Case Summary (G.R. No. 223526)
Procedural History and Relevant Decisions
The MeTC Branch 49 provisionally dismissed the cases on June 9, 2003, for failure of the complainant and counsel to appear, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The complainant received notice of this order on July 2, 2003. On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive, which the MeTC granted on October 14, 2004. Following Judge Ortiz’s inhibition, the cases were raffled to MeTC Branch 50, where petitioner Co filed a Motion for Permanent Dismissal in July 2006, which was granted in September 2006. The Orders dismissing the cases were annulled by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on January 28, 2008, directing the MT Branch 50 to proceed with the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed this RTC decision. Petitioner Co filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which was denied.
Issues Presented for Resolution
The petition raised the following principal issues: (1) Whether the dismissal based on denial of the right to speedy trial constitutes a final dismissal; (2) Whether the MeTC had jurisdiction to revive the criminal cases provisionally dismissed; (3) If the dismissal was provisional, whether the one-year period for revival is computed from the issuance of the provisional dismissal order; (4) Whether the actual number of days in the year affects the computation of the one-year revival period; and (5) Whether the filing of the motion to revive automatically revives the criminal cases.
Right to Speedy Trial and Nature of Dismissal
Petitioner’s claim of denial of right to speedy trial was found baseless. The Court emphasized that the right to speedy trial is a relative, flexible concept requiring balancing of four factors: duration of delay, reason for delay, assertion or failure to assert the right, and prejudice to the accused. Mere delay or mathematical reckoning without showing malice or without justifiable cause is insufficient. The trial court’s dismissal was provisional, not final, as essential procedural requirements for final dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 were not met.
Procedural Requirements in Provisional Dismissal and Notice to Offended Party
A key procedural deficiency was the absence of notice to the private complainant of any motion for provisional dismissal at least three days prior to hearing, violating Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. The provisional dismissal was granted based on the motion made in open court without prior notice to the offended party, undermining due process. The Court reiterated the necessity of prior notice to the offended party or their counsel to permit effective opposition and to avoid collusion or prejudice, referencing People v. Lacson.
Computation of the One-Year Period to Revive Provisional Dismissal
The Court clarified that the one-year period for a provisional dismissal to become permanent does not commence at issuance of the order but upon service of the order to the public prosecutor or private counsel representing the offended party. When a private counsel represents the offended party, service should be made to the counsel’s address, analogous to Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules, to satisfy due process.
Timeliness of Motion to Revive and Court Order Granting It
The petitioner’s argument that both the motion to revive and the court order granting revival must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period was rejected. The Court recognized practical realities of court administration and the necessity to avoid oppressive procedural results that would unduly prejudice the offended party. The date of filing the motion to revive within one year is critical, whereas the issuance of the court order may follow.
Effect of Leap Year and Counting of Days in Computing the One-Year Period
The petitioner’s contention that the motion to revive was one day late due to leap year 2004 was dismissed as immaterial. The Court clarified that under the Administrative Code of 1987, a year is reckoned as twelve calendar months regardless of the actu
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. 223526)
Background and Procedural History
- Petitioner William Co was the accused in multiple criminal cases (Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77, and 209634) filed for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, with respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products represented by Elizabeth Uy as private complainant.
- The cases were first raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) Branch 49, Caloocan City.
- Due to the absence of private complainant Uy and her counsel, the MeTC provisionally dismissed the cases on June 9, 2003 under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
- Uy received a copy of the dismissal order on July 2, 2003; her counsel received it a day later.
- Uy filed a Motion to Revive the cases on July 2, 2004, which was granted on October 14, 2004 by Judge Belen B. Ortiz.
- Judge Ortiz inhibited herself upon Co’s motion for recusal, leading to the cases being raffled to MeTC Branch 50.
- Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Caloocan City, challenging the revival; it was dismissed on May 23, 2005 and the dismissal became final on March 20, 2006.
- Co filed a motion for permanent dismissal before MeTC Branch 50 on July 13, 2006; it was granted on September 4, 2006, and denial of Uy’s motion for reconsideration followed.
- Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC Branch 121, which annulled and set aside the MeTC orders on January 28, 2008, ordering the trial to proceed.
- Co’s subsequent petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) was dismissed with denial of motion for reconsideration.
Issues Presented for Resolution
- Whether the June 9, 2003 provisional dismissal of the criminal cases on grounds of denial of the right to speedy trial should be treated as a final dismissal.
- Whether the MeTC had jurisdiction to revive criminal cases that had been dismissed on speedy trial grounds.
- If the dismissal was provisional, the computation of the one-year time bar to revive the cases:
- Whether it runs from the date of issuance of the order or from notice to the offended party.
- Whether actual days in a year or calendar months govern computation.
- Whether the filing of the motion to revive automatically revives the case.
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The provisional dismissal on June 9, 2003 should be deemed final as it was based on the violation of the right to speedy trial.
- The delay from arraignment on March 4, 2002 to June 9, 2003 was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive, violating Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) and Section 2, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure mandating a 180-day trial period from first day of trial.
- Revival of the cases by MeTC would violate double jeopardy as the court has lost jurisdiction once dismissal was final.
- If dismissal was provisional, the one-year period to revive runs from issuance of the June 9, 2003 order, not from notification.
- The Motion to Revive filed on July 2, 2004 was one day late because 2004 was a leap year.
Supreme Court’s Findings and Rulings
Res Judicata and Procedural Bars
- The issues raised were already resolved in Co’s previous petition (G.R. No. 171096), dismissed by the Court on February 13, 2006.
- The dismissal of that petition became final on March 20, 2006, constituting res judicata between the parties.
- Petition should have been dismissed ou