Title
Chua vs. People
Case
G.R. No. 196853
Decision Date
Jul 13, 2015
Robert Chua acquitted of 54 BP 22 violations due to lack of proof of notice receipt; civil liability for dishonored checks upheld.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 196853)

Key Dates and Documentary Evidence

Relevant time frame: checks were issued from September 24, 1993 to December 25, 1993 (54 checks in all).
Two demand letters are central: a demand letter dated December 10, 1993 (attached to the complaint as a photocopy) and a demand letter dated November 30, 1993 (later introduced into the record as Exhibit “SSS”). The November 30 letter bears Chua’s signature but contains no date of receipt notation.

Applicable Law and Legal Standards

Primary statute: Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), particularly Section 2 establishing a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds if a maker/ drawer receives written notice of dishonor and then fails within five banking days to pay or make arrangements.
Rules on new evidence/new trial: Rule 37, Section 1(b) and Rule 121, Section 2(b) of the Rules of Court (requirements for newly discovered evidence).
Burden and quantum of proof in criminal BP 22 cases: prosecution must prove elements beyond reasonable doubt; notice of dishonor and actual receipt must be clearly proven.

Factual Background — Checks, Dishonor and Complaint

Chua and See had a rediscounting arrangement: Chua issued 54 postdated PSBank checks in 1992–1993 for various amounts. When See deposited them, many were dishonored for insufficient funds or closed account. See sent demand(s) and, after failed demands, filed a criminal complaint under BP 22 on December 23, 1993, attaching a December 10, 1993 demand letter (photocopy).

Proceedings and Evidentiary Timeline at Trial

The prosecution formally offered the December 10, 1993 demand letter (photocopy) as evidence. Chua objected, alleging it was a photocopy and lacking proof of receipt. Chua moved for submission of demurrer to evidence in April 1999. The prosecution later filed (March 28, 2003) a motion to re‑open and to submit additional evidence, stating See had located an original demand letter dated November 30, 1993 (allegedly personally served on Chua) in February 2002. The MeTC initially refused a supplemental offer filed by the private prosecutor without conformity of the public prosecutor, but the November 30, 1993 letter nevertheless entered the record as Exhibit “SSS.”

Defense Assertions and Demurrer to Evidence

The defense consistently argued: (1) the December 10, 1993 letter attached to the complaint was only a photocopy and lacked registry proof or proof of receipt; (2) the November 30, 1993 letter, although bearing Chua’s signature, lacked any notation of the date of actual receipt and could not support reckoning the five‑banking‑day period; (3) the November 30 letter might have been fabricated or a later intercalation on paper that Chua had signed for another purpose; and (4) the November 30 letter was not newly discovered evidence since it could have been located earlier with due diligence.

MeTC and RTC Findings on Receipt and Stipulation

The MeTC convicted Chua of all 54 counts, reasoning that the prosecution proved personal service and receipt of a written notice of dishonor and that the defense had stipulated in open court to the existence of the demand letter and Chua’s signature thereon, estopping Chua from denying receipt. The MeTC also presumed that the date on the demand letter equated to the date of receipt. The RTC affirmed, relying on the November 30, 1993 letter (Exhibit “SSS”) and the defense counsel’s earlier stipulation that the document and signature existed.

Court of Appeals Ruling

The CA affirmed the RTC and MeTC rulings. It rejected Chua’s contention that the November 30, 1993 letter was fabricated or that the defense counsel was tricked into stipulating. The CA emphasized that stipulations validly entered are conclusive unless set aside for fraud, duress, collusion, or similar grounds, and it found no such grounds. The CA therefore concluded that all elements of BP 22 were established.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

  1. Whether the lower courts correctly applied the presumption of knowledge (Section 2, BP 22) by treating the date of the November 30, 1993 letter as the date of receipt for reckoning the five‑banking‑day period; and
  2. Whether the November 30, 1993 demand letter constituted newly discovered evidence that could be admitted belatedly.

Parties’ Arguments before the Supreme Court

Petitioner Chua: the prosecution failed to prove the crucial element of knowledge because there was no proof of the date Chua actually received the November 30 letter; without a date of receipt there is no way to reckon the five‑day period and the Section 2 presumption cannot arise. Chua also argued the November 30 letter was not newly discovered and could have been found earlier with due diligence.
Respondent (OSG): the issues were factual and thus not proper in a certiorari petition; lower courts’ findings on receipt and newly discovered evidence should be accorded full faith and credence.

Supreme Court’s Legal Characterization and Standard of Review

The Supreme Court treated the raised issues as questions of law because the underlying fact (absence of date of receipt) was undisputed and the legal consequence—whether the Section 2 presumption may be invoked—could be resolved without re‑weighing credibility. The Court noted that, even if presented as factual issues, exceptions permit review where material facts were overlooked and would materially affect the outcome.

Supreme Court Analysis of Element of Knowledge under BP 22

The Court reiterated the three essential elements of BP 22 and stressed that the second element—knowledge of insufficient funds at issuance—is the most difficult to prove and depends on Section 2’s presumption. That presumption arises only after proof that the issuer actually received written notice of dishonor and then failed within five banking days to pay or arrange payment. The Court held the prosecution bore the burden to prove actual receipt beyond reasonable doubt and that mere presentation of a dated demand letter without proof of date of receipt is insufficient.

Stipulation’s Limited Effect and the Requirement of Proof of Receipt

The Supreme Court distinguished the limited scope of the defense counsel’s stipulation — it related only to the existence of the document and the presence of Chua’s signature, not to Chua’s receipt of the notice or to acceptance of the document’s contents. The Court held that a stipulation to the document’s physical existence does not equate to an admission of actual receipt; therefore Chua was not estopped from denying receipt and the lower courts erred in treating the stipulation as conclusive on receipt.

Newly Discovered Evidence Analysis and Due Diligence

Applying the Rules of Court criteria for newly discovered evidence (discovery after trial; could not have been produced with reasonable diligence; materiality), the Court found the November 30, 1993 letter did not qualify. See’s own affidavit stated he knew of the letter’s existence at the time of filing the complaint and apparently kept it in his house; had he exercised reasonable diligence the letter could have been located and produced during trial. The late production suggested an afterthought designed to fill evidentiary gaps rather than genuinely new evidence.

Additiona

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