportunity to be heard; respondent was represented by counsel throughout and had prior opportunities to challenge and cross-examine during the OSG investigation.

Effect of the 1984 Restraining Order

  • The original restraining order was based on the existence of a prejudicial question pending in Civil Case No. Pqa0401-P. The Court observed that the civil case was dismissed without prejudice (per complainant’s allegation, which respondent did not deny), removing the basis for the restraining order; consequently, there was no continuing impediment to the IBP proceedings.

Laches and Delay

  • The Court rejected a laches defense. The 14-year lapse before IBP resumed the matter resulted from the Court-ordered restraining order of December 19, 1984; the delay was not attributable to inaction inconsistent with prosecution by complainant or by the Court, and thus laches did not excuse the respondent.

Finality of IBP Board Resolution and Imposition of Discipline

  • The Court clarified that the IBP Board of Governors’ resolution recommending suspension is recommendatory under Section 12, Rule 139-B; it does not attain finality or operate as final disciplinary a

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