G.R. No. 92191-92 - Co vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

Case Summary (G.R. No. 92191-92)

Procedural Posture and Relief Sought

Petitioners filed election protests with HRET contesting Ong’s qualifications. HRET ruled in favor of Ong on November 6, 1989; motions for reconsideration were denied. Petitioners then sought relief from the Supreme Court by petitions for certiorari (and related relief), challenging HRET’s conclusions as affected by grave abuse of discretion.

Key Dates (selected)

Birth of Jose L. Ong, Jr.: 19 June 1948.
Congressional election: 11 May 1987.
HRET decision: 6 November 1989 (denying disqualification).
HRET denial of reconsideration: 22 February 1990.
(Decision date of the Supreme Court case is 1991; constitutional analysis uses the 1987 Constitution.)

Applicable Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

1987 Constitution: Article VI, Section 17 (Electoral Tribunals as sole judges of contests involving members of the House and Senate); Article VI, Section 6 (qualifications for members of the House); Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 (citizenship and natural-born definition).
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Law), Section 15 (naturalization of minor children upon parent’s naturalization).
Commonwealth Act No. 625 (procedure for election of Philippine citizenship by those born of Filipino mothers before 17 January 1973).

Primary Legal Question

Whether HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in determining that Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for purposes of qualification as a Member of the House of Representatives.

Standard of Review — Jurisdictional Limits and Scope

The Court reiterates that under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution the HRET is the “sole judge” of contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of House members, and its jurisdiction is original and exclusive. Supreme Court review is narrowly confined to extraordinary circumstances: interference is permitted only where there is a clear showing that the tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (equated with arbitrary or improvident use of power amounting to denial of due process). The Court will not reweigh factual findings to correct what it perceives as errors absent such abuse.

Material Facts Relating to Citizenship

Ong’s grandfather (Ong Te) migrated from China and established residence in Laoang, Samar, circa 1895 and obtained a certificate of residence under the Spanish colonial administration.
Ong’s father (Jose Ong Chuan) was born in China (1905), brought to Samar in 1915, married a natural-born Filipina (Agripina Lao) in 1932, and fathered Jose L. Ong, Jr. (born 1948).
Jose Ong Chuan applied for naturalization on February 15, 1954; the Court of First Instance of Samar declared him a Filipino on April 28, 1955; an order made the decision final and executory on May 15, 1957; he took the Oath of Allegiance and was issued a certificate of naturalization. Section 15 of CA 473 would operate for minor children.
Ong, Jr. grew up in Laoang, pursued higher education and employment in Manila, registered and voted in Laoang in 1984 and 1986, and ran for Congress in 1987.

Constitutional Definition and Interpretive Approach

The 1987 Constitution defines natural-born citizens as those who are citizens from birth without performing an act to acquire or perfect citizenship; it also provides that those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching majority shall be deemed natural-born. The Court interprets these provisions in light of constitutional framers’ debates and the remedial purpose to correct unfair discrimination against children of Filipino mothers born before 1973; the remedial provision was intended to operate retroactively to avoid inequitable results keyed to arbitrary dates and thus to treat those similarly situated equally.

HRET’s Reasoning on Citizenship — Majority View Adopted by the Court

HRET concluded Ong, Jr. is natural-born on two principal bases the Court upholds: (1) the father’s naturalization while Ong was a minor operated under CA 473 to make Ong a Filipino by operation of law without any act required by Ong, and (2) even apart from the father’s naturalization, Ong’s maternal lineage and his conduct (registering and voting, living, working and fully participating as a Filipino) suffice to show election of Philippine citizenship or at least demonstrate that formal election would have been superfluous and unnecessary for someone who was effectively a citizen from childhood. The Court finds HRET’s factual findings supported by the record and not shown to be the product of grave abuse of discretion.

Election of Citizenship and Application of Pre‑1973 Rules

The Court accepts that the constitutional provision recognizing as natural-born those born before January 17, 1973 to Filipino mothers who elected citizenship was intended to include persons who had elected under earlier regimes; the framers’ deliberations indicate that election under the 1935 rules or by conduct (such as exercising suffrage) can evidence election, and that the provision should cure earlier inequities. The Court applies precedents recognizing that certain acts (suffrage, participation in elections, entry into professions requiring citizenship, taking public positions) can manifest an election where formal documentation might be superfluous.

