Title
CKH Industrial and Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. 111890
Decision Date
May 7, 1997
CKH, owned by Cheng Kim Heng, sold properties to Century-Well via Rubi Saw, who claimed non-payment. SC rescinded the sale due to failure of consideration, ruling compensation invalid and upholding CKH's ownership.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 111890)

Factual Background

CKH Industrial and Development Corporation owned two contiguous parcels in Karuhatan, Valenzuela, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. B-8710 and B-8711. After the death of its incorporator and president, Cheng Kim Heng, control of CKH passed to Rubi Saw. On May 8, 1988, at the residence of Uy Chi Kim, Rubi Saw and Lourdes Chong signed a Deed of Absolute Sale transferring the two lots to Century-Well Phil. Corporation for the stated price of P800,000.00. The Deed recited that the sum of P800,000.00 "paid by VENDEE to VENDOR, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged." The instrument was acknowledged before a notary the following day, which the records also state as March 9, 1988.

Parties' Allegations and Immediate Events

Petitioners alleged that payment of the P800,000.00 did not occur and that the Deed was procured through assurances by Uy Chi Kim and Lourdes Chong that the purchase price would be delivered in the form of a manager’s check, a promise ultimately unfulfilled. Petitioners recounted that after signing, Rubi Saw delivered the owner’s copies of the titles but received only P20,000.00 in cash from Uy Chi Kim, and that subsequent demands for payment were ignored. Century-Well, Lourdes Chong, and Chong Tak Kei countered that the agreed price was satisfied by P100,000.00 in cash and P700,000.00 by application or set-off of three promissory notes executed in favor of Chong Tak Choi and Chong Tak Kei for sums of P400,000.00, P100,000.00, and P200,000.00 respectively.

Trial Court Proceedings and Findings

The trial court denied the petitioners’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction. After trial, the court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale should be rescinded for failure of consideration because the written Deed expressly provided for payment of P800,000.00 in cash and the evidence did not establish payment. The court ruled that compensation by way of off-setting was inapplicable because Article 1278 of the Civil Code requires that parties be mutually bound as creditors and debtors, a prerequisite not satisfied in this case. The trial court ordered annulment of the Deed, awarded moral damages and attorney’s fees to petitioners, directed cancellation of the certificates of title issued to Century-Well, and dismissed related counterclaims.

Appellate Court Ruling and Rationale

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court found that the sale resulted from mediation to settle familial disputes after Cheng’s death and held that payment occurred by P100,000.00 cash and by compensation through off-setting of the P700,000.00 promissory notes. The appellate court deemed the Deed’s recital of receipt credible and concluded that the parties intended the promissory notes to constitute payment, invoking Article 1249 Civil Code on the effect of mercantile documents and recognizing conventional compensation as permissible where parties so agree. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint and ordered petitioners to pay moral damages and attorney’s fees to the private respondents.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The central question was whether the consideration for the sale was in fact paid, and specifically whether the obligation of Cheng evidenced by the promissory notes could validly be compensated or set off against the purchase price so as to extinguish petitioners’ claim for the P800,000.00.

Parties' Contentions on Appeal

Petitioners asserted that the Deed of Sale, being the best evidence of the parties’ agreement under Section 9, Rule 130, Rules of Court, expressly provided for payment of P800,000.00 in cash and that no payment had been made. Petitioners further contended that the promissory notes did not bind Century-Well and thus could not be off-set. Private respondents argued that the Deed did not reflect the true agreement reached in mediation, which contemplated payment by P100,000.00 cash and the application of the P700,000.00 promissory notes as set-off.

Supreme Court's Analysis of the Written Agreement and the Parol Evidence Rule

The Court emphasized that when terms are reduced to writing the document presumptively contains the full agreement, citing Section 9, Rule 130, Rules of Court and the parol evidence rule. The Court recognized exceptions to that rule where the written instrument is alleged to contain intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, failure to express the true intent, invalidity, or where additional post-execution terms are asserted. The Deed’s recital that P800,000.00 was paid gave the recital probative weight and prima facie credibility to respondents’ claim; however, the Court held that validity of the asserted mode of payment must be adjudged against substantive law on extinguishment of obligations.

Legal Doctrines on Compensation and Application to the Promissory Notes

The Court recited applicable law: Article 1231 on modes of extinguishing obligations; Article 1278 defining legal compensation; Article 1279 listing requisites for legal compensation; the distinction between legal (operation of law) and conventional compensation; and Article 1249 on the effect of promissory notes and mercantile documents. The Court found no basis for legal compensation because the requisite mutual principal capacity as creditor and debtor between CKH and Century-Well was absent. The promissory notes showed CKH’s indebtedness to Chong Tak Choi and Chong Tak Kei as individuals, and the notes did not evidence an indebtedness of CKH to Century-Well. The Court further held that conventional compensation cannot operate to compensate the sale price with obligations owed to third-party individuals who were not parties to the Deed and who were not shown to be identical in persona to Century-Well.

Corporate Personality and Inability to Offset Shareholders' Credits

The Court stressed the separate juridical personality of corporations under Section 2, Corporation Code, noting that Choi and Kei were stockholders of Century-Well but not parties to the Deed. The Court declined to pierce the corporate veil in the absence of proof that the corporate form was used to defeat public convenience, perpetrate fraud, or that Century-Well was merely an alter ego serving to evade obligations. Consequently, the promissory notes in favor of the individual sons could not be off-set against the obligation of Century-Well to pay the purchase price.

Supreme Court's Disposition

The Supreme Court held that compensation of the purchase price with the promissory notes was inval

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