G.R. No. 154614 - City of Iloilo vs. Legaspi

Case Summary (G.R. No. 154614)

Procedural and Factual Background

The Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Regulation Ordinance No. 2001-037 (7 March 2001) authorizing the mayor to institute expropriation proceedings over Lot No. 935 for on-site relocation and housing for the poor. A formal offer to purchase at P250.00 per square meter was sent (14 March 2001); negotiations ceased by letter dated 26 June 2001 after the owners’ counter-proposal was deemed unacceptable. The City filed an Amended Complaint for Eminent Domain (seeking condemnation of Lot No. 935). The heirs answered and raised special and affirmative defenses; the trial court initially set the case for preliminary hearing on those defenses, then set the case for pre-trial after counsel for the heirs withdrew the preliminary-hearing motion.

Motion for Writ of Possession and Trial-Court Orders

Petitioner deposited P2,809,696.50 with the court, representing fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value based on the property’s current tax declaration, and filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession (11 April 2002). The RTC issued an order (15 April 2002) giving the heirs ten days to oppose and indicating the court would resolve the motion for writ of possession after the plaintiff had rested its case. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (9 May 2002) arguing the writ issuance is ministerial upon compliance with Rule 67 and Section 19, RA 7160, citing Robern Development Corp. v. Quitain and related precedents. The trial judge denied reconsideration and held resolution of the writ in abeyance (5 June 2002). Petitioner sought certiorari and prohibition relief from the Supreme Court.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

The petition raised two principal allegations: (1) that the trial court gravely abused its discretion by denying the motion for reconsideration and by deferring resolution of the writ of possession despite petitioner’s compliance with statutory requisites, and (2) that the trial court effectively accepted respondents’ contention that the Amended Complaint was insufficient in form and substance, thereby withholding a ministerial writ of possession improperly.

Governing Law and Jurisprudential Principles

Under the 1987 Constitution and pertinent statutes, a local government unit may exercise eminent domain through its chief executive pursuant to ordinance, for public use and upon payment of just compensation. Section 19 of RA 7160 authorizes an LGU to take immediate possession upon filing expropriation proceedings and depositing at least fifteen percent (15%) of fair market value based on the current tax declaration, provided a valid, definite offer was previously made and not accepted. Rule 67, Section 1 prescribes the required contents of a verified complaint for eminent domain (right and purpose, property description, joinder of claimants); Section 2 addresses entry upon deposit. Precedent establishes that, upon compliance with the requisites (sufficient complaint and required provisional deposit), issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial and not contingent upon a hearing (Robern; Biglang‑awa; Bardillon; City of Manila v. Serrano).

Juridical Existence of Orders and Timeliness of Reconsideration

The Supreme Court reiterated the established rule that an order or judgment has no juridical existence until it is set in writing, signed, promulgated, and served. The 15‑day period to file a motion for reconsideration runs from receipt of the written order. Petitioner received the written 15 April 2002 order on 26 April 2002 and filed its motion for reconsideration on 9 May 2002, which the Court found timely.

Sufficiency in Form and Substance; Deposit Requirement

The Supreme Court determined the Amended Complaint was sufficient in form and substance under Rule 67, Section 1 and that the deposit of P2,809,696.50 represented the required fifteen percent (15%) under Section 19, RA 7160. The Court observed that the trial court’s own act of setting the case for pre‑trial and trial supported the conclusion that the pleading was adequate on its face. The Court emphasized that sufficiency for purposes of the writ is determined by examination of the complaint’s allegations rather than by a full evidentiary inquiry.

Requirement of Hearing on Socialized Housing Statutory Compliance

Respondents argued the complaint failed to demonstrate compliance with the mandatory requirements under RA 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act) governing acquisition for socialized housing. The Supreme Court held that while compliance with RA 7279’s specific prerequisites is a material issue, resolution of that question requires an evidentiary hearing. The Court distinguished the threshold determination for issuance of a writ of possession — which requires only a complaint sufficient

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 154614)

Citation and Procedural Posture

Reported at 486 Phil. 474, Second Division; G.R. No. 154614; decided November 25, 2004.
Petition: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order filed by the City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treaas.
Respondents: Hon. Judge Emilio Legaspi, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Iloilo City; private respondents are the heirs of Manuela Yusay, represented by Sylvia Yusay del Rosario and Enrique Yusay, Jr.
Relief sought in petition: nullification and/or modification of the RTC Branch 22 Order dated June 5, 2002 denying motion for reconsideration and holding in abeyance resolution of Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession until after petitioner shall have rested its case; also assails Order dated April 15, 2002 which had set procedure for resolution of the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession.