Evidence, Best Evidence Rule and Use of Constitutional Convention Records

Petitioners challenged the documentary proof used to show recognition of Ong-family citizenship by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and related records. The Court accepts HRET’s findings that the originals were not producible after due diligence, allowing admission of copies and witness recollection under recognized exceptions to the best evidence rule. Testimony from former Convention officers and librarians supported execution and nonavailability; the Convention committee report and minutes were corroborated by witnesses. HRET reasonably relied on these materials and witnesses without grave abuse.

HRET’s Conclusion on Residence (Domicile) and the Court’s Treatment

HRET found Ong a resident of Laoang, Samar. The Court confirms that “residence” in constitutional qualifications is construed as domicile — a fixed permanent residence characterized by animus revertendi. Temporary absence for education or work does not negate domicile. Ong’s habitual returns, family home and property (including a family-built apartment with reserved doors), voter registration and voting in Laoang support his continuing domicile there. The fact that title to property remained in parents’ names does not negate residence; owning real property is not a constitutional requirement. HRET’s resolution on residence is accorded deference and affirmed.

Relationship to 1971 Constitutional Convention Determination

The 1971 Constitutional Convention had earlier addressed the citizenship of Ong’s brother and found him natural-born under facts presented then (relying in part on the notion that the grandfather Ong Te was a Spanish subject and thus his descendants fell within the Philippine Bill of 1902). The Court recognizes that the Convention’s findings and the subsequent Committee Report were relevant and were permissibly relied upon by HRET as corroborative, but HRET reached its decision primarily on other facts (father’s naturalization and the respondent’s conduct). The Court distinguishes error from grave abuse and declines to overturn HRET on the basis that other bodies may have viewed the matter differently.

Policy and Observations on Naturalization Law

The Court commented on the historical technicality and harshness of naturalization laws and stressed the need for a humane and less technical approach to citizenship adjudication, observing that the present case illustrated the importance of focusing on substantive allegiance and integration rather than overly formalistic traps.

Final Holding and Relief

The petitions are dismissed. The HRET decision is affirmed. Jose L. Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, and therefore qualified to be a Member of the House of Representatives.

Dissenting Opinion — Principal Arguments (Justice Padilla)

Jurisdiction and review: While recognizing the narrow standard for review, the dissent views the case as properly subject to judicial review under Article VIII, Section 1 because the question concerns a constitutional qualification for office.
Citizenship-by-birth analysis: The dissent contends Ong was born a Chinese national (father then Chinese) and, therefore, under 1935 rules required an express election upon majority to become a Filipino natural-born. The dissent emphasiz

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 92191-92)

Procedural Posture and Relief Sought

Two consolidated petitions (G.R. Nos. 92191-92; G.R. Nos. 92202-03) challenge the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that declared Jose Ong, Jr. a natural-born Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting and congressional-qualification purposes.
Petitioners (Antonio Y. Co and Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr.) sought annulment and reversal of the HRET decision and sought appropriate reliefs arising from Ong’s alleged disqualification.
HRET rendered its decision on November 6, 1989 in favor of the private respondent; petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (filed November 12, 1989) which HRET denied (resolution dated February 22, 1989, as reported in the source).
Petitioners elevated the controversy to the Supreme Court by petitions for certiorari (and mandamus in the separate pleadings); comments were treated as answers and the issues were taken up by the Court en banc.

Central Legal Issues Presented

Jurisdictional issue: whether the Supreme Court may review an HRET decision or whether the HRET is the sole and final judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of its Members.
Citizenship: whether Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines under Article IV (Sections 1 and 2) of the 1987 Constitution, taking into account his parentage and the naturalization of his father.
Residency: whether Jose Ong, Jr. was a resident (domiciled) in Laoang, Northern Samar for at least one year immediately preceding the May 11, 1987 congressional elections.
Evidentiary issue: admissibility and sufficiency of documentary proofs relied upon (notably records and committee reports of the 1971 Constitutional Convention) and applicability of the best evidence rule.

Relevant Background Facts (family history, upbringing, education, employment, civic acts)

Grandfather Ong Te arrived in the Philippines from China in about 1895, established residence in Laoang, Samar, acquired property and obtained a certificate of residence under the Spanish colonial administration.
Father Jose Ong Chuan: born in China (1905), brought to Samar in 1915 by Ong Te, grew up and assimilated in Laoang, married Agripina Lao (a natural-born Filipina) on February 4, 1932; the couple had eight children, including private respondent Jose Ong, Jr. (born June 19, 1948).
Jose Ong Chuan applied for naturalization on February 15, 1954 (Court of First Instance of Samar); decision in his favor dated April 28, 1955; order declaring decision final and directing issuance of certificate of naturalization and oath on May 15, 1957; he took the oath and certificate issued thereafter.
Private respondent’s life: elementary education in Laoang; later finished secondary and college in Manila; passed the CPA board exams; worked as an examiner at the Central Bank of the Philippines and later in the family hardware business; married Desiree Lim in 1984.
Family property and residence: family houses in Laoang burned (one in 1961 and another in 1975); new houses built, later a 16-door apartment was constructed with two doors reserved for the family — HRET found Laoang remained the family abode.
Political acts: Jose Ong, Jr. registered and voted in Laoang in the 1984 and 1986 elections; re-registered in December 1986; in 1987 he ran for Representative of the second district of Northern Samar and was proclaimed duly elected. Even combining the two petitioners’ votes, Ong would still lead by more than 7,000 votes (as stated in the record); at proclamation he led petitioner Co by about 16,000 votes.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Quoted or Applied

1987 Constitution provisions:
- Article VI, Section 17 — creation and exclusivity of Electoral Tribunals (HRET/SET) as sole judges of contests relating to election, returns and qualifications.
- Article IV, Section 1 — categories of Philippine citizenship, including paragraph (3): those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
- Article IV, Section 2 — definition of natural-born citizens: persons who are citizens from birth without performing any act to acquire or perfect citizenship; those who elect under Section 1(3) are deemed natural-born.
- Article VI, Section 6 — qualifications for Members of the House (natural-born citizen, age, literacy, registered voter, and one-year residency).
Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473), Section 12 (oath requirement) and Section 15 (minor children of a naturalized citizen born in the Philippines become citizens upon parent’s naturalization).
Commonwealth Act No. 625 — requirements and formalities for the option/election to take Philippine citizenship by those born of Filipino mothers (Sections 1 and 2 quoted in the source).
Historical statutes referenced: Philippine Bill of 1902 (Section 4) and Civil Code of Spain (Articles cited in discussion regarding Spanish subjects and domicile).

Jurisdictional Analysis and Standard of Review (majority reasoning)

Constitutional framework: HRET is the exclusive and original tribunal to judge contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of House Members; the term “sole” underscores exclusivity.
Supreme Court’s review is narrowly confined to its extraordinary jurisdiction: intervention is proper only upon a clear showing that the Tribunal’s decision was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion — i.e., arbitrary, improvident use of power amounting to denial of due process (citing Morrero v. Bocar, Lazatin, Robles).
The Court emphasized deference to HRET’s province absent a showing of manifest grave abuse of discretion; mere disagreement or perceived error is not a ground for judicial interference.
Applying the standard, the majority found no denial of due process or manifest grave abuse by the HRET in resolving the citizenship and residence claims of Jose Ong, Jr., and therefore declined to overturn the HRET decision.

Citizenship Analysis — Majority Rationale and Findings

Grandfather Ong Te: established domicile and residence in Laoang ca. 1895; obtained a Spanish-era certificate of residence. Under the Civil Code of Spain and the Philippine Bill of 1902, a person domiciled in Spanish territory and thus a Spanish subject who continued to reside in the islands on April 11, 1899 could be deemed a Filipino under the 1902 Bill; HRET found Ong Te satisfied these criteria.
Effect on descendants: if Ong Te qualified as a Filipino under the 1902 Bill, his descendants’ claims to Philippine citizenship flowed therefrom — a factual finding the HRET adopted and the Supreme Court majority accepted.
Father’s naturalization: Jose Ong Chuan’s naturalization proceedings (petition filed Feb. 15, 1954; CFI decision April 28, 1955; order May 15, 1957 directing issuance of certificate and oath; thereafter certificate issued and oath taken) were found by HRET to have made the minor son (Jose Jr.) a Filipino by operation of Section 15 of CA 473 when the father naturalized, and HRET concluded the law effectively “elected” Philippine citizenship for the minor.
Election by acts and the In Re: Florencio Mallare rule: the Court noted jurisprudence that election of Philippine citizenship can be formal or informal; Mallare held exercising the right of suffrage and participation in elections constitute a positive act of election. The majority applied the Mallare principle where it found respondent’s voting, participation in political life, professional acts requiring citizenship and the long-standing life in the Philippines to be substantial manifestations of his choice and to support natural-born status under the constitutional framework.
Constitutional Commission de