Title
City of Baguio vs. Nino
Case
G.R. No. 161811
Decision Date
Apr 12, 2006
Awarded land dispute: Narcisa Placino vs. Francisco NiAo. Court ruled demolition requires special court order; DENR lacks authority. Supreme Court upheld due process, affirming Court of Appeals' decision.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 161811)

Bureau of Lands Award and Finality of the Administrative Ruling

On May 13, 1966, the Bureau of Lands awarded the subject parcel, identified as Lot No. 10, to Narcisa A. Placino. Francisco Nino, who was occupying the lot, challenged the award by filing a Petition Protest on December 23, 1975 before the Bureau of Lands. The Director of Lands dismissed the Petition Protest through an Order dated November 11, 1976.

Nino appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court, but he did not obtain relief. With the Director of Lands’ decision dated November 11, 1976 becoming final and executory, the administrative enforcement phase proceeded upon Narcisa’s petition.

Order of Execution and Failed Enforcement Attempts

After finality, the then Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Cordillera Autonomous Region (DENR-CAR) issued an Order of Execution dated February 1, 1993. The order directed the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Officer to enforce the final decision by ordering Nino and those acting for him to refrain from continuously occupying the area and to remove whatever improvements they had introduced.

Attempts to enforce the February 1, 1993 Order of Execution failed. Narcisa then filed a complaint for ejectment before the Baguio City Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). The MTCC dismissed the ejectment complaint by Order dated August 7, 1996.

In response to the continued failure of enforcement, Narcisa’s counsel, Atty. Edilberto Claravall, sought the issuance of a special order from the DENR-CAR to authorize demolition or removal of Nino’s improvements through the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and a demolition team. The DENR-CAR denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and it invoked Rule 39, Sec. 14 (now Sec. 10(d)).

Amendment of the Order of Execution

Atty. Claravall then moved to amend the previously issued Order of Execution, and the DENR-CAR granted the motion. The amended order specifically addressed enforcement with assistance upon request from the City Sheriff of Baguio, the Demolition Team of Baguio City, and the Baguio City Police Station, while ordering Nino and those acting for him to refrain from occupying the area and to remove the improvements.

Despite the amendment, the DENR-CENRO, together with the Demolition Team and the Baguio City police, desisted in an earlier attempt to enforce the amended order.

Demolition Operation and the Filing of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition

On July 16, 1997, the demolition team headed by Engineer Orlando Genove and the Baguio City Police began demolishing the houses of Nino and his co-respondents. The demolition was carried out on orders of then Baguio City Police Officer-In-Charge (OIC) Donato Bacquian. The demolition was temporarily stopped when instructed by DENR-CENR Officer Guillermo Fianza, who later advised Nino that the DENR-CENRO would implement the amended Order of Execution on August 4, 1997.

Nino and his wife filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. They named Guillermo Fianza, Teofilo Olimpo of DENR-CENR, Mayor Mauricio Domogan, Atty. Claravall, Engineer Orlando Genove, Rolando Angara, and Police Officer Donato Bacquian as respondents, and they challenged the Amended Order of Execution.

The spouses later filed an Amended Petition, impleading Emmanuel Nino and Eurlie Ocampo as co-petitioners, and adding the City of Baguio and Narcisa as additional respondents, while also praying for damages.

RTC Dismissal and Court of Appeals Review

The RTC, Branch 6, dismissed the petition of Nino and the co-petitioners for lack of merit. After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, respondents filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 before the Court of Appeals.

By Decision dated December 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. It ruled that Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 applied. The appellate court found that under Sec. 10(d), when the property subject of execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer could not destroy, demolish, or remove those improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing, and after the former failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.

The Court of Appeals consequently set aside the challenged orders and directed the city officials and demolition authorities to cease and desist from enforcing the amended Order of Execution concerning demolition of respondents’ structures until private respondent applied for the required special court order.

Motions for Reconsideration and Issues Raised to the Supreme Court

Respondents filed an ex parte motion for reconsideration, asserting that some prayed reliefs were left unacted upon. Petitioners also filed a motion for reconsideration raising, among others, the claim that the Court of Appeals misapplied Sec. 10(d), Rule 39, and that it erred in giving due course to the petition for review.

Notably, petitioners raised before the Court of Appeals only for the first time in the motion for reconsideration the alleged authority of the City Mayor under Sec. 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code of 1991, in relation to the National Building Code of the Philippines, arguing that the Mayor could order demolition without a special court order when structures were illegally constructed without building permits.

The Court of Appeals denied both motions for reconsideration by Resolution dated December 17, 2003. Petitioners then came to the Supreme Court, assigning error in the Court of Appeals’ ruling that a special court order was needed for demolition, in applying Sec. 10(d), Rule 39, and in entertaining respondents’ Rule 42 petition.

Supreme Court’s Disposition: Dismissal of the Petition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision and resolution. Although the Court recognized that respondents’ appeal to the Court of Appeals had been erroneously brought under Rule 42 instead of Rule 41, it did not dismiss the appeal on that technical ground. The Court deemed the error inconsequential in light of the merits of respondents’ case, consistent with the doctrine that technicalities should not prevent the equitable and complete resolution of parties’ rights and obligations.

Legal Basis and Reasoning: Due Process and the Requirement of a Special Court Order

On the merits, the Supreme Court held that petitioners’ contention that enforcement of the Amended Order of Execution did not require a hearing or a special court order did not persuade. The Court emphasized that the fact that an administrative agency with quasi-judicial functions issued the Amended Order of Execution was immaterial. The Court reasoned that Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 reflects the constitutional command that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and it protects persons against summary destruction of property improvements without the procedural safeguards embodied in Sec. 10(d).

The Court further explained that neither the Bureau of Lands nor the DENR had an explicit statutory authority to issue an order of demolition in the nature of what the amended order effectively directed. It distinguished the Bureau of Lands’ power, which is mainly confined to determining rights of rival claimants and disposing of public lands, from the courts’ role in resolving conflicts of physical possession and in quelling disturbances involving occupants. The Court stressed that the Bureau of Lands lacked the wherewithal to police public lands and prevent breaches of peace among occupants.

In line with this framework, the Court reiterated the controlling principle that the power to order a sheriff to remove improvements and turn over possession belongs to the courts of justice and not the Bureau of Lands. Thus, the enforcement mechanism could not circumvent the requirement of special court authority contemplated by Sec. 10(d) for demolition or removal of improvements introduced by the judgm

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