Factual Background

Property: Lot No. 935 (Cadastral Survey of Arevalo), area 85,320 square meters, covered by TCT No. T-67506, Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City.
Local ordinance authorization: Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Regulation Ordinance No. 2001-037 on March 7, 2001, granting authority to the City Mayor to institute expropriation proceedings; ordinance approved by then City Mayor Mansueto A. Malabor.
Offer to purchase: On March 14, 2001 Mayor Malabor formally offered to purchase Lot No. 935 at P250.00 per square meter, addressed to the heirs through Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del Rosario as Administratrix of the estate of Manuela Yusay, for the purpose of on-site relocation for poor and landless residents as part of the city housing development program.
Counter-proposal and termination of negotiations: By letter dated June 26, 2001 Mayor Malabor informed the administrators that their counter-proposal was not acceptable to the City Council and that expropriation should be filed per SP Resolution No. 01-445; with apparent refusal to sell, the City terminated further proceedings.
Commencement of expropriation: Petitioner (represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treaas) filed an Amended Complaint for Eminent Domain (Civil Case No. 01-26801) against the heirs of Manuela Yusay; pleadings exchanged included private respondents’ Answer (Sept. 25, 2001), petitioner’s Reply (Oct. 19, 2001).
Procedural motions before the RTC: Private respondents filed Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing on Special and Affirmative Defenses (Oct. 23, 2001); petitioner opposed; RTC Branch 22, Hon. Emilio B. Legaspi, in Order dated Feb. 4, 2002 found the motion meritorious and set the case for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses; petitioner moved for reconsideration of that Order.
Change in stance and pre-trial: On April 1, 2002 private respondents’ counsel manifested withdrawal of the Motion for Preliminary Hearing; public respondent set the case for Pre-Trial; petitioner did not object.
Motion for writ of possession and deposit: On April 11, 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging deposit with the Court of P2,809,696.50, representing fifteen percent (15%) of fair market value based on the current tax declaration, and invoking Section 19, R.A. No. 7160.
RTC Order of April 15, 2002: Public respondent ordered that Atty. Benedicto (counsel for private respondents) be given 10 days to file Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, with plaintiff given 10 days to file a reply; parties agreed the Court would resolve the Motion after the plaintiff shall have rested its case after trial on the merits.
Opposition and reply: Private respondents filed Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession; petitioner filed Reply.
Motion for Reconsideration: On May 9, 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 15 order, arguing no hearing necessary for issuance of writ once deposits and requisites are met, citing Robern Development Corp. v. Quitain and Salvador Biglang-Awa v. Bacalla.
RTC Order of June 5, 2002: The Motion for Reconsideration was denied and resolution of the Motion for Writ of Possession was held in abeyance until further orders of the Court.
Petition to the Supreme Court: Petitioner sought certiorari and prohibition to annul/modify the June 5 and April 15, 2002 orders.

Issues Presented by Petitioner

Whether the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by denying the Motion for Reconsideration and holding the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession to be resolved only after petitioner has rested its case despite Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and controlling jurisprudence (Robern Development Corp. and Biglang-Awa).
Whether the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion by effectively accepting private respondents’ contention that the Amended Complaint is insufficient in form and substance, thereby justifying withholding issuance of the writ of possession.

Arguments of Petitioner (as presented)

The Amended Complaint complies with Section 19, R.A. No. 7160 and Section 1, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; the court’s setting of Pre-Trial and hearing confirms sufficiency in form and substance.
Petitioner deposited P2,809,696.50 with the Regional Trial Court, equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of fair market value based on the current tax declaration, satisfying the deposit requirement.
Once requisites are satisfied, issuance of writ of possession is ministerial and no hearing is necessary; reliance on Robern Development Corp. v. Quitain and Biglang-Awa v. Bacalla.
Filstream cases and provisions of R.A. No. 7279 are not applicable; requirements under R.A. No. 7279 are not conditions precedent for exercise of eminent domain by an LGU under Section 19, R.A. No. 7160.
The Motion for Reconsideration was timely filed—15-day period counted from receipt of written order on April 26, 2002, not from oral pronouncement on April 15, 2002.
No estoppel or waiver: there is no statutory time limit for filing a motion for issuance of writ of possession; petitioner was not barred by lapse of time.

Arguments of Private Respondents (as presented)

The April 15, 2002 order, dictated in open court, was final (on April 30, 2002) when petitioner filed Motion for Reconsideration on May 9, 2002; thus petitioner’s motion was untimely.
Parties had agreed in court that resolution of the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession would be after petitioner rested its case; petitioner is estopped from reversing position.
Petitioner waived its right to immediate issuance of the writ because of delay (eight months and twelve days from filing of Amended Complaint; nine months and thirteen days from Original Complaint) before filing the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession.
A court hearing is necessary before issuance of the writ of possession because the Amended Complaint is assailed as insufficient in form and substance; issuance ceases to be ministerial if complaint fails to allege compliance with mandatory requirements for exercise of eminent domain for socialize