Title
City of Manila vs. Alegar Corporation
Case
G.R. No. 187604
Decision Date
Jun 25, 2012
Manila's expropriation of private lots for socialized housing dismissed; City failed to comply with legal requirements, prove public necessity, or negotiate in good faith.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 187604)

Applicable Law and Constitutional Basis

Applicable constitutional framework: 1987 Philippine Constitution (decision issued after 1990). Statutory and regulatory provisions applied: Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act, UDHA) — particularly Sections 9 and 10; Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code (procedures for offer and conference when owner seeks a higher price); Local Government Code provisions on expropriation (including the advance deposit requirement under Section 19); and procedural precepts from the Rules of Court. The Court also relied on existing jurisprudence cited in the record.

Material Facts

The Manila City Council enacted Ordinance authorizing acquisition of specified titled lots for socialized housing. The City offered P1,500.00 per sq. m.; owners rejected the offer as too low and indicated willingness to sell at an appropriate price. The City filed an expropriation complaint in the RTC after depositing P1,500,000.00 to enable possession. The RTC issued a writ of possession; later parties agreed to dispense with pre-trial and to submit memoranda on whether necessity for expropriation existed. Respondents filed a memorandum; the City did not. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with statutory prerequisites (Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279) and for failing to show exhaustion of other acquisition modes and genuine necessity. The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court denied the petition with specified modifications.

Procedural History

  • City passed ordinance authorizing acquisition and made a written offer.
  • Owners rejected offer; City filed expropriation action in RTC.
  • City deposited funds and obtained writ of possession.
  • Parties agreed to forego pre-trial and submit memoranda; only respondents timely filed theirs.
  • RTC dismissed complaint for procedural and substantive noncompliance with R.A. 7279 and implementing rules.
  • CA affirmed the dismissal.
  • Petition to the Supreme Court was denied, with modifications on indemnity and return of deposit; City was allowed to re-file after statutory compliance.

Issues Presented to the Court

  1. Whether the RTC denied the City due process by dismissing the case without hearing the City’s side.
  2. Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC’s ruling that the City failed to comply with Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279 in attempting to expropriate the lots.
  3. Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s finding that the City failed to establish genuine necessity/public use for the taking.
  4. Whether respondents’ withdrawal of the City’s deposit constituted implied consent to expropriation.

Court’s Analysis — Due Process and the City’s Opportunity to Be Heard

The Court treated expropriation as having two stages: (1) determination of the authority/necessity to acquire property for public use (a threshold question), and (2) determination of just compensation. The parties’ agreement to submit memoranda in lieu of pre-trial implicated the threshold issue. By agreeing to that procedure, the City effectively waived its opportunity to present additional evidence at trial; it nonetheless failed to submit a memorandum. The City’s subsequent appeal, filed before the RTC ruled on its motion for reconsideration, extinguished any complaint of denial of opportunity to be heard. The dismissal therefore did not violate due process because the City had agreed to the procedure and then failed to avail itself of the agreed method for presenting its case on the threshold question.

Court’s Analysis — Compliance with R.A. 7279 Section 9 (Priorities)

Section 9 of R.A. 7279 prescribes an order of priority for acquiring lands for socialized housing: (a) government-owned lands; (b) alienable public domain lands; (c) unregistered/idle lands; (d) lands within declared priority/zonal improvement/slum improvement sites not yet acquired; (e) BLISS sites not yet acquired; and (f) privately-owned lands. The statute contains an exception permitting deviation where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to beneficiaries; however, the local government bears the burden of proving that the exception applies. The City asserted on-site development was more practicable because the occupants were long-time residents of the lots, but it produced no evidence to substantiate that factual claim. Without that proof, the City could not bypass the statutory priorities that place private lands last.

Court’s Analysis — Compliance with R.A. 7279 Section 10 (Modes of Acquisition) and Negotiation Requirement

Section 10 of R.A. 7279 lists preferred modes of acquiring land (community mortgage, land swapping, negotiated purchase, etc.) and conditions that expropriation should be used only after other modes are exhausted. The Court emphasized the policy against litigation as the first remedy and the statutory expectation that the government exhaust reasonable negotiation and other modes. Article 35 of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code specifically requires the local chief executive to call property owners to a conference if owners indicate willingness to sell at a higher price. Here, respondents rejected the P1,500.00 offer yet indicated openness to sale at a proper price, but the City made no further effort to renegotiate or show exhaustion of other modes. The City’s failure to make a bona fide effort to reach agreement rendered the expropriation filing premature and subject to dismissal.

Court’s Analysis — Genuine Necessity and Burden of Proof

Respondents directly contested the asserted public purpose, alleging the proposed taking would benefit only a few occupants. That affirmative defense raised a factual question going to the threshold stage. Because the parties agreed to submit memoranda rather than take evidence and the City did not file its memorandum or otherwise present evidence to prove public necessity, the Court found the City failed to establish the requisite showing that the taking was for a legitimate public use or benefit. The burden to prove genuine necessity rested on the City at the threshold stage, and it did not meet that burden.

Court’s Analysis — Deposit, Withdrawal, and Implied Consent

The Court distinguished between the advance deposit required to obtain a writ of possession and payment of just compensation. The deposit functions as (a) a pre-payment if expropriation succeeds and (b) indemnity for damages if the proceeding is dismissed. Withdrawal of such a deposit by respondents does not constitute implied consent to expropriation or a waiver of defenses. Because the complaint was dismissed, the deposit may be used to indemnify respondents for damages or returned to the City as appropriate. In this case respo

    ...continue reading

    Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
    Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.