Title
Co Tiong Sa vs. Director of Patents
Case
G.R. No. L-5378
Decision Date
May 24, 1954
Co Tiong Sa sought to register "FREEDOM" for undershirts, opposed by Saw Woo Chiong & Co. over similarity to "FREEMAN." Court ruled "FREEDOM" and "FREEMAN" confusingly similar, affirming opposition.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. L-5378)

Factual Background: Competing Marks and Their Alleged Trade Use

The trademark sought for registration consisted of the word “FREEDOM” in hand print, with a slight slant to the right. In the facsimiles attached to the original application, the word appeared without surrounding letters, lines, or figures; however, in the label Exhibit D-1, “FREEDOM” was preceded by a triangle with the letter “F” inside and small letters “H.L.” underneath. A capital letter “L” appeared on the lower right-hand corner, and these elements were enclosed in a rectangle of double lines. In Exhibit D-2, the label again showed “FREEDOM”, but with a capital “M” above it, a flourish under it, and the words “HIGH QUALITY” below. The label used for boxes was similar to Exhibit D-1, except that the rectangle was heavier and longer.

Saw Woo Chiong & Co.’s oppositor trademark (Exhibit D-3) consisted of the word “FREEMAN” in hand print, slanted to the right. Above the middle of the word was a vignette of a man wearing a tophat. The vignette was preceded by the printed word “The,” and followed by two parallel lines close to each other. Beneath “FREEMAN” were the words “PERFECT WEAR” in smaller letters. The oppositor’s trademark had been registered in 1947 in the Bureau of Commerce and re-registered in the Patent Office on September 22, 1948. The oppositor used the mark not only on shirts but also on polo shirts, undershirts, pajamas, skippers, and T-shirts. The record also reflected that, in 1947, Saw Woo Chiong & Co. discontinued manufacturing skippers and T-shirts due to scarcity of materials. The oppositor traced use of the mark since 1938, and advertised it extensively in newspapers and magazines.

Proceedings Before the Director of Patents

The Director of Patents sustained the opposition and denied the application for registration. The petitioner assailed the ruling, arguing that the Director misapplied the legal tests for trademark similarity and unfair competition, and likewise erred in denying the petitioner’s procedural attack based on the oppositor’s alleged failure to present witness testimony.

The Parties' Contentions

The petitioner framed five assignments of error. The first four were treated as interrelated. In substance, Co Tiong Sa contended that the Director erred by: (one) focusing on the central idea of each trademark while disregarding differences in details; (two) holding that if both trademarks create the same general impression, they are confusingly similar; (three) concluding that “FREEDOM” and “FREEMAN” convey the same general impression and are therefore confusingly similar; and (four) ruling that even if no actual confusion or deception would occur, the oppositor would nevertheless be damaged. The fifth assignment of error argued that the Director wrongly held the oppositor not to require testimony to substantiate the opposition.

The petitioner’s overarching position was that, upon close inspection, the marks displayed enough dissimilarities in their details—particularly in their supplementary features—to prevent any likelihood of confusion.

The Court's Analysis on Trademark Similarity and the Test of Dominancy

The Court rejected the petitioner’s approach that legally accepted similarity tests depend on the details. While the Court observed that a careful eye would notice multiple differences between the marks, it held that variations in details are not the legally accepted measure. The Court reaffirmed the consistent doctrine that the question in trademark cases is determined by the test of dominancy: similarity of size, form, and color, though relevant, is not conclusive. In trademark infringement analysis, if the competing mark contains the main or essential or dominant features of another, and confusion and deception are likely, infringement results. The Court also reiterated that duplication or imitation is not strictly required, and it is unnecessary that the alleged infringing label suggest an effort to imitate.

The Court further grounded the inquiry on whether the use of the marks would likely cause confusion or mistake among the public or deceive purchasers. It characterized trademark infringement as a form of unfair competition, and described unfair competition as a question of fact resolved by the universal test of whether the public is likely to be deceived.

Dominant Features as the Basis of Customer Recall

The Court explained that, when a person views an object, a central or dominant picture is formed in the mind, and decorations and minor details are forgotten. It used examples to illustrate that when customers see a label, they retain the dominant characteristics or central idea and overlook or disregard variations. It emphasized that ordinary customers do not scrutinize details; they retain a general impression. The Court also observed that the average buyer’s reliance may be even more pronounced where radio advertising is used, because the buyer may depend on sound alone.

On this doctrinal footing, the Court held that infringement does not require literal copying and does not require appropriation of every word. It may exist where the substantial and distinctive part of the trademark is copied or imitated. The Court further clarified that dissimilarities in accessories are not controlling if the resemblances so dominate the differences that ordinary purchasers may be deceived.

Application: “FREEMAN” and “FREEDOM” as Confusingly Similar

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the oppositor’s trademark “FREEMAN” had dominant features that were reproduced or imitated in the petitioner’s “FREEDOM”. The Court found that the word “FREEDOM” conveys a similar idea to “FREEMAN.” It also found that the style of the capital letters, including the peculiar writing of “F” letters and the slant of the letters, was similar. The Court further reasoned that an ordinary purchaser or unsuspecting customer who had seen the oppositor’s label would not recognize the differences between the two labels. The Court stated that variations would likely be ignored as mere modifications distinguishing types or qualities of goods produced by the same source.

To support the conclusion, the Court referred to earlier holdings on marks that were considered confusingly similar because of meaning and appearance as well as sound—such as “CELDURA” and “COBDURA,” “SKOAL” and “SKOL,” and the local jurisprudence involving “Lusolin” and “Sapolin.” It also cited La Insular vs. Jao Oge, where differences in the pictured subject’s posture and coloring did not prevent a finding of infringement because the dominant overall impression was retained. After the “careful study” it conducted, the Court determined that the dominant characteristic of the oppositor’s mark was imitated in the petitioner’s mark to an extent likely to confuse and deceive the public into believing that goods bearing one label were similar or produced by the same manufacturer as goods bearing the other label.

Procedural Issue: Alleged Failure to Present Witness Testimony

On th

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