Title
Civil Service Commission vs. Sojor
Case
G.R. No. 168766
Decision Date
May 22, 2008
Henry Sojor, CVPC president, faced CSC administrative complaints for alleged misconduct. SC ruled CSC has concurrent jurisdiction with BOR over university presidents, affirming accountability under civil service laws.
jurisdiction
disciplinary action
academic freedom

Case Summary (G.R. No. 168766)

Factual Background

On August 1, 1991, respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as President of Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete City. In June 1997, R.A. No. 8292 was enacted and required the formation of a Board of Trustees (BOT) as the governing body in state colleges. Under this structure, the BOT appointed respondent as university president for a four-year term beginning September 1998 and expiring in September 2002. After the expiration of his first term, respondent received a second appointment as president of the institution for another four-year term, expiring on September 24, 2006.

On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted into Negros Oriental State University (NORSU) through R.A. No. 9299. A Board of Regents (BOR) succeeded the BOT.

While respondent was president, three separate administrative cases were filed by CVPC faculty members before the CSC-RO No. VII. In ADM DC No. 02-20(A) (filed June 26, 2002), complainants Jose Rene A. Cepe and Narciso P. Ragay alleged that respondent approved the release of salary differentials despite the absence of required plantilla and salary adjustment forms and valid appointments. In ADM DC No. 02-20 (filed July 10, 2002), complainants Jocelyn Juanon and Carolina Fe Santos alleged that respondent maliciously allowed the antedating and falsification of reclassification differential payrolls, allegedly to the prejudice of instructors and professors seeking academic rank adjustments. In ADM DC No. 02-21 (filed August 15, 2002), complainant Rose Marie Palomar alleged nepotism, asserting that respondent appointed his half-sister, Estrellas Sojor-Managuilas, as casual clerk in violation of nepotism rules under the Administrative Code.

CSC Proceedings and Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

Before filing counter-affidavits, respondent moved to dismiss the first two complaints based on lack of jurisdiction, prior judgment, and forum shopping. He argued that the CSC had no jurisdiction because he was a presidential appointee, placed exclusively under the disciplinary authority of the Office of the President (OP). He maintained that the Civil Service Law contained no provisions allowing CSC investigation, discipline, and removal of presidential appointees. He also asserted that the subject matters had allegedly already been resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman.

The CSC-RO denied the motion to dismiss in a Resolution dated September 4, 2002, and respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Respondent then faced formal charges for (1) dishonesty, misconduct, and falsification of official documents; (2) dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and (3) nepotism.

On appeal, respondent reiterated his jurisdictional theories. He argued that because the BOT was headed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Higher Education who was under the OP, the BOT was also under the OP, and thus the university president was a presidential appointee. He further contended that the jurisdiction allegedly conferred by P.D. No. 807 was superseded by R.A. No. 8292, which he claimed gave the BOT power to remove university officials.

Resolutions of the CSC and Preventive Suspension

In a Resolution dated March 30, 2004, the CSC dismissed respondent’s appeal, authorized the CSC-RO to proceed with the formal investigation, and imposed preventive suspension for ninety (90) days. The CSC held that respondent’s claim that he was a presidential appointee lacked factual and legal basis. The CSC reasoned that respondent’s appointment had been signed by the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Chairman and that the appointment expressly showed approval and adoption by the CVPC BOT pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 8292. Since the president of a state college was appointed by the BOT, the CSC concluded that respondent was not a presidential appointee.

The CSC further ruled that it and the university governing board had concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases involving officials and employees of the university. Because the complaints were filed with the CSC and not with the BOT, the CSC concluded it acquired disciplinary jurisdiction to the exclusion of the BOT. The CSC categorized respondent as a third level official under its rules, placing him within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Commission Proper, and directed the CSC-RO to proceed under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on July 6, 2004.

CA Proceedings and Ruling

Respondent petitioned the CA for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that the CSC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it issued the challenged CSC Resolutions. He again argued that the CSC encroached upon academic freedom and that the power to remove, suspend, and discipline the university president belonged exclusively to the BOT.

On September 29, 2004, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing the CSC to cease and desist from enforcing the CSC Resolutions, and the formal investigation before the CSC-RO was suspended. On June 27, 2005, after hearing both sides, the CA annulled the CSC Resolutions and permanently enjoined the CSC from proceeding with the administrative investigation.

The CA ruled that the BOT’s power to appoint carried with it the power to remove and discipline. It held that the conversion of CVPC into NORSU under R.A. No. 9299 did not divest the governing body of the power to discipline and remove faculty members, administrative officials, and employees. It relied on provisions of R.A. No. 8292 granting the governing board authority to remove for cause and of R.A. No. 9299 that (through its governing board and president framework) continued these disciplinary powers in favor of the BOR. The CA treated E.O. No. 292 as a general law and held it did not prevail over R.A. No. 9299, a special law.

Issues Raised in the Supreme Court

The CSC sought reversal of the CA decision on the ground that the CA gravely erred in holding that the CSC acted without jurisdiction in issuing CSC Resolution No. 040321 dated March 30, 2004 and CSC Resolution No. 040766 dated July 6, 2004.

Legal Basis and Reasoning of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held that the petition was meritorious. It began by emphasizing that the Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. It discussed that the civil service includes every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. It reiterated the constitutional classification of civil service positions into career and non-career service.

The Court described the characteristics of career positions and non-career positions, citing the categories under the law. It then explained that CSC’s jurisdiction remained comprehensive over both career and non-career civil servants and officials, and that CSC rules on specific jurisdiction merely implemented the general grant. It relied on CSC rules specifying jurisdiction, including the rule that the CSC—except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law—had the final authority on removal, separation, and suspension and matters relating to conduct, discipline, and efficiency of officers and employees in the civil service.

Applying these principles, the Court found that respondent, as a state university president with a fixed term appointed by the governing board, was a non-career civil service officer under the civil service system and therefore remained under CSC jurisdiction.

The Court next rejected the premise that the BOR’s disciplinary power was exclusive. It acknowledged that R.A. No. 8292 granted the governing board authority to remove for cause, and that this provision was carried into R.A. No. 9299, including the BOR’s power to remove faculty members, employees, and officials for cause in accordance with due process. The Court nonetheless concluded that these grants did not demonstrate exclusivity. When a government body is given jurisdiction over a matter, the presumption of exclusivity yields where another body is also vested with the same jurisdiction. The Court held that all members of the civil service are under CSC jurisdiction unless a law provides otherwise.

The Court treated the matter as not novel. It cited University of the Philippines v. Regino to reject the view that a university governing board had exclusive jurisdiction to discipline its employees, and it explained that, as part of the civil service, university employees could be subject to CSC appellate disciplinary jurisdiction. It also cited Camacho v. Gloria to support the proposition that a complaint against a university official may be filed either with the university’s governing board or directly with the CSC, and that CSC could delegate investigation while retaining jurisdiction.

On the academic freedom argument, the Supreme Court recognized that academic institutions enjoy wide latitude under the

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