Title
City of Cagayan De Oro vs. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc.
Case
G.R. No. 224825
Decision Date
Oct 17, 2018
Cagayan de Oro imposed a P500 annual fee per utility pole; CEPALCO challenged it as excessive. SC upheld the ordinance, ruling it a valid regulatory fee, not a tax, and not unreasonable.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 224825)

Petitioner

City of Cagayan de Oro

Respondent

Cagayan Electric Power & Light Co., Inc. (CEPALCO)

Key Dates

• January 24, 2005 – Enactment of Ordinance No. 9527-2005 imposing a P500 annual fee per utility pole.
• February 8, 2008 – Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismisses CEPALCO’s petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
• June 10, 2015 – Court of Appeals (CA) reverses the RTC and declares the ordinance void as unreasonable and exorbitant.
• October 17, 2018 – Supreme Court issues its decision on petition for review.

Applicable Law

• 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article X, Section 5 (Local Autonomy)
• Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code), particularly Sections 130, 147, 151, 186, and 187
• Relevant jurisprudence on regulatory fees versus taxes (Smart Communications, Morcoin) and the presumption of validity (Balacuit, Laguio, Victorias Milling)

Factual Background

Ordinance No. 9527-2005 imposed a P500 per-post annual fee on electric and telecommunication poles within city streets. CEPALCO estimated an annual liability of P8.5 million. It filed a declaratory relief petition before the RTC, alleging that the fee was unjust, excessive, oppressive, and in conflict with its legislative franchise. The RTC dismissed the petition for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies under Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The CA reversed, declaring the ordinance void for lacking a disclosed basis for the P500 rate and for being confiscatory, and it excused CEPALCO from the exhaustion requirement.

Classification as a Regulatory Fee

Under the Local Government Code, a “fee” is charged for regulation or inspection, whereas a “tax” is imposed primarily to raise revenue. The Supreme Court examined the ordinance’s whereas clauses, which expressly cite hazard prevention and skyline regulation as the motivating purposes. It held that the primary objective is police power regulation, characterizing the exaction as a regulatory fee rather than a tax or revenue measure.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Section 187 requires prior appeal to the Secretary of Justice only for tax ordinances or revenue measures. Because the Mayor’s Permit Fee is regulatory in nature, the exhaustion doctrine does not apply. Direct recourse to the courts is permissible, and the RTC erred in dismissing the petition on exhaustion grounds.

Presumption of Validity and Burden of Proof

Ordinances enjoy a presumption of validity, owing deference to the legislative body’s judgment. A challenger must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to law, or unreasonable. In the absence of facial invalidity, proof of substantive infirmity is required.

Substantive Reasonableness of the Fee

Sections 130(b)(3) and 186 of the Local Government Code prohibit fees that are unjust,

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster—building context before diving into full texts.