Case Summary (G.R. No. L-5a)
Continuation of Municipal Laws and Courts under Hague Conventions
Even under belligerent occupation, the Hague Conventions impose a duty on the occupant to maintain existing municipal laws and courts “for the protection and benefit of the inhabitants,” ensuring public order and safety. Failure to maintain them would unduly disrupt civil life. Hence, judicial acts of courts operating under occupation remain valid unless expressly suspended by the occupant.
Renunciation of War and Protection of Judicial Acts
The Kellogg–Briand Pact and constitutional renunciation of war do not invalidate the Hague Convention rules permitting an occupant to preserve local judiciary. Upholding occupation-era judicial acts serves the rights of inhabitants and prevents rewarding the aggressor or further harming the conquered population.
Scope of “Processes” in MacArthur’s Proclamation
General MacArthur’s October 23, 1944 proclamation nullified “all laws, regulations and processes” of any government other than the Commonwealth. The Court applied the interpretive maxim noscitur a sociis, holding that “processes” refers to legislative and constitutional instruments (e.g., executive orders, ordinances, constitutions) and not to judicial process—service of process or court proceedings—so as to allow occupation‐era courts to continue civil actions involving private rights.
Indefeasibility of Occupation-Era Judgments under Law of Nations
Judicial acts under occupation—applying pre-occupation municipal law to private rights—are valid before and after the lapse of occupation. Their reversal by the restored government would inflict national wrong on vested rights, even if no “international wrong” might be shown. Precedent from U.S. Supreme Court cases (e.g., Dow v. Johnson; Raymond v. Thomas) confirms that military or occupation authorities may not arbitrarily abrogate judicial decisions affecting private rights.
Status of Occupation-Era Courts Relative to Japanese Courts
Courts maintained under occupation function as local tribunals under military authority but are not foreign (Japanese) courts. Analogous to U.S. military courts in conquered territory (e.g., Jecker v. Montgomery), they serve public order and protect inhabitants; their decisions are not Japanese judicial acts and thus are inheritable by the restored Commonwealth judiciary.
Mandamus as Plain, Speedy, and Adequate Remedy
When a lower court erroneously refuses
...continue readingCase Syllabus (G.R. No. L-5a)
Facts and Procedural Posture
- Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s decision denying a petition for mandamus against Judge Arsenio P. Dizon.
- The underlying suit was originally brought by petitioner Co Kim Cham in the Court of First Instance of Manila under Japanese occupation (Civil Case No. 3012), comprising pleadings dated November 17 to December 21, 1944.
- The court record was destroyed in the Manila liberation fire; petitioner then moved to reconstitute it by filing copies of the papers previously submitted.
- The trial court refused, holding it had no jurisdiction to continue the “inherited” case under a defunct regime and doubting the authenticity of petitioner’s copies.
- Petitioner sought mandamus to compel record reconstitution and resumption of proceedings; respondents opposed and moved for reconsideration of this Court’s denial of mandamus.
Issues Presented
- Whether the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines was “actual and effective,” thereby creating a valid de facto government.
- Whether judicial acts and proceedings of Philippine courts under belligerent occupation remain valid under municipal law and international law.
- Whether constitutional renunciations of war (Philippine Constitution, Kellogg–Briand Pact) preclude application of Hague Convention rules on belligerent occupation.
- Whether the term “processes” in General MacArthur’s October 23, 1944 proclamation includes judicial processes.
- Whether a restored legitimate government may reverse or nullify occupation-era judicial acts without violating international law.
- Whether the courts functioning under the Japanese regime were in fact “courts of Japan.”
- Whether mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a trial court to resume proceedings after it has assumed it lacks jurisdiction.
Supreme Court’s Resolution
- The motion for reconsideration and petition for oral argument were both denied.
- The majority reaffirmed that Japanese occupation was actual and effective from the surrender of U.S. and Philippine forces.
- Judicial acts under occupation are valid both under municipal law and the law of nations, even if the occupier was a treacherous aggressor.
- “Processes” in MacArthur’s proclamation refer to legislative and constitutional instruments, not judicial processes.
- Mandamus is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy to compel a court that has erroneously refused to proceed on the merits.
Military Occupation and De Facto Government
- The occupation became an accomplished fact on April 9 and May 10, 1942, upon the surrender of Generals Wainwright and Sharp.
- Under U.S. Army doctrine, occupation is a question of fact: it requires hosti