Title
Choa vs. Choa
Case
G.R. No. 143376
Decision Date
Nov 26, 2002
Marriage nullity case: Respondent alleged petitioner's psychological incapacity; SC ruled evidence insufficient, reversed CA, dismissed case due to grave abuse of discretion.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 143376)

Key Dates and Procedural Milestones

Marriage: March 15, 1981; two children born of the union. Complaint for annulment filed October 27, 1993; Amended Complaint (psychological incapacity) filed November 8, 1993; respondent presented evidence and filed Formal Offer of Exhibits February 20, 1998; petitioner filed Demurrer to Evidence May 11, 1998; RTC denied demurrer by Order dated December 2, 1998; RTC denied motion for reconsideration March 22, 1999; petitioner sought relief from the CA (CA-GR SP No. 53100) which dismissed the petition as interlocutory and denied relief; petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari.

Issues Presented

(1) Whether a denial of a demurrer to evidence is properly subject to an extraordinary remedy of certiorari (Rule 65) instead of requiring the defendant to present evidence and await final appeal. (2) Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer by ignoring or misapplying governing jurisprudence on psychological incapacity (notably Molina and Santos).

Legal Standards on Availability of Certiorari

Interlocutory orders are generally not appealable, yet Rule 41 expressly permits a special civil action under Rule 65 where no appeal lies and the order is tainted by lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The Court reiterates established exceptions: where an interlocutory order is patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, certiorari may lie (citing Tadeo, Cruz, and provisions of Rules 41 and 65 as applied). Thus, a denial of a demurrer to evidence may be assailed by certiorari when the denial is shown to be tainted by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and where appeal would not be a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.

Nature and Standard of Review for a Demurrer to Evidence

A demurrer to evidence challenges the sufficiency in law of the opposing party’s evidence to sustain the case — i.e., whether the plaintiff has produced competent or sufficient proof to support a verdict. When reviewing a demurrer, the court asks whether plaintiff’s evidence, taken as true, is sufficient in law to make out the plaintiff’s case. If the evidence is “utterly and patently insufficient,” it is capricious to force the defendant to present evidence to refute a nonexisting case. The demurrer should be granted where proceeding would needlessly delay and effectively deny justice.

Governing Doctrine on Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 requires demonstration of “psychological incapacity” that, as explained in Santos and Molina, must be characterized by three elements: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The Court emphasized that psychological incapacity is not satisfied by mere immaturity, difficulty, neglect, refusal, or ordinary personality conflicts; it refers to serious personality disorders that render a party truly incapable of understanding or fulfilling essential marital obligations. The illness must be shown to exist at the time of marriage (natal or supervening disabling factor) and must be more than emotional outbursts or incompatibility.

Application to the Plaintiff’s Non-Expert and Documentary Evidence

The Court examined the evidence offered by respondent and found it legally insufficient. The fact that petitioner filed various criminal or administrative charges (perjury, false testimony, concubinage, deportation-related actions) against respondent does not, standing alone, establish psychological incapacity. The documents only prove the prosecution of said charges; they do not demonstrate a disabling psychological condition. It would be erroneous and inequitable to equate the filing of complaints with incapacity to perform marital obligations.

Respondent’s own testimony likewise failed to prove the required elements. His testimony depicted complaints of petitioner’s alleged lack of household help, alleged neglect of children, immaturity, insistence on constant visits, and claimed lack of intention of procreative sexuality. The Court held that these traits—either singly or together—do not meet the legal standard of psychological incapacity as articulated in Santos and Molina. The evidence showed incompatibility and ordinary marital difficulties, not the grave, antecedent, incurable incapacity contemplated by Article 36.

Evaluation of Expert Testimony (Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon)

The Court found the purported expert testimony unreliable and insufficient. Dr. Gauzon’s opinion (that both parties were “normal” but incompatible and that therapy might reconcile them) did not identify a root cause constituting a grave, juridically antecedent, or incurable psychological disorder. Crucially, the expert did not conduct any personal psychological examination of petitioner; his conclusions were primarily based on respondent’s descriptions and review of transcripts. The professional opinion expressly prefaced itself with qualifications (“if what Al

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